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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Macroeconomics
by
Sangmin Aum
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2018
Professor Yongseok Shin, Chair
My dissertation investigates how technological progress shapes economy. Technological
changes have heterogeneous effects on economic agents as they are often biased toward
certain tasks or sectoral activities. The dissertation aims at understanding the sources of
heterogeneity and their impacts on aggregate outcomes, focusing on economic growth and
labor allocation.
The first chapter investigates a bi-directional relation between technology and occupational
structure (job allocation). Jobs have polarized in the U.S. since at least the 1980s, but the
growth of high-skill jobs has been stagnated since 2000s (skill demand reversal). I document
that software innovation has increased compared to equipment innovation and relate this
changes in the direction of innovation to the skill demand reversal, based on a novel empirical
observation: The intensity of software- and equipment-use by occupation represents the
cognitive- and routine-task intensity, respectively. I then propose a general equilibrium model
that endogenously explains both employment share and software innovation trends. The
productivity growth in the equipment-producing sector replaces the middle-skill occupations
which use equipment more intensively. Thus the demand for equipment declines, resulting in
more software innovation than equipment innovation. This, in turn, leads to a skill demand
xi
reversal by enhancing the productivity of high-skill occupations. Quantitative analysis shows
that the model explains approximately 70 to 80% of the rise in software and skill demand
reversal in the data.
The second chapter, joint work with Tim Lee and Yongseok Shin, investigates the role
of differential productivity growth across jobs (routinization) and industries to explain a
slowdown in aggregate growth in the U.S. since the 2000s. In the model, complementarity
across jobs and industries in production leads to aggregate productivity slowdowns, as the
relative size of those jobs and industries with high productivity growth shrinks. We find
that this effect was countervailed by the evolution of computer industry: Its productivity
growth was extraordinarily high during the 1980s and 1990s and, at the same time, computer
output became an increasingly more important input in production across all industries
(computerization). It was only as the productivity growth in the computer industry slowed
down in the 2000s that the negative effect of differential productivity growth across jobs
became apparent for aggregate productivity.
In the third chapter, Dongya Koh, Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis, and I document a rise of
intellectual property products (IPP) captured by up-to-date national accounts in 31 OECD
countries. These countries gradually adopt the new system of national accounts (SNA2008)
that capitalizes IPP—which was previously treated as an intermediate expense in the pre-
SNA1993 accounting framework. We examine how the capitalization of IPP affects stylized
growth facts and the big ratios (Kaldor, 1957; Jones, 2016). We find that the capitalization
of IPP generates (a) a decline of the accounting labor share, (b) an increase in the capital-to-
output ratio across time, and (c) an increase in the rate of return to capital across time. The
key accounting assumption behind the IPP capitalization implemented by national accounts is
that the share of IPP rents that are attributed to capital, χ, is equal to one. That is, national
accounts assume that IPP rents are entirely owed to capital. We argue that this assumption
xii
is arbitrary and extreme. More reasonable assumptions about the split of IPP rents between
capital and labor—for example, based on the cost structure of R&D—generate a secularly
trendless labor share, a constant capital-to-output ratio, and a constant rate of return across
time. We discuss the implications of these new measures of IPP capital—conditional on
χ—for cross-country income per capita differences using standard development and growth
accounting exercises.
xiii
Chapter 1
The Rise of Software and Skill
Demand Reversal
1.1 Introduction
The employment shares of high- and low-skill occupations grew relative to that of middle-skill
occupations in the United States since at least the 1980s. While many studies have focused
on the long-run trend of this process of job polarization, less attention has been given to its
shorter-run dynamics. When broken down decade-to-decade, the rise of high- and low-skill
occupations has shown distinct patterns: The rise of high-skill occupations has stagnated,
while that of low-skill occupations has accelerated since the late 1990s. We will refer to this
phenomena as skill demand reversal following Beaudry et al. (2016) (figure 1.2).
This paper provides a technology-based explanation for skill demand reversal. We first
document that skill demand reversal was accompanied higher growth in software innovation
relative to other types of innovation (figure 1.4), and argue that this change in the direction
1
of innovation was closely related to changes in the occupational structure of the U.S. economy.
This is done by combining two datasets—the National Income and Product Account (NIPA)
and O*NET Tools and Technology Database. The newly merged dataset shows that the
average amount of investments in software and/or equipment by occupation are strongly linked
to the tasks of each occupation. Namely, software is used intensively by cognitive (high-skill)
occupations, while equipment is used intensively by routine (middle-skill) occupations.
We then provide a unified framework that can explain both skill demand reversal and
the rise of software relative to equipment endogenously. The model has three novel features.
First, the model features workers of heterogeneous skill sorting into heterogeneous tasks, and
also different types of capital (software and equipment). Second, technological changes in the
model are embodied into different types of capital, and innovators endogenously choose which
type of technology (or capital) to improve. These two features enable us to simultaneously
analyze the static and dynamic implications of interactions between technology and the
labor market. Last but not least, technological changes (embodied in different types of
capital) alter job allocations because all workers use both types of capital, but with different
intensities depending on their occupations. This departs from the typical assumption that
only particular kinds of occupations are affected by a specific type of technical change, and
also implies that impact of one type of technological change on the labor market can change
the subsequent direction of technological change.
In the model, the intensities at which each occupation use software and equipment can be
measured directly from the newly merged dataset mentioned above. Equipment and software
are modeled as a composite of infinitesimal varieties provided by innovators who are free
to choose a type of capital to innovate, so the amount of innovation toward each type of
capital can also be directly mapped into capital investment data in the National Accounts,
facilitating quantification of the model.
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After characterizing the equilibrium, we prove a series of comparative statics in response
to one exogenous change: an increase in the productivity of the equipment-producing sector.1
Increased productivity in equipment production lowers the price of equipment, which leads to
job polarization if different occupations are complementary in production. Since middle-skill
occupations use equipment most intensively, labor flows out from these jobs and into high-
and low-skill jobs. But the decline in middle-skill employment also means that the demand
for equipment declines, inducing innovators to shift their focus away from equipment and
more toward enhancing software. In turn, the rise of software leads to skill demand reversal
if jobs are complementary: Middle-skills jobs were already declining (job-polarization), the
employment share of high-skill jobs decelerates since they use software most intensively, and
consequently skill demand becomes concentrated in low-skill jobs.
We verify the empirical validity of the model’s mechanism using the fact that the decline
in the relative price of equipment to software varies across industries. The model predicts: i)
A negative relationship between the speed of decline in the relative price of equipment to
software and the growth of middle-skill employment relative to high-skill employment; and
ii) A positive correlation between the speed of decline in the relative price of equipment to
software and the relative growth of software innovation to R&D other than software. We
confirm significant correlations in both cases.
Confident of the mechanism, we use the model directly to quantify its importance. Our
quantitative analysis shows that the channel of directed technical change can account for more
than two-thirds of the rise of software and skill demand reversal. The former is measured by
the relative size of software investment to equipment investment, and the latter is measured
by a gap between the actual series and the level implied by the linear trend of the 1980s.
1We also document a faster increase in the productivity of the equipment-producing sector in the data.
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The results have two important implications. First, software and equipment capital
measured in the National Accounts is a good proxy for the technological changes shaping
the structure of the labor market. Since technological changes have significant impacts on
many economic variables, careful investigation of the composition of capital investment can
be fruitful in understanding economic phenomena other than job polarization as well.
Second, a technological change that directly affects a particular group of occupations
could lead to other types of technological change that eventually affect other occupations.
Hence, innovation policy targeting a specific group of products may have to consider this
dynamic general equilibrium effect. This paper also shows that recent technical changes
reduce cognitive intensive occupations as long as those occupations use software intensively.
Moreover, while not explicitly analyzed here, changes in the demand for high-skill occupations
will also change the expected returns to skill acquisition, consequently altering individuals’
education decisions and labor supply.
Related Literature The relationship between polarization and increases in the productiv-
ity of middle-skilled occupations, which are intensive with respect to routine tasks, is well
documented in the literature (e.g., Autor et al., 2006; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Goos et al., 2014,
among others). Though fewer, there are also studies that have discussed the flattening of
the demand for high-skilled workers around 2000, such as Beaudry et al. (2016) and Valletta
(2016). This paper contributes to this literature by analyzing both polarization and skill
demand reversal in a unified framework, and extends it by linking labor market phenomena
to changes in the composition of capital investment.
Several papers analyze the consequences of task-specific technological change on the labor
market with an assignment model (Costinot and Vogel, 2010; Lee and Shin, 2017; Michelacci
and Pijoan-Mas, 2016; Stokey, 2016; Cheng, 2017, among others). We include a similar
4
assignment feature, but characterize tasks by their different uses of two types of capital, and
also introduce endogenous task-specific technological change generated from innovations on
each type of capital. By doing so, we obtain a direct mapping of two distinctive task-specific
technological changes to observed data.2 Also, we explain why a particular type of technology
may or may not change.
Recent studies by Bárány and Siegel (forthcoming) and Lee and Shin (2017) show that
either task-specific technological change or sector-specific technological change can lead to
both job polarization and structural change. Since a single type of technological change can
result in both phenomena, it is not easy to conclude whether the source of technological
change has been task- or sector-specific. Our paper implies that the technological change
embodied in a particular type of capital could be a source of task-specific technological change
that can generate both phenomena.
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016) and Hémous and Olsen (2016) also analyze the interaction
between technological change and the labor market with the directed technical change
framework of Acemoglu (2002). While they provide new insights on how automated technology
evolves and affects labor market outcomes, the interpretation of the technology with respect
to the observable data is not straightforward. Our technological changes are directly measured
from investment in software and equipment in the National Accounts, so the changes are
easy to interpret. Our tasks also have a clear interpretation as they are mapped directly to
different occupations in the data.
2Cheng (2017) also obtains the routine-biased technological change from the data by measuring different
capital intensities across occupations. Different from ours, Cheng (2017) measures the capital intensities across
occupations from industry level capital share and the variations in the composition of occupations across
industries, and confirms that the middle-skill occupations are capital intensive. Summing the equipment
and software, our dataset also shows that the total capital is intensively used in the middle jobs. We show,
however, that the distinction between equipment and software is important as the software is not used
intensively by the middle jobs.
5
A seminal paper by Krusell et al. (2000) links changes in the price of equipment capital to
skill-biased technical change to analyze the effects of technological change on labor market
outcomes. They emphasize that skill-capital complementarity (capital substitutes low-skill
labor more than high-skill labor) is key to understanding how a rise in the productivity of
capital leads to higher demand for high-skill workers. In contrast to Krusell et al. (2000), in
our model, the substitutability between labor and capital is same across occupations. Instead,
we assume that occupations vary in how intensively they use different types of capital, and
that the occupations are complementary to one another.
The work by Krusell et al. (2000) and our paper do not contradict each other, as the worker
classifications are essentially different.3 They classify workers by education, and we classify
workers by occupation. Low-educated workers may well be able to do what high-educated
workers usually do (though less efficiently), whereas workers in certain occupations may not
be able to do what workers of other occupations usually do. Indeed, recent papers such as
Goos et al. (2014) and Lee and Shin (2017) highlight complementarity between tasks as a
key to understanding task-level employment changes (i.e., polarization). In this regard, our
paper complements Krusell et al. (2000) by linking capital to task-based employment.
Another important feature of this paper is distinguishing software capital from equipment
capital. Software investment is becoming increasingly important, as evidenced by its rapid
rise as a share of total investment. Aum et al. (2017) analyzes the role of computer capital
(hardware and software) in shaping the dynamics of aggregate productivity. Koh et al. (2018)
emphasizes the importance of software capital (more broadly, intellectual property products
capital) in accounting for the declining labor share in the US. Whereas their analysis focuses
on the relation between total labor and capital, we emphasize the separate roles of software
and other types of investment in shaping the distribution of occupational demand. Though
3They also classify workers into two types, while we consider more.
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not a primary focus of this paper, our model also generates a decline in the labor share
caused by higher software investment, and we also show that there is a significant correlation
between labor share declines and software intensity at the industry-level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2, we summarize the relevant
empirical facts. In section 1.3, we present the model and characterize its equilibrium. In
section 1.4, we conduct analytical comparative statics and in section 1.5, verify that the
model’s predictions hold empirically across industries. In section 1.6, we calibrate the model
to quantify how important its mechanism is for accounting for the rise of software and skill
demand reversal. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Key Facts
We document several data observations in this section. First, equipment-producing industries
have experienced much faster TFP growth than that of software-producing industries. Second,
the pattern of polarization shows that the rise of high-skill occupations slowed with a greater
increase in low-skill occupations since the late 1990s. Third, software development expendi-
tures have increased relative to other R&D expenditures. Meanwhile, a share of software
investment in total investment has also increased whereas that of equipment investment has
decreased. Fourth, most importantly, we show that middle-skill occupations use equipment
intensively, whereas high-skill occupations use software intensively. Moreover, the intensity
of equipment and software across tasks is closely correlated with routine task intensity and
cognitive task intensity. Again, our main hypothesis is that the first observation – together
with the fourth observation – can generate both the second and the third observations.
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1.2.1 Productivity of Equipment / Software Production
The input-output table published by BEA reports the industrial composition of equipment
and intellectual property products (IPP) investment, where the IPP investment consists of
software, R&D, and others. From the table, we can obtain the weights on detailed industries
producing equipment and software investment goods. On the basis of these weights, we
compute the total factor productivity (TFP) of equipment- and software-producing industries
according to the Törnqvist index.
Using Industry Accounts from BEA, we first compute an industry i’s TFP growth between
time u and t as
log(TFPi,t/TFPi,u) = log(yi,t/yi,u)− αi,t + αi,u
2
log(ki,t/ki,u),
where y is the real value added per employment, k is the real non-residential capital divided
by the number of employment, and α is one minus the labor share.
From the input-output table of each year (t), we obtain the share of each industry
commodity in equipment investment (ωei,t) and software investment (ω
s
i,t). Then, the TFPs of
the equipment- and software-producing industries are computed by
log(TFPe,t/TFPe,t−1) =
∑
i
ωei,t + ω
e
i,t−1
2
log(TFPi,t/TFPi,t−1),
log(TFPs,t/TFPs,t−1) =
∑
i
ωsi,t + ω
s
i,t−1
2
log(TFPi,t/TFPi,t−1).
The results are presented in figure 1.1, which shows that equipment-producing sector has
experienced much faster increase in the productivity than software-producing sector.
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Figure 1.1: TFP of equipment / software producing industries
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1.2.2 The Pattern of Job Polarization
Figure 1.2 shows the changes in employment share across skill percentile by decade from
1980, computed from Census/ACS data. Each point in the skill percentile represents a group
of occupations representing 1% of the labor supply in 1980, sorted by average log hourly
wage in 1979.
The figure shows clear U-shaped changes in employment share from 1980 to 2010. By
assessing the three lines separately, however, we see that the rise in high-skill occupations
is strongest in the first two decades while that of low-skill occupations accelerates during
2000-2010. Moreover, the range of shrinking occupations shifts toward the right across
decades.
Similar observations are also in the annual data from CPS when occupations are classified
into three groups: cognitive (high-skill), routine (middle-skill), and manual (low-skill)4. We
4The classification of occupations is based on one-digit SOC. The cognitive occupations are management,
professionals, and technicians. The routine occupations are machine operators, transportation, sales and
office, mechanics, and miners and production.
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Figure 1.2: Changes in employment structure in the US by decade
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Note: Each point on the horizontal axis is a group of occupations composing 1%
of total employment in 1980, sorted by 1979 average log wage.
compare two different trends – a linear trend from 1980 to 1995 and an HP trend including
all data points – of the employment share of each occupational group. Figure 1.3 confirms
that there are breaks in the trends of employment shares of cognitive (high-skill) occupations
and manual (low-skill) occupations in the late 1990s. Interestingly, the decline in routine
(middle-skill) occupations follows similar trends before and after 1995.
1.2.3 Rising Software Innovation and Investment
We now turn to the R&D composition in the US. NIPA does not report expenditures on
software development directly but the series can be obtained from Crawford et al. (2014) or
from differences between R&D in NIPA excluding software development and R&D recorded
in the innovation satellite account which includes software development. Figure 1.4 shows the
size of software development relative to R&D expenditures from manufacturing industries,
10
Figure 1.3: Employment share of cognitive, routine, and low-skill services occupations
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(b) Routine (middle-skill)
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(c) Manual (low-skill)
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Note: 1) Cognitive occupations are management, professionals, and technicians.
Routine occupations include office and sales, transportation, machine operators,
mechanics, construction and production workers.
2) The blue line is the linear trend of 1990 to 1995, and the red (dash) line is the
HP trend with smoothing parameter 100. All vertical axes represent 15%p of the
range.
with and without chemical-related R&D’s 5, across years. Both show an increasing pattern,
especially during the late 1990s, suggesting that the changes in the pattern of polarization
could be related to increasing software innovation.
5We view R&D expenditures funded by manufacturing industries except chemicals-related industries as
the expenditures most related to R&Ds on equipment.
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Another observation to note is that software investment, as well as software innovation,
has also increased faster than other types of investment. From NIPA, we compute the share
of software investment and equipment investment of total non-residential investment and
plot the results in figure 1.5. Figure 1.5a shows an increasing trend of software investment
while figure 1.5b shows a decreasing trend of equipment investment. Moreover, the downward
trend of equipment share has accelerated since the mid-1990s.
Figure 1.4: Software innovation compared to equipment related R&D1)
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Note: 1) R&D expenditures funded by manufacturing industries excluding chemical-
related industries.
2) The blue line is the linear trend of 1990 to 1995, and the red (dash) line is the
HP trend with smoothing parameter 100.
1.2.4 Capital Use by Occupation
We provide data evidence that documents strong connections between the use of different
types of capital across occupations. Specifically, we construct capital use by occupation data
by combining two data sources – NIPA and O*NET Tools and Technology Database.
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The O*NET Tools and Technology database provides information about the types of tools
and technology (software) used by each occupation. One caveat of this dataset is that it
does not provide information about the value of each item. To address this shortcoming, we
attempt to link capital items in O*NET Tools and Technology to NIPA data obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Specifically, we make a naive concordance between the UN Standard Product and Services
Code (UNSPSC), a product classification system used in the O*NET database, and 25
categories of non-residential equipment in NIPA table 5.5 (details can be found in the
appendix A.1). Then, we distribute the total amount of a particular type of equipment
investment to each occupation by means of the number of tools included in the investment
category according to the concordance.
For example, suppose that firms have invested USD 20 billion in metalworking machinery
in the NIPA table. According to the constructed concordance, metalworking machinery
Figure 1.5: Investment share in private non-residential investment
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includes a total of 139 commodities in UNSPSC. Some occupations use none of the 139
commodities, and other occupations use various numbers of the commodities in the category.
Because we know the number of employment by occupation, we can calculate the total
number of metalworking machinery items used by all workers in a given year. Then, we can
approximate the amount attributed to an individual occupation by distributing the total USD
20 billion investment according to the number of items used by the occupation. Subsequently,
dividing by the number of employees provides an estimate of the per capita investment in
metalworking machinery by occupation.
The per capita investment in equipment by occupational skill group is shown in figure 1.6a,
where an occupational skill group is defined as a group representing 1% of total employment
among all occupations ranked by mean hourly wages. We also plot the routine-intensive task
share – a share of routine-intensive employment out of total employment within the skill
group – in the same figure. Here, routine-intensive employment is defined as employment
in occupations with the highest one-third routine task index of all occupations, where the
routine task index is computed using the O*NET task database following Acemoglu and
Autor (2011).
In figure 1.6b, we plot software investment per capital across the same wage percentile,
and the cognitive-intensive task share defined similarly to the routine-intensive task share.
Again, the cognitive task index is computed following Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
We can see from the figures that middle-skill workers use equipment more intensively,
whereas high-skill workers use software more intensively. Moreover, the use of equipment
closely follows the routine task share while the use of software is closely related to the cognitive
task share. We further illustrate the use of equipment subitem by occupation in figures 1.6c
(industrial equipment) and 1.6d (industrial and information processing equipment). Among
14
Figure 1.6: Use of equipment and software across skill percentile
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(d) Industrial + IT + Other equipment
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the equipment subitems, industrial equipment is most strongly correlated with routine task
intensity.
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1.3 Model
There is a continuum of individuals endowed with human capital h ∈ [1, h¯] drawn from a
measure M(h). Specifically, we assume that:
Assumption 1 (distribution) The measure of skill, M : [1, h¯] 7→ [0, 1] is a cumulative
distribution function with a differentiable probability distribution function, µ : [1, h¯] 7→ R+.
There is a continuum of tasks τ ∈ [0, τ¯ ], and final goods are produced by combining task
output T (τ) according to:
Y =
(∫
τ
γ(τ)
1
T (τ)
−1
 dτ
) 
−1
. (1.1)
The task output is produced by integrating human capital specific task production y(h, τ)
across all skill levels used for the production of task τ :
T (τ) =
∫
h∈L(τ)
y(h, τ)dh. (1.2)
The human capital specific task production, y(h, τ), depends not only on worker human
capital h but also on task τ that the worker is performing. Specifically, the functional form
of y(h, τ) is given by
y(h, τ) =
[{
αh(τ) (b(h, τ)l)
σe−1
σe + αe(τ)E
σe−1
σe
}σe(σs−1)
(σe−1)σs
+ αs(τ)S
σs−1
σs
] σs
σs−1
, (1.3)
where l(h) represents the level of employment of workers with human capital h, S and E
represent software and equipment, respectively.
16
The function b(h, τ) captures the productivity of a worker with human capital h when she
performs task τ . We assume that b(h, τ) is strictly log supermodular.
Assumption 2 The function b(h, τ) : [1, h¯]× [0, τ¯ ] 7→ R+ is differentiable and strictly log
supermodular. That is,
log b(h′, τ ′) + log b(h, τ) > log b(h, τ ′) + log b(h′, τ),
for all h′ > h and τ ′ > τ .
As shown in Costinot and Vogel (2010), assumption 2 helps to ensure positive assortative
matching (PAM). In other words, the higher human capital h is, the higher τ task she will
perform in equilibrium. Not only how each occupation utilizes a worker’s human skill, but
tasks are also different in to which intensities they use two types of capital. This second
feature is essential to understanding the differential effects of capital-embodied technical
change on various occupations. 6
The software and equipment available for workers are given by
S =
(∫ Ns
0
s(k)νsdk
) 1
νs
and E =
(∫ Ne
0
e(k)νedk
) 1
νe
, (1.4)
where each variety of capital (s(k) and e(k)) is provided by a permanent patent owner under
monopolistic competition.
6 Many studies following Krusell et al. (2000) consider a production technology in which capital substitute
a certain group of workers more or less than others. In our model, the substitutability between capital
and human skill is same across occupations. We still have differential effects of capital-embodied technical
change on various occupations for three reasons. First, each occupation utilizes human skill differently.
Second, occupations rely on capital with various intensities. Third, any changes in the relative productivity
in occupation-level alter relative demand for occupations through the final production, combining all tasks.
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The production technology of software or equipment is
s(k) = Asx, e(k) = Aex,
where x is the amount of final goods used to produce software or equipment. The production
technology implies that the marginal costs of producing software and equipment are given by
the inverse of productivity, qs := 1/As and qe := 1/Ae.
New software and equipment are created from R&D expenditures Zs and Ze, and the laws
of motion for total varieties follow
N˙s = Zs/ηs and N˙e = Ze/ηe. (1.5)
Finally, the representative household has CRRA preference given by
∫ ∞
s
e−ρt
C(t)1−θ − 1
1− θ dt,
and the resource constraint in the economy is
C + qe
∫ Ns
0
s(k)dk + qs
∫ Ne
0
e(k)dk + Ze + Zs ≤ Y. (1.6)
1.3.1 Static Equilibrium
To characterize the static equilibrium, we take the total varieties of software and equipment,
Ne and Ns, as given. We first define the equilibrium.
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Definition 1 (Static equilibrium) The static equilibrium consists of the price function
p(τ), w(h), ps(k), and pe(k), the quantity function T (τ), l(h, τ), s(k, τ), e(k, τ), and the
quantity Y such that:
1. Given p(τ), final goods producer solves
max Y −
∫
τ
p(τ)T (τ)dτ,
given equation (1.1).
2. For each task, the task output is produced to solve
max p(τ)T (τ)−
∫
h
w(h)l(h, τ)dh−
∫ Ns
0
ps(k)s(k, τ)dk −
∫ Ne
0
pe(k)e(k, τ)dk,
given equation (1.2), w(h), ps(k), and pe(k).
3. A capital provider solves
max pis(k) =
∫
τ
[ps(k)s(k, τ)− qss(k, τ)] dτ,
max pie(k) =
∫
τ
[pe(k)e(k, τ)− qee(k, τ)] dτ,
given the marginal cost qs and qe.
4. All workers choose the highest-paying occupation (task).
5. The labor market clears µ(h) =
∫
τ
l(h, τ)dτ .
From the final goods production, the demand for task output T (τ) is given by
p(τ) =
(
γ(τ)Y
T (τ)
) 1

, (1.7)
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and the price function p(τ) satisfies
∫
τ
γ(τ)p(τ)1−dτ = 1.
Since we assume that the capital producer maximizes profit under monopolistic competition,
we obtain the price of the software and equipment as
ps(k) =
1
Asνs
and pe(k) =
1
Aeνe
, for all k.
By substituting this result into the first-order conditions from task output production, we
can show that the wage function w(h) satisfies
w(h) ≥

p(τ)1−σs −
(
αs(τ)
σs
1−σs
AsN
ϕs
s νs
)1−σs
1−σe
1−σs
−
(
αe(τ)
σe
1−σe
AeN
ϕe
e νe
)1−σe
1
1−σe
αh(τ)
− σe
1−σe
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=ω(τ)
×b(h, τ), (1.8)
with equality when l(h, τ) > 0.
Equation (1.8) shows that the wage function w(h) can be expressed as a product of
terms depending only on τ (ω(τ)) and human capital task-specific productivity b(h, τ). The
existence of PAM between h and τ follows.
Lemma 1 (Positive assortative matching) Under assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a
continuous and strictly increasing assignment function hˆ : [0, τ¯ ] 7→ [1, h¯] such that hˆ(0) = 1
and hˆ(τ¯) = h¯.
The proof is same as the proof of Lemma 1 in Costinot and Vogel (2010) and is omitted.
The equilibrium assignment hˆ is characterized by:
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Lemma 2 (Equilibrium assignment function) The equilibrium assignment function hˆ(τ),
price function p(τ), and the wage rate ω(τ) satisfy the following system of differential equa-
tions.
d logω(τ)
dτ
= −∂ log b(hˆ(τ), τ)
∂τ
, (1.9)
hˆ′(τ) =
γ(τ)p(τ)σs−αh(τ)σsψ(τ)σe−σsY
ω(τ)σeb(hˆ(τ), τ)µ(hˆ(τ))
, (1.10)
p(τ) =
[
ψ(τ)1−σs + αs(τ)σs (νsAsNϕss )
σs−1] 11−σs , (1.11)
with hˆ(0) = 1, hˆ(τ¯) = h¯, and
∫
γ(τ)p(τ)1−dτ = 1,
ψ(τ) :=
[
αh(τ)
σeω(τ)1−σe + αe(τ)σe (νeAeNϕee )
σe−1] 11−σe , ϕe := 1−νeνe , and ϕs := 1−νsνs .
Proof In appendix A.3.
After the assignment function hˆ is obtained, all the equilibrium quantities and prices can
be computed.
1.3.2 Dynamic Equilibrium
Now consider a dynamic equilibrium where technology evolves endogenously. The HJB
equations for innovators are given by
r(t)Vs(k, t)− V˙s(k, t) = pis(k, t), (1.12)
r(t)Ve(k, t)− V˙e(k, t) = pie(k, t), (1.13)
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with profit functions,
pis(k) =
∫
τ
[ps(k)s(k, τ)− qss(k, τ)]dτ = 1− νs
νsAs
∫
τ
s(k, τ)dτ, (1.14)
pie(k) =
∫
τ
[pe(k)e(k, τ)− qee(k, τ)]dτ = 1− νe
νeAe
∫
τ
e(k, τ)dτ. (1.15)
The free entry condition ensures that
Ve ≤ ηe, with equality if Ze > 0, and Vs ≤ ηs, with equality if Zs > 0.
If both R&D’s are positive, we have ηeVe = ηsVs, and from equations (1.12) and (1.13),
r(t) = pie(t)/ηe = pis(t)/ηs. (1.16)
Finally, from the household’s problem, we have a standard Euler equation:
C˙(t)
C(t)
=
r(t)− ρ
θ
, (1.17)
and the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
[
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds (Ne(t)Ve(t) +Ns(t)Vs(t))
]
= 0.
Now, we have a characterization of the steady state equilibrium in the following lemma.
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Lemma 3 (Steady state equilibrium) There exist νe < 1 and νs < 1 sufficiently large
that are compatible with the unique steady state equilibrium, i.e.,
pie/ηe = pis/ηs = ρ, (1.18)
and every variable remains constant. Moreover, when σs = σe = 1,
max
{
1−νs
νs
αs(τ)
αh(τ)
+ 1−νe
νe
αe(τ)
αh(τ)
}
< 1 ensures the existence of the steady state equilibrium.
Proof In appendix A.3.
Intuitively, high enough νe and νs ensure profits by providing additional variety not too
large, which makes the rate of return on increasing variety strictly decreasing on the total
varieties. As the rate of return is strictly decreasing in the size of varieties, we have a certain
level of varieties that equates the rate of return and time preference (ρ), leading to the
existence of the steady state.
We consider only a case with no growth steady state as no standard balanced growth
path exists when the task production is a general CES function. Note that the source of
growth (increasing variety) is a capital-augmented technological change in our model. It
is well-known that no balanced growth path would exist for a capital-augmented technical
change if the production function is not of the Cobb-Douglas form (e.g. Grossman et al.,
2017). 7
A detailed analysis of the transitional dynamics is not the primary focus of this paper.
Instead, we focus on the differences between the static equilibrium (where Ns and Ne are
7In the Cobb-Douglas task production case (σs = σe = 1); however, a sustained growth can be obtained
by assuming strictly positive population growth, as in Jones (1995). We still have every task growing at a
different rate, so the most labor intensive task (the slowest-growing task) would dominate the economy in the
limit under complementarity between tasks ( < 1), which is similar to the results in Ngai and Pissarides
(2007) and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).
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fixed) and the steady state throughout the paper. We confirm numerically that the obtained
steady state is saddle-path stable in the quantitative analysis. When the steady state is
saddle-path stable, the transitional dynamics will be similar to that of the Neo-classical
growth model, as a key is that the production function is strictly concave in the varieties.
Exogenous vs Endogenous Productivity Our model has both exogenous and endoge-
nous productivity for equipment and software. Exogenous productivity is augmented in
capital production, Ae or As, and captures how well one can produce equipment or software
that has already been introduced into the economy. For example, when equipment production
became faster as a result of using a faster computer in the production process, this shift would
be captured in the increase in Ae. Instead, endogenous productivity, Ne or Ns, captures an
introduction of new types of capital to the economy. For example, the development of the
Uber application supporting drivers would be captured by an increase in Ns.
1.4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we restrict our attention to the case with σe = σs = 1, ηe = ηs and νe = νs to
obtain analytical comparative statics. Specifically, we assume:
Assumption 3 The elasticities of substitution between labor and equipment/software are
one, i.e., σs = σe = 1. The individual task production function is then
y(h, τ) = (b(h, τ)l(h))αh(τ)Eαe(τ)Sαs(τ).
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Additionally, we put some structures on the intensity functions αh(τ), αe(τ), and αs(τ) to
reflect the fact that high-skill workers use software intensively and middle-skill workers use
equipment intensively, i.e.,
Assumption 4 (intensities) The functions αh(τ) : [0, τ¯ ] 7→ (0, 1], αs(τ) : [0, τ¯ ] 7→ (0, 1]
and αe(τ) : [0, τ¯ ] 7→ (0, 1] satisfy the following.
2.1 αs(τ) is differentiable and increasing on [0, τ¯ ].
2.2 αe(τ) is differentiable, increasing on [0, τe] and decreasing on [τe, τ¯ ].
2.3 αe(τe) > αs(τe), αs(τ¯) > αe(τ¯), and αe(0) = αs(0).
Now, we show that an increase in the productivity of equipment production (Ae ↑)
leads to polarization and the rise of software and skill demand reversal when the tasks
are complementary. Specifically, we focus on three main predictions of the model: (1) the
polarization induced by the rise of equipment-producing productivity in the static equilibrium,
and (2) the subsequent rise of software innovation, and (3) the decreasing demand for high-
skilled employment in the steady state.
Job Polarization
First, we show the impact of an increase in the equipment productivity (Ae) on equilibrium
assignment function hˆ(τ) in the static equilibrium (i.e., when Ne and Ns are fixed). We
consider A1e < A2e and denote the equilibrium assignment functions corresponding to A1e
and A2e as hˆ1 and hˆ2, respectively.
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Proposition 1 (Polarization) Consider A1e < A2e. Suppose  < 1 and assumptions 1 to
4. For sufficiently small α′h(τ), we have τ
∗ ∈ (0, τ¯) such that hˆ1(τ ∗) = hˆ2(τ ∗), hˆ1(τ) < hˆ2(τ)
for τ ∈ (0, τ ∗), and hˆ1(τ) > hˆ2(τ) for τ ∈ (τ ∗, τ¯).
Proof In appendix A.3.
Proposition 1 states that there will be a shrinking employment of task around τ ∗ where
corresponding equipment intensity αe(τ ∗) is relatively higher than αe(0) and αe(τ¯). Figure
1.7 illustrates the change in the assignment function with A1e (blue solid line) and A2e > A1e
(red dashed line). For a given task τ ∈ [τ ∗ − , τ ∗ + ], we can see that employment decreases
because we have higher hˆ2(τ) on the left side of τ ∗ and lower hˆ2(τ) on the right side of τ ∗.
As shown in section 1.2, tasks with higher equipment intensities are consistent with
routine-intensive tasks; hence, the proposition states that decreasing routine employment can
be caused by a decrease in the price of equipment.
The condition of sufficiently small α′h(τ) is assumed because the impact of the change in
equipment price on human capital depends on the relative size of αe to αh, not αe alone. The
Figure 1.7: Equilibrium comparison: A1e vs A2e > A1e
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condition is sufficient but not necessary. As we show via numerical examples in appendix
A.4, α′h(τ) need not be too small.
The intuition under the proposition is as follows. An increase in the equipment productivity
(Ae) leads to a decrease in the price of equipment (qe). This increases the productivity of
all tasks but to a greater extent for tasks with higher equipment intensities. When the
production is complementary in the tasks ( < 1), the rise of relative productivity causes
factors to flow out to other tasks, which results in polarization.
The intuition is similar to other papers in the literature, for example, Lee and Shin (2017),
Goos et al. (2014), and Cheng (2017): The technological change making the middle-skill
tasks more productive reduces demand for the middle jobs when the tasks are relatively more
complement than the relation between workers and technology. Our model enables a more
direct mapping to the data due to the intensity function αe(τ) and αs(τ), meaning that it
is not the technology affects a certain occupational group only but affects occupations to
different extents. Cheng (2017) also introduces heterogeneous intensities across occupations.
Ours differs from Cheng (2017) that we focus on the equipment among capital, which is
a specific component used by middle-skill occupations intensively. We also highlight that
the changes in the occupational structure itself can lead to another type of task-specific
technological change, which we explore in the following propositions.
The Rise of Software
The profits from providing software and equipment are proportional to the demand, which in
turn, is proportional to the task output times the factor intensity of the task. Hence, changes
in the relative size of task production result in changes in the profit from providing each type
of capital according to the corresponding factor intensity.
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We know from proposition 1 that the employment share around τ ∗ (in the middle) shrinks.
As long as α′h(τ) is small, the share of task production around τ
∗ also has to decrease.
Meanwhile, αe(τ ∗) > αs(τ ∗), together with αe(τ¯) < αs(τ¯) and αe(0) = αs(0) (assumption 4),
imply that a decrease in production share around τ ∗ actually decreases e more than s, and an
increase in production share around τ¯ increases s more than e. Therefore, providing software
becomes more profitable for innovators. Innovators then focus innovation toward software,
resulting in higher Ns/Ne in the new steady state.
Although this prediction is valid for most reasonable quantifications, we have to impose
tight restrictions on the structures of the intensities over the entire range of τ ∈ [0, τ¯ ] to
prove the analytical proposition as we are comparing the ratio of two integrations over all
τ (pie/pis ∝
∫
αe(τ)p(τ)T (τ)dτ/
∫
αs(τ)p(τ)T (τ)dτ). To express the analytical proposition
in a simple way, we consider an approximation with three discrete tasks (j = 0, 1, 2 for low,
middle, and high) in this subsection. Specifically, consider a production technology given by
Y =
(∑
j
γ
1

j T
−1

j
) 
−1
for j = 0, 1, 2, (1.19)
with Tj = (b(h, j)l(h))αh,jEαe,jSαs,j . The detailed derivation of the equilibrium conditions for
this approximation can be found in appendix A.2.
With this approximation, assumptions 1 and 4 are replaced by the following.
Assumption 5 (distribution-II) The measureM : [1, h¯]→ [0, 1] has a differentiable p.d.f.
µ(h), where µ(h) is sufficiently small everywhere.
Assumption 6 (intensities-II) The discrete intensities satisfy the following.
6.1 αe,1
αh,1
> αe,0
αh,0
≈ αe,2
αh,2
.
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6.2 αe,0 ≈ αs,0, αe,1 > αe,2, and αs,2 > αs,1.
In assumption 5, we add the requirement for µ(h) to be sufficiently small to consider the
discretization as an approximation of continuous tasks matched with a continuum of skills8.
Assumption 6.1 states that task 1 is the most equipment intensive, relative to labor,
compared to task 0 and task 2. Assumption 6.2 states that middle-skill tasks use equipment
more than software, high-skill tasks use software more than equipment, and low-skill tasks
use software and equipment similarly.
Again, consider an exogenous increase in the productivity of equipment, A1e < A2e. Denote
the total varieties in the previous steady state as Ns1 and Ne1 and those in the new steady
state as Ns2 and Ne2. Then, we have:
Proposition 2 (Rise of software) Consider A1e < A2e with discretized tasks (1.19), where
equipment variety is at least as large as software variety in the original equilibrium (Ne1 ≥ Ns1).
Suppose  < 1, νe = νs, assumptions 2, 5, and 6. In the new steady state, software variety
increases more than equipment variety, i.e., Ns2/Ne2 > Ns1/Ne1.
Proof In appendix A.3.
8For discretized tasks, the assignment function hˆ(τ) becomes a sequence of threshold human capital hˆj .
When the hˆj ’s change, it not only affects demand for labor around the threshold level but also the total labor
supply given to each task,
∫ hˆj
hˆj−1
µ(h)dh. We ignore indirect effects resulting from changes in
∫ hˆj
hˆj−1
µ(h)dh by
assuming µ(hˆj) and µ(hˆj−1) are sufficiently small.
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Skill Demand Reversal
We now show that an increase in Ns results in skill demand reversal (i.e., a decrease in
the demand for high-skilled labor). We consider Ns2 > Ns1, and denote hˆ1 and hˆ2 as the
equilibrium assignment corresponding to Ns1 and Ns2, respectively.
Proposition 3 (Skill demand reversal) Consider Ns2 > Ns1 and suppose  < 1 and
assumptions 1 to 4. With sufficiently small α′h(τ), the matching function shifts upward
everywhere, i.e., hˆ2(τ) > hˆ1(τ) for all τ ∈ (0, τ¯).
Proof In appendix A.3.
Note that an increase in variety increases the productivity of software-intensive tasks more
than that of other tasks (equation (1.11)). Following the same intuition as in the case of
polarization, this would lead to a reallocation of labor from high-skill tasks to lower-skilled
tasks under complementarity ( < 1). The change in assignment function is depicted in figure
1.8, which shows that all workers downgrade their tasks.
This proposition, together with proposition 2, impies that skill demand reversal results
from the increase in software innovation induced by the increase in Ae. Note that, when Ae
increases, Ne should also increase; otherwise, pie/ηe > ρ. The proposition 2, however, confirms
that the variety of software would increase more than that of equipment. Accordingly, we
have the following transition dynamics.
First, increases in Ae lead to immediate polarization according to proposition 1. Second,
Ns jumps to equate pie and pis. Ns and Ne rise from then on until Ne and Ns reach the
new steady state. Since increasing Ne will lead to polarization, the resulting steady state
30
Figure 1.8: Equilibrium comparison: Ns1 and Ns2 > Ns1
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equilibrium itself would be a mix of polarization and skill demand reversal. As Ns increases
more quickly, the skill demand reversal effect becomes stronger.
Again, the technical assumption of sufficiently small α′h(τ) is required for proof, but it does
not need be that small quantitatively. We provide numerical examples, including the case
with a general CES task production, in appendix A.4 to illustrate the comparative statics.
1.5 Empirical Evidence
This section checks a validity of the model’s predictions using industry data. Specifically, we
test two predictions. First, the model predicts a negative relationship between changes in the
relative price of software to equipment and changes in middle-skill employment relative to
high-skill employment. Second, the model implies a positive correlation between changes in
the relative price of software to equipment and changes in software innovation relative to
other innovation. Note that, in our model, the prices of equipment and software are inversely
related to productivity in the equipment- and software-producing sectors, respectively.
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We measure the relative price of equipment to software by dividing nominal investment
by real investment, provided by BEA. They are different by industry as each industry uses
a different combination of subitems within the category of equipment or software. For the
relative employment of middle-skill to high-skill occupations, we use the employment of routine
occupations divided by the employment of cognitive occupations by industry, computed from
Census data. Finally, the relative size of software innovation to other innovation is measured
by own account software investment (in-house software investment by firms) divided by R&D
excluding software. Details of the data construction are presented in appendix C.1.
Figure 1.9a shows the differences in the growth of middle-skill and high-skill employment
against changes in software price relative to equipment price. Figure 1.9b shows the changes
in software innovation net of R&D expenditures excluding software against changes in the
relative price. The first has a negative relation, and the second has a positive relation,
consistent with the model’s predictions.
To determine whether these relations are statistically significant, we estimate the following
regression:
∆ log yi,t = a+ ct +∆ log(qs,i,t/qe,i,t) + εi,t,
where yi,t is either the ratio of routine (middle-skill) employment to cognitive (high-skill)
employment or the ratio of in-house software investment to R&D expenditures excluding
software. The estimation results, which show significant relations between the two variables,
are given in table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: Estimation results
Routine/Cognitive Sft/R&D (excl. sft.)
Sft price/ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗ +0.747∗∗ +0.717∗∗∗
Eqp price (0.000) (0.014) (0.016) (0.001)
Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
R2 0.172 0.054 0.117 0.064
p-values in parentheses.
Figure 1.9: Changes in the relative price and employment / innovation
(a) Relative employment vs Relative price
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
dl
og
(R
ou
tin
e e
mp
) −
 dl
og
(C
og
nit
ive
 em
p)
−1.5 −1 −.5 0 .5 1
dlog(Software price) − dlog(Equipment price)
(b) Relative innovation vs Relative price
−
3
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
dl
og
(In
 ho
us
e s
oft
wa
re)
 − 
dlo
g(R
&D
 ot
he
r th
an
 S
ft)
−1.5 −1 −.5 0 .5 1
dlog(Software price) − dlog(Equipment price)
33
1.6 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we use the discretized model (appendix A.2) to map the tasks to ten
occupational groups consistent with one-digit SOC code (as in table 1.3). Specifically, the
following production technology is used for the quantitative analysis.
Y =
(∑
j
γ
1

j T
−1

j
) 
−1
, and (1.20)
Tj =Mj

αh,j (∫ hˆj
hˆj−1
b(h, j)µ(h)dh
)σe−1
σe
+ αe,jE
σe−1
σe
j

σe(σs−1)
(σe−1)σs
+ αs,jS
σs−1
σs
j

σs
σs−1
.
Sources of Exogenous Variation Note that we have two types of exogenous productivity
(Ai’s and Mj’s), as well as endogenous productivity (Ni’s). The changes in exogenous
productivities (Ai’s and Mj’s) are sources of exogenous variation in this section. What do
these different productivities represent?
First, Ae and As capture how well a given technology produces already-introduced equip-
ment or software. In other words, increases in Ai capture improvements in the production
process, not the varieties of tools that occupations can utilize. To map Ai’s as data, we use
the TFP of equipment- or software-producing industries.
Second, Mj’s are additional task-specific productivities introduced to match changes in
the employment share of routine occupations in the model with data exactly. Recall that the
changes in Ae or As also act as task-specific productivity in our model. A natural question
is how much of the changes in the employment share between occupations can be captured
only through Ae and As. We answer this question in one of the exercises in this section.
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Third, Ne and Ns are endogenous productivities that capture varieties of software or
equipment that workers can use to do their tasks. We view changes in Ne or Ns roughly
correspond to R&D expenditures on each kind of capital in the data.
One may wonder how we can distinguish the productivity embodied in capital (Ai’s) from
dis-embodied technical change (Ni’s). Regarding identification, increases in Ae and As result
in the decline in the price of equipment and software, whereas changes in Ne and Ns do not
alter the price of capital. Indeed, the price of equipment decreases more quickly than that
of software, and the TFP of equipment-producing industries increases faster than that of
software. To the contrary, software development expenditures rise more quickly than other
types of R&D. These observations are consistent with our distinction between Ai’s and Ni’s.
Scenarios Given the changes in exogenous productivities, we perform two main exercises.
The first is to investigate the extent to which endogenous innovation of software explains
the changes in the pattern of polarization. For this exercise, we match the changes in the
employment share of middle-skill occupations with Ai’s and Mj ’s and look at the employment
dynamics of high- and low-skill occupations generated from the model with innovation and
without innovation.
The next exercise aims to determine the extent to which changes in the productivity of
the equipment- and software-producing sectors only account for the shifts in the employment
share between occupations. To address this question, we repeat the simulation with all the
other parameters fixed, assuming constant Mj for all middle-skill occupations.
Finally, as a sensitivity analysis, we test how the simulation results change by varying
the elasticity of substitution between tasks, mark-ups, and alternative measures for the
productivity of the equipment- and software-producing sectors. Importantly, we confirm that
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observed changes in the price of equipment and software are consistent with the changes in
the TFPs.
Following the literature, we label high-, middle-, and low-skill occupations as cognitive,
routine, and manual occupations, respectively. Cognitive occupations include management,
professionals, and technicians. Routine occupations are administrative, machine operators,
transportation, sales, mechanics, and production workers. Finally, manual occupations are
low-skilled services occupations. The reason we use ten occupational groups rather than
three occupational groups is that we use the changes in the payroll share of each occupational
group to calibrate the elasticity of substitution between tasks, which is the most crucial
parameter driving the mechanism.
1.6.1 Calibration
We calibrate most of the parameters according to the 1980 data assuming a steady state. For
the functional forms, we set the productivity function b(h, j) as
b(h, j) =

h¯ if j = 0
h− χj if j ≥ 1
and the skill distribution M(h) as
M(h) = 1− h−a.
The weight parameters in the final production (γj’s) are taken from the employment
share by occupation in 1980. The χj’s and a are determined to match income share across
occupational groups in 1980. Between-factor intensities by task (αh, αe, αs) are matched to
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equipment and software investment by occupational group9 and labor share in 1980. For the
benchmark analysis, we map the equipment in the model to industrial equipment in the data
as it has the closest relation with the routineness of occupations (figure 1.5).
There are two categories of parameters that are difficult to identify from only 1980 data:
(1) the elasticity of substitution (, σe and σs), and (2) markup-related parameters (νe and
νs). We use various methods to identify these parameters.
For the elasticity of substitution between tasks, we set  to minimize the root-mean-squared
error of the changes in payroll share between 1980 and 2010 by occupation. That is, we
set  to minimize
[∑J
τ=1
[
(wmτ,2010 − wmτ,1980)− (wdτ,2010 − wdτ,1980)
]2
/J
] 1
2
, where ωτ is a payroll
share of occupational group τ . Intuitively, occupations are complementary when changes in
quantity share (employment share) and changes in the relative price (relative wage) move
in the same direction. Figure 1.10 shows that this is the case as relative wages of cognitive
and manual occupations to routine occupations both have increased while the employment
share of routine occupations has decreased (figure 1.3). The resulting parameter value for the
elasticity of substitution between tasks is 0.301, which confirms the complementarity between
tasks. We also perform a robustness check by varying the value of  in subsection 1.6.4.
For the elasticity of substitution between factors in task production (σe and σs), we match
linear trends of aggregate labor share and labor share only with equipment capital. To
illustrate the identification process, note that factor share in a given task τ can be derived as
follows:
9We assume that the number of commodities used by each occupation is the same and attribute the
capital investment in 1980 to each occupation to get occupational use of equipment and software in 1980.
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LS−s =
wL
wL+ peE˜
=
1
1 +
(
αe
αh
)σe
(νeAeN
ϕe
e ω)
σe−1
, (1.21)
LS =
wL
wL+ peE˜ + psS˜
=
1
1 +
(
αe
αh
)σe
(νeAeN
ϕe
e ω)
σe−1 + α
σs
s
(
νsAsN
ϕs
s
)σs−1
ω1−σeασeh
(
ασeh ω
1−σe+ασee
(
νeAeN
ϕe
e
)σe−1)σe−σs1−σe ,
(1.22)
where LS−s is the labor share without software and LS is the standard labor share. From
equation (1.21), it is straightforward to see that the labor share without software does not
directly depend on the elasticity of substitution between labor and software, σs.
The fact that the aggregate labor share and labor share with equipment capital only show
different trends from 1980 to 2010 makes this strategy even more useful (figure 1.14a). The
labor share with equipment capital only has an increasing trend, whereas the aggregate labor
Figure 1.10: Log of relative wage
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Table 1.2: Estimation results: markup
Equipment1) Software2)
b .228 .473
(.000) (.113)
N 333 37
Note: 1) Industries 331, 332, 333, 334, 335,
3361MV, 3364TO, 337, and 339.
2) Industry 511. 3) p-values in parentheses.
share has a declining trend. 10 It is easy to predict σe < 1 and σs > 1 on the basis in the
trends of total labor share and increasing productivity (both exogenous and endogenous) of
capital.
We estimate the markup-related parameters νe and νs separately using the Industry
Account and Fixed Asset Table from BEA, following Domowitz et al. (1988). Specifically, we
estimate
∆ log qit − αLit∆ log lit − αmit∆ logmit = ci + b∆ log qit + εit,
where q is gross output/capital, l is employment/capital, m is intermediate input/capital,
and αLit and αMit are the labor and intermediate shares, respectively. We estimate this
relation for the equipment-producing industry (industry 3 in the BEA industry codes) and
software-producing industry (industry 511). To control for endogeneity, GDP growth is used
as an instrumental variable. Once estimated, νe and νs can be obtained by calculating 1− b.
The estimation results are presented in table 1.2.
10 We compute the labor share with equipment capital only following Koh et al. (2018). To be specific, a
standard asset pricing formula gives Ri = (1 + r)qi − q′i(1− δi), where Ri is the gross return on capital type
i, qi is the relative price of capital type i, δi is a depreciation rate of capital type i, and r is the net rate of
return. The no arbitrage condition implies that the net rate of return, r, is common across i. Using the fact
that one minus labor share is equal to
∑
iRiKi/Y under the CRS production technology, we can impute the
gross rate of return on equipment, Re. The labor share with equipment capital only then can be computed
by CE/(CE +ReKe), where CE is the compensation of employees and Ke is the equipment capital stock.
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Table 1.3: Parameters by occupation
αe αs αh γ χ
Low-skilled services 0.190 0.009 0.801 0.004
Administrative 0.060 0.186 0.754 0.711 0.000
Machine operators 0.644 0.017 0.339 0.077 0.002
Transportation 0.551 0.016 0.433 0.037 0.027
Sales 0.084 0.019 0.898 0.004 0.029
Technicians 0.265 0.020 0.714 0.002 0.071
Mechanics 0.696 0.020 0.285 0.135 0.071
Production 0.528 0.022 0.450 0.022 0.096
Professionals 0.133 0.012 0.854 0.005 0.097
Management 0.019 0.013 0.969 0.004 0.097
Target Equipment, software, and labor share Employment Income share
Table 1.4: Remaining parameters
Value Obtained from
σs 1.425 Labor share with and without software in 2010
σe 0.974
νe 0.772 Estimation (table 1.2)
νs 0.527
 0.301 Changes in average wage by occupation
Table 1.3 and 1.4 summarizes all the calibration results. Detailed calibration procedure is
in appendix A.6.
1.6.2 Simulation Results: With Changes in Ai’s and Mj’s
We assume the economy was in a steady state in 1980 and compute a new steady state
corresponding to the exogenous changes (Ae, As, Mj’s). We then assess how well the model
explains the shifts in the trends of high-skilled and low-skilled employment with and without
endogenous software innovation.
The Pattern of Occupational Employment Figure 1.11a displays the annualized
changes in employment during the first two decades (blue bar) and last decade (light blue
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bar) by occupational group. Figures 1.11b and 1.11c show the same series generated from the
model with endogenous innovation (varying Ne and Ns) and without innovation (no changes
in Ne and Ns), respectively.
The blue bar (changes during 1980-2000) is higher than the light blue bar (changes during
2000-2010) for cognitive occupations and lower for manual occupations, as highlighted in
section 1.2. As shown in Figures 1.11b and 1.11c, these changes in the pattern appear only
in the simulation with endogenous innovation, i.e., with increases in Ns/Ne. The increase in
cognitive occupation during the last decade in the data is 0.31%p lower than the average of
the first two decades, whereas in the model, it is 0.26%p lower with endogenous innovation
and only 0.05%p lower without endogenous innovation. For manual occupations, the change
in the increases between 2000-2010 and 1980-2000 is +0.26%p in the data and +0.22%p in
the full model. By contrast, the model without innovation shows a change of +0.01%p only.
Figure 1.12 shows a decadal pattern from 1980 to 2010. The deviation from the initial
trend in cognitive occupation in the model captures 75% of the actual deviation in the data
(figure 1.12a and 1.12b), where the deviation from the initial trend in manual employment
in the model is 70% of that in the data (figure 1.12c and 1.13a). The model captures not
only the magnitude but also the timing of changes in the trends, as it produces much larger
changes during 2000-2010 than during the first two decades. Without endogenous innovation,
the simulation generates almost no variation in the trends of high- and low-skill employment.
The Rise of Software The ratio of software investment to industrial equipment investment
increases from 0.16 to 1.7 in the data, a more than tenfold increase. Since we match the
initial level of relative investment 0.16 exactly by calibration, we compare the level of the
ratio in 2010 to determine how well the model explains the rise of software. The full model
with innovation explains 63% of the rise of software investment relative to that of equipment
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(figure 1.13a). If we remove the endogenous innovation channel (i.e., no changes in Ns and
Ne), the model generates only 19% of the change in the software to equipment ratio (green
dashed line).
In figure 1.13b, we plot the ratio of software variety to equipment variety (Ns/Ne). There is
no clear counterpart for the varieties in the data as we do not have data of R&D on equipment.
As a crude measure, we compare the varieties Ne/Ns to the cumulated software development
and the cumulated R&D funded by manufacturing industries, excluding chemicals. Both
show an increasing pattern, and the ratio between varieties in the model increases faster in
the last decade.
The Decline of Labor Share Although the labor share dynamics are not a goal of this
exercise, they merit further discussion. Note that we use labor share trend as a target variable
to calibrate the elasticity of substitution (σe and σs); therefore, it is not surprising that the
labor share in the model exactly matches the labor share trend in the data. What is new is
Figure 1.11: Simulation results – changes in employment shares
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Figure 1.12: Simulation results – employment shares by decade
(a) Cognitive employment share
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Figure 1.13: Simulation results – relative investment and labor share
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that the simulation without endogenous software innovation produces an almost flat labor
share (figure 1.14b).
This occurs because an elasticity of substitution between equipment and labor (σe) is
close to one, and hence exogenous variation does not generate declining labor share without
software innovation. Therefore, the declining labor share in our model is mostly a result of
endogenously increasing software investment. We highlight a negative correlation between
software investment and labor share not only in the time series (figure 1.14a) but also in the
industrial variation, especially during 2000-2010 (figures 1.14c and 1.14d). We believe that a
detailed investigation of the relation between labor share and software capital is meaningful
future research.
1.6.3 Simulation Results: With Changes in Ai’s Only
Recall that we the use exogenous variation in the middle-skill specific technical change
(changes in Mj) in addition to the evolution of the productivities of capital to match the
changes in the employment share of the middle-skill occupations exactly. The natural question
is how much of the observed changes in the productivities alone explain the variation in the
share of employment by occupation.
The results are shown in figure 1.15. The changes in equipment price explain 78%, 75%,
and 69% of the changes in cognitive, routine and low-skilled services employment. Two
characteristics are noteworthy.
First, all occupational groups move in the same direction as the data, meaning that
the differential growth of sectoral productivities – together with differences in the use of
capital – captures routine-biased technical change quite well. The analysis suggests that a
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Figure 1.14: Labor share and software
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from this figure.
differential productivity growth on the sector level (among capital-producing sectors) could
be an underlying source of routine biased technological change.
Second, the decadal pattern of changes in occupational employment is also similar to that
of the data, even without additional task-specific technical change (figure 1.15a and 1.15b).
Moreover, changes in TFP generates 75% of job polarization (declines in routine occupations)
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in magnitude. We conclude that the evolution of the productivities embodied in equipment
and software has been crucial in generating a pattern consistent with the data.
The analysis suggests that two further studies would be helpful in understanding the
changes in the occupational structure caused by capital-embodied technical change. The first
is to look at heterogeneity in sector-level production more closely. The second is an attempt
to obtain a better productivity measure for various capital items.
1.6.4 Sensitivity
We assess how the results vary by the elasticity of substitution between tasks (), markups
(νe and νs), and measures for A’s.
The Elasticity of Substitution between Tasks Regarding the elasticity of substitution
between tasks, we expect the model’s explanatory power to increase as  decreases as the
model mechanism is amplified when the tasks are more complementary. Table 1.5 confirms
this intuition.
Markups As can be seen in figure 1.16, the price-to-cost margins of equipment- and
software-producing industries exhibit different trends. The changes in market structure also
affect innovational incentives. To examine the importance of the time-varying markups, we
map the variations in the price-to-cost margin into changes in νe and νs. With time-varying
markups, explanation for the pattern of cognitive employment share decreases and that of
manual employment share increases.
Alternative Measures for Ae and As Another way to measure the capital-embodied
productivity is to compute the inverse of the price of equipment and software. We compare
the simulation results with the inverse of the price of equipment and software as Ae and As.
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The sensitivity analysis shows that the price series give a bit lower explanatory power for
changes in employment share but higher explanation for the increase in software investment
than a case with the benchmark.
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Table 1.5: Sensitivity
The elasticity of substitution between tasks ()
Data Innov. No innov.
Cognitive benchmark -4.16 -3.11 (.75) -0.61 (.15)
(dev. from trend)  = .1 -4.16 -3.63 (.87) -0.60 (.14)
 = .5 -4.16 -2.97 (.72) -0.64 (.15)
 = .7 -4.16 -2.57 (.62) -0.63 (.15)
Low skilled benchmark 3.50 2.45 (.70) -0.05 (-.01)
(dev. from trend)  = .1 3.50 2.97 (.85) -0.06 (-.02)
 = .5 3.50 2.31 (.66) -0.02 (-.01)
 = .7 3.50 1.90 (.54) -0.03 (-.01)
Soft/eqp benchmark 1.68 1.06 (.63) 0.32 (.19)
(lev. in 2010)  = .1 1.68 1.08 (.65) 0.31 (.19)
 = .5 1.68 1.21 (.72) 0.34 (.21)
 = .7 1.68 1.30 (.78) 0.37 (.22)
Markup-related parameters (νe and νs)
Data Innov. No innov.
Cognitive benchmark -4.16 -3.11 (.75) -0.61 (.15)
(dev. from trend) time-varying -4.16 -2.72 (.65) -0.55 (.13)
Low skilled benchmark 3.50 2.45 (.70) -0.05 (-.01)
(dev. from trend) time-varying 3.50 2.64 (.76) -0.44 (-.13)
Soft/eqp benchmark 1.68 1.06 (.63) 0.32 (.19)
(lev. in 2010) time-varying 1.68 0.97 (.58) 0.33 (.20)
Alternative measure for Ae and As
Data Innov. No innov.
Cognitive Ind eqp -4.16 -2.05 (.49) -0.39 (.09)
(dev. from trend) Total eqp -4.16 -1.75 (.42) 0.33 (-.08)
Ind+IT -4.16 -2.24 (.54) -0.11 (.03)
Low skilled Ind eqp 3.50 1.39 (.40) -0.27 (-.08)
(dev. from trend) Total eqp 3.50 1.09 (.31) -0.99 (-.28)
Ind+IT 3.50 1.57 (.45) -0.55 (-.16)
Soft/eqp Ind eqp 1.68 1.06 (.63) 0.42 (.25)
(lev. in 2010) Total eqp 0.35 0.63 (1.83) 0.12 (.35)
Ind+IT 0.59 0.76 (1.27) 0.19 (.33)
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Figure 1.15: Simulation results: no task-specific technological changes (constant Mj’s)
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Figure 1.16: Price-to-cost margin1) of the equipment- and software-producing industries2)
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1.7 Conclusion
We provided a model with heterogenous tasks and two types of capital whose varieties are
determined endogenously through a firm’s innovation. We showed both analytically and
quantitatively that the mechanism in the model is important in understanding the impact of
capital-augmented technical change on the structure of the labor market.
One important implication is that two types of capital – software and equipment– measured
in National Accounts, provide a good proxy for recent technological changes. Understanding
the impact of a technical change on the economy has always been an important topic. One
of the main difficulties is that technological change is not easy to measure, especially in
aggregate analyses. This paper shows that the investigation of different types of capital can
be a meaningful process to capture recent technological changes.
Our paper also implies that a technological change affecting a small group of occupations
leads to other types of innovation, eventually affecting a broader set of occupations. Note that
the same intuition applies to sectoral technical changes. This paper analyzes the technical
change in the context of task-biased technological change, but a task-biased technical change
is strongly linked to a sector-biased technical change, as emphasized in Lee and Shin (2017)
and Bárány and Siegel (forthcoming).
Our model has many useful extensions that can be implemented easily. For example,
further decomposition of equipment capital into subcategories will be helpful in understanding
more detailed changes in occupational structure through technological changes embodied in
capital. Further, integrating a multi-sector structure would provide additional interesting
implications with respect to the relation between polarization and structural changes and the
evolution of task-specific and sector-specific productivity, as in Aum et al. (2017).
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Though not as straightforward, the analysis herein could also lead to many interesting
future research topics. For example, by using firm-level software and equipment investment
data, we may generate interesting implications on the impact of technological change on
firm-level heterogeneity and occupation-level heterogeneity. Many countries are attempting
to broaden the types of capital measured in National Accounts (System of National Account
2008). A multi-country extension would also be meaningful, enabling the analysis of trade or
offshoring in addition to technological changes.
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Chapter 2
Computerizing Industries and
Routinizing Jobs: Explaining Trends
in Aggregate Productivity
This chapter was coauthored with Tim Lee and Yongseok Shin.
2.1 Introduction
Amid the sluggish recovery following the Great Recession, much attention has been given to
the slowdown in productivity growth in the United States economy (sometimes referred to as
“secular stagnation”). We dissect this trend in aggregate productivity by developing a model
in which technological progress is both sector- and occupation-specific,11 to better understand
11Throughout the text, we will use “sector” and “industry” interchangeably, as well as “occupations” and
“jobs.”
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which sectors and occupations contribute most to trends in aggregate productivity.12 In
particular, we pay special attention to the computer sector (hardware and software), which
enjoyed an impressive rise in productivity even as the rest of the economy lagged behind.
Computers have become an important factor of production for all other sectors, especially
since the 1990s (which we call “computerization”), so we separate them from other machinery
equipment as a distinct type of capital. Using the model, we quantify the importance
of the computer sector and compare it against “routinization” (i.e., faster technological
progress specific to occupations that involve routine or repetitive tasks) in explaining trends
in aggregate productivity.
We find that a downward trend in aggregate productivity growth was already present since
the 1970s, but that this was more than compensated for by the extraordinary productivity
growth of the computer sector in the 1980s and 1990s. It was only when the computer
sector’s productivity growth came down to normal levels in the 2000s that the deceleration
in aggregate productivity became abruptly apparent. This generated the illusion that the
aggregate productivity slowdown has its roots in the 2000s, even though the slowdown had
already been underway in the preceding decades.
In our analysis, the driving force of the aggregate productivity slowdown is complementarity
across occupations and across industries in production: Those occupations and industries
with above-average productivity growth shrink in terms of value-added and employment
shares, and their contributions toward aggregate productivity growth becomes smaller even
when their productivity continues to grow fast. This is related to “Baumol’s disease,” i.e.,
that aggregate productivity growth can slow down because sectors with high productivity
12Our model will admit an aggregate productivity that is distinct from conventional measures of total
factor productivity (TFP), which assumes a homogeneous of degree one (HD1) production function in the
two factors of capital and labor. When distinction is necessary, we will refer to our version with three factors
(capital, labor and computers) simply as “productivity,” and the two-factor residual as “TFP.”
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growth may decline in importance (e.g., manufacturing). However, our results show that it is
the shrinkage of occupations with fast occupation-specific productivity growth, not sectors,
that accounts for most of the downward trend in aggregate productivity growth.
Another novel element of our analysis is the computer sector. When sectors are comple-
mentary to one another, the extraordinarily high productivity growth of the computer sector
should reduce its relative importance, and hence its contribution to aggregate productivity
growth over time (Baumol’s disease). However, because we model the computer sector’s
output as a distinct type of capital used in the production of all sectors (including itself), its
productivity growth and the accompanying fall in its price boost the demand for computers
from all sectors. Consequently, the computer sectors’s contribution to aggregate productivity
remained important for a prolonged period of time, more than offsetting the negative effect
of routinization on aggregate productivity growth for over two decades. We also show that
computerization accounts for most of the decline in the labor income share since the 1980s.
In our model, individuals inelastically supply labor to differentiated jobs. Each sector uses
all these jobs, but with different intensities. Sectors are complementary across one another
for the production of the final good. Within each sector, jobs are also complementary to one
another, and labor is combined with capital for sectoral production. Most important, we
divide capital into computer capital (including software) and the rest (i.e., all capital not
produced from the computer sector), and assume that the substitutability between labor
and computer capital may differ across sectors. We model computer and software as capital
used by all other sectors rather than an intermediate input, because the computer share of
all investment is substantially larger than its share of all intermediates (14 vs. 2 percent,
averaged between 1980 and 2010).
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It should be noted that computerization and routinization are empirically distinct phenom-
ena. Computer and software usage increased the most for high-skill or cognitive occupations,
not middle-skill or routine occupations, justifying our choice to model productivity growth in
both dimensions (sector- and occupation-specific). We then estimate the degree of comple-
mentarity across sectors, and calibrate the growth rates of the sector- and occupation-specific
productivities, substitutability/complementarity across jobs, and substitutability between
computer capital and labor, using detailed data on employment shares and computer capital
by industry and by occupation. Our estimation and calibration verify that as long as produc-
tivity growth rates are positive, (i) sectors are complementary to one another for final good
production;13 (ii) jobs are complementary to one another within sectors; and most important,
(iii) computer capital is in fact substitutable with labor in all sectors.
Given the structure of our model and estimated/calibrated parameters, we find that when
sector- and occupation-specific productivities grow at constant but different rates, aggregate
productivity growth declines over time due to the two types of complementarity (across jobs
within sectors, and across sectors in final good production). Jobs and sectors with highest
productivity growth shrink in terms of employment and value-added. Then low-growth jobs
and sectors gain more weight when computing aggregate productivity growth, resulting in its
slowdown. As productivity growth slows down, output growth slows down even more.
The mechanics of our model is consistent with our empirical findings: Since the 1980s,
sectors that rely heavily on routine jobs experienced the highest growth in their TFP’s, as
measured by conventional growth accounting.14 These occupations, and the sectors that rely
relatively more on them, also saw their employment shares fall.
13Or consumption, which we do not model.
14That is, assuming an HD1 production function with two factors, capital and labor. By “measured,”
we mean productivity or TFP obtained directly from the data by growth accounting, as opposed to being
computed from our model.
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Next, we find that the fall in aggregate productivity growth in the longer run is more due
to the differential growth across occupations (i.e., routinization) rather than the differential
growth across sectors. In fact, if all occupation-specific productivities had grown at a common
rate from 1980, holding all else equal, aggregate productivity growth rates would have stayed
nearly constant through 2010. This contrasts with Baumol’s disease, which emphasizes the
differential sector-specific productivity growths, especially the slow productivity growth of
the service sector.
The natural question is then why the downward trend in aggregate productivity growth
did not manifest itself until the 2000s. In our model, the slowdown in aggregate productivity
growth can be temporarily arrested and even reversed if certain sectors or jobs experience
faster-than-usual technological progress. We find that this is exactly what happened during
the 1990s, when the computer sector recorded impressive productivity growth. Without
the technological progress specific to the computer industry, aggregate productivity growth
during the 1990s would have been 0.5 percent per year, instead of 0.8 percent. It is only
after the subsequent slowdown in the computer sector’s productivity growth in the 2000s
that the longer-run downward trend in aggregate productivity growth became apparent. Our
analysis confirms that if productivity growth in the computer sector had been completely
absent, aggregate productivity growth would have declined monotonically since 1980. In fact,
although our focus is on the slowdown toward the end of the sample period in Figure 2.1, a
slowdown is also apparent in the 1970s to early 1980s.
In the data, sectors with higher measured TFP growth saw their employment shares decline,
except for the computer sector. The same happens in our model because all sectors use
computer capital in production. Then, as the computer sector’s productivity growth reduces
the price of computer capital, all sectors use more computers, which contributes to output
growth in addition to the computer sector’s direct contribution to aggregate productivity
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Source: National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). TFP
is measured as the Solow residual assuming a homogeneous of degree one production function with two
factors, capital and labor.
growth.15 Indeed, if there had been no productivity growth in the computer sector and hence
no computerization, output per worker growth would have been 1.5 percent per year during
the 1990s, rather than the 3.5 percent observed in the data. In other words, the sluggish
growth of aggregate productivity and output in the 2000s was not abnormal. It was the
faster-than-trend growth during the 1990s driven by the outburst of the computer sector’s
productivity that was extraordinary.
Treating computer capital as a separate production factor as we do also has implications
for the measurement of aggregate productivity. We find that conventional TFP accounting
with only two factor inputs, with all types of capital being summed up into a single category,
overstates aggregate productivity growth by 0.4 percentage points per year when averaged
15As discussed earlier, this model element is also important for understanding why the direct contribution
of the computer sector to aggregate productivity growth did not dwindle in importance despite the comple-
mentarity across sectors. The computer sector’s production share has been stable over time: 3.1 percent in
the 1980s, 3.4 percent in the 1990s, 3.9 percent in the 2000s, and 3.4 percent in the 2010s.
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between 1980 and 2010. That is, ignoring different types of capital, which differ in their
rental and depreciation rates, can bias productivity measurements upward.
Lastly, we relate computerization to the decline in the labor income share. In our model,
the labor share decline is caused by the substitutability between labor and computer capital,
as the computer sector becomes more productive. We find that computerization during the
1990s accounts for most of the decline in the labor share between 1980 and 2010 (4 out of
5 percentage points), even the model does not target the labor share at all. This implies
that computer capital alone is more important than all other machinery and equipment in
explaining the decline in the labor share.
Related literature In our model, employment shifts across sectors—or “structural change”—
occur due to differential sector- and occupation-specific productivity growth as in Lee and
Shin (2017). Most studies in the structural change literature that consider sector-specific pro-
ductivity growth, e.g., Ngai and Pissarides (2007), have paid little attention to its implications
for changes in aggregate productivity. In fact, most were interested in obtaining balanced
growth. However, since as far back as Baumol (1967), it was well known that complementarity
between industries can lead to an increase in the employment share of the low productivity
growth sector, consequently leading to a slowdown in aggregate productivity. A recent study
by Duernecker et al. (2017) is a notable exception. They explicitly consider Baumol’s disease
in a multi-sector model, and evaluate whether structural change is quantitative important
for explaining the aggregate productivity slowdown. In our analysis, we model differential
progress across occupation-specific technologies in addition to heterogeneous sector-specific
productivity growth, and find that it was the dispersion of occupation-specific productivities
that was more important for the aggregate productivity slowdown in the United States.16
16Aum et al. (2017) document occupation-specific and sector-specific shocks at a higher frequency—during
and after the Great Recession.
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Our work also relates to studies on the importance of information technology (IT) in
explaining the evolution of productivity (e.g., Byrne et al., 2016; Syverson, 2017). In particular,
Acemoglu et al. (2014) investigate the relationship between productivity growth and IT capital
intensity by industry, and conclude that IT usage has little impact on productivity. While we
emphasize the role of computerization, our analysis is consistent with theirs. Computerization
is important for shaping aggregate productivity growth in our analysis, but there is no direct
effect of computerization on the productivity of other industries. Instead, computerization
affects industry level output and value-added through an increase in the use of computer
capital.
In many empirical analyses related to routinization, the price of information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) capital is often used as a proxy for routine-biased technological
change (e.g., Goos et al., 2014; Cortes et al., 2017). However, when we break down com-
puter usage by occupation, we find that computerization and routinization are two distinct
phenomena, with different implications for the macroeconomy. Related, the first chapter of
this dissertation analyzes increasing investment in software in a model that also features
routinization. While the first chapter focuses on its impact on changes in occupational
employment, the second chapter focuses on its implications for aggregate productivity.
Finally, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) suggest that the decline in the labor income
share could be due to a decline in the price of capital. Since the decline in the price of capital
is mostly driven by the price of computer-related equipment, and it mirrors the productivity
increase in the computer industry, our analysis concurs with their explanation of the declining
labor share. Furthermore, our results show that a specific component of capital—computer
hardware and software—can be more important than all other types of capital. This is in
line with Koh et al. (2016), who emphasize the importance of intellectual property products
capital (including software) for the decline of the labor share.
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Figure 2.2: PC use by occupation and PC industry TFP
Source: (a) IPUMS Census, BEA NIPA and O*NET. (b) BEA Industry Accounts. The computer industry
includes industries 334 and 511 (for hardware and software, respectively). See footnote 18 and text for the
data and accounting behind the graphs.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
We begin by establishing that routinization and computerization are two distinct phenomena.
For the empirical analysis, occupational data is from the decennial censuses and industrial
data from the BEA industry accounts. We consider industries at the 2-digit level, resulting
in 60 industries. In particular, we label industry 334 (computers and electronic products)
the “hardware” industry and 511 (publishing industries including software) the “software”
industry. The combination of both is the “computer sector.”
In Figure 2.2(a), the horizontal axis is occupational employment shares (percentile),
in ascending order of each occupation’s 1980 average wage.17 The figure shows that the
routine-task intensity (RTI) of occupations (Autor and Dorn, 2013) is high for middle-wage
occupations, as is well known in the routinization/polarization literature, but that high-wage
occupations tend to use computers more.18 So at the occupational level, an increase in the
17The ordering of occupational mean wages barely changes from 1980 to 2010.
18Computer usage is approximated from 2010 NIPA Tables 5.5.5 (Private Fixed Investment in Equipment
by Type), 5.6.5 (Private Fixed Investment in Intellectural Properties by Type), and the O*NET Tools and
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use of computers (i.e., computerization) should be distinguished from routinization, which is
typically understood as faster productivity growth among middle-wage or routine-intense
tasks.
Computerization in our model is a consequence of the fast productivity growth of the
computer industry. We first employ conventional accounting to measure each industry’s TFP
growth: the growth rate of real value-added net of the growth of capital and labor inputs,
weighted by the income share of each factor. Specifically, industry i’s measured TFP growth
between time s and t is
log
TFPit
TFPis
= log
Yit
Yis
− αis + αit
2
· log Lit
Lis
− 2− αis − αit
2
· log Kit
Kis
,
where Y is real value-added, L is employment, K is the net real stock of non-residential fixed
capital, and α is the labor share (compensation of employees divided by value-added).19
Figure 2.2(b) depicts the log-TFP of computer-related industries (BEA industry code
334 for hardware and 511 for software) and the average of the log-TFP of all industries
excluding agriculture and government (weighted according to the Törnqvist index). The TFP
of hardware shows an average annual growth rate of 16 percent, far higher than the average
across all industries. Software also features higher TFP growth compared to the average.
The TFP of the “computer industry”—the value- added weighted average of hardware and
Technology database as follows. In NIPA Table 5.5.5, we assume that “computers and peripheral equipment”
are produced by industry 334, and in Table 5.6.5, that “software” are produced by industry 511. O*NET
lists all the tools and technology that are used for each occupation. O*NET occupation codes can be easily
mapped to the census, and tools and technology are coded using the UNSPSC commodity system. We
assume that 4321xxxx corresponds to “hardware,” which includes all computers and peripheral equipment,
and that 4323xxxx corresponds to “software.” Then we count the number of distinct commodities needed in
each occupation, multiply it by the employment share of that occupation, and assume that hardware and
software investment is allocated across occupations proportionately to this number. Finally, we standardize
this measure of computer investment by occupation to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1.
While this may be a crude measure for computer usage, it is highly correlated with data from the CPS, which
reports computer use intensity by occupation. See Appendix A for more details.
19Later when we separately consider computer capital, TFP computed here would be a misspecification.
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Figure 2.3: Computer use in production over time
Source: BEA Input-Output Tables and Fixed Asset Tables (FAT). In panel (a), hardware and software are
industries 334 and 511. In panel (b), hardware and software are investments into “computers and peripheral
equipment” and “software” in the FAT.
software—shows that the hardware industry mostly determines the TFP of the computer
industry. Note that the exceptionally fast growth of the computer industry’s TFP slowed
down since around the early 2000s.
Reflecting the fast growth of the computer industry’s measured TFP, the use of computer
and software also rose substantially until the late 1990s. Figure 2.3(a) shows the computer
and software share of total intermediates over time. Figure 2.3(b) plots the share of computers
and software in total non-residential investment. In both figures, it is clear that there was a
steep rise in the importance of computers in the 1980s to 1990s, which stagnated starting in
the 2000s.20
We now turn to disaggregated evidence at the industry level, which will support our
hypotheses of heterogeneous growth rates and complementarity across jobs and industries.
Because job or occupation-level productivity is not directly measurable, we first establish
two new empirical patterns, utilizing the fact that industries differ in the composition of
20The data behind Figures 2.3(a) and (b) come from BEA’s Input-Output Tables and Fixed Assets Tables,
respectively.
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Figure 2.4: Routinization and industry TFP and employment
Source: IPUMS Census and BEA Industry Accounts. Hardware and Software are industries 334 and 511,
respectively. In panel (a), routine jobs are defined as occupations above the 66 percentile in terms of the RTI
index (Autor and Dorn, 2013). In panel (b), FTPT is full-time plus part-time workers.
their workers’ occupations. Figure 2.4(a) shows that the routine job share of an industry is
positively correlated with its measured TFP growth (log difference) between 1980 and 2010
(consistent with routinization), where routine jobs are defined as occupations that are above
the 66 percentile in terms of the RTI index following Autor and Dorn (2013). Figure 2.4(b)
shows that TFP growth and employment growth are negatively correlated across industries,
consistent with complementarity across jobs and/or industries.21
However, note that the computer industry is a conspicuous outlier. In Figure 2.4(a),
despite having a routine job share around the median, not only is the computer industry’s
TFP growth 10 times larger than other industries at similar levels of routineness, it is in fact
2 to 4 times larger than the next two industries with the highest levels of TFP growth overall.
Despite this, as shown in Figure 2.4(b), its employment barely fell. With complementarity
across industries, a high productivity growth sector should lose value-added and employment
shares. A possible explanation is that other industries depend heavily on the computer
21Employment in this figure is full-time plus part-time workers (FTPT). Full-time equivalent (FTE)
employment shows similar patterns, but is only available by industry from 1997 onward. For this period,
there are level differences between the two measures, but dynamic patterns are similar for both.
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industry, so that even as its productivity grows the size of this sector would not shrink as
long as other industries rely on it more. If so, those industries with faster growth in computer
capital should grow faster than those that use computers less intensively in terms of output:
since computer capital is a factor in production, it would not necessarily increase productivity.
Figure 2.5 confirms the positive relationship between the growth of computer capital (total
investment into hardware and software from 1980-2010) for an industry and its value-added
growth between 1980 and 2010.
2.3 Model
The model for our quantitative analysis builds on those in Goos et al. (2014) and Lee and
Shin (2017), both of which simultaneously analyze an economy’s occupational and industrial
structure. In particular, the latter explicitly models how workers of heterogeneous skill sort
into different occupations, and also industries that differ in the intensity with which they
combine workers of different occupations for production. Here we ignore selection on skill,
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but instead expand previous models by letting all industries use output from the computer
sector as a capital good in production, an important channel through which the productivity
gains of the computer industry affect aggregate production.
Environment A representative household maximizes its discounted sum of utility
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints,
Ct + It + pI,tFt ≤ Yt,
where I is investment in traditional capital (machinery and equipment excluding computer
hardware and software), F investment in computer capital, and pI the price of computers.
The final good is the numeraire, which can be used for consumption and traditional capital
investment. The law of motion for each type of capital satisfies
Kt+1 = It + (1− δK)Kt, St+1 = Ft + (1− δS)St,
where (K,S) are traditional and computer capital, respectively, and (δK , δS) their depreciation
rates. In what follows, we drop the time subscript unless necessary, and simply denote next
period variables with a prime.
Within the representative household is a unit mass of identical individuals who supply
labor inelastically to one of J occupations, indexed by j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. The final good is
produced by combining products from I sectors, which we index by i ∈ {1, . . . , I}. To be
specific, final good production combines industrial output using a CES aggregator with the
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elasticity of substitution :
Y =
[
I∑
i=1
γ
1

i Y
−1

i
] 
−1
.
In each sector, a representative firm organizes the J occupations to produce sectoral output
Yi according to
Yi = AiK
αi
i Z
1−αi
i , (2.1)
where Ai is industry i’s exogenous sector-specific productivity and Zi a computer-labor
composite that combines computer capital Si with an occupation composite Xi:
Zi =
[
ω
1
ρi
i S
ρi−1
ρi
i + (1− ωi)
1
ρiX
ρi−1
ρi
i
] ρi
ρi−1
, Xi =
[
J∑
j=1
ν
1
σ
ij (MjLij)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
.
Each Lij is the number of occupation j labor (i.e., workers) used in sector i, and Mj is the
exogenous occupation-specific productivity of job j that differs across occupations but not
sectors. The parameters ωi and νij are CES weights that differ by sector, as well as ρi, the
elasticity of substitution between computers and labor in sector i. However, we assume that
the elasticity of substitution across occupations, σ, is identical across sectors. There are
several reasons we let the ρ’s vary across sectors but not σ, which we discuss in Section 2.4.2.
Since each industry uses all types of occupations but with different intensities νij , changes
in Mj would have differential effects on the occupation composite Xi, and thus on Zi, the
computer-labor composite. Ultimately, it will manifest itself as differential effects on sectoral
productivity and output. In contrast, changes in Ai affects sectoral productivity and output
directly.
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Computer capital Si is also used in all sectors, and without loss of generality we will
assume that the computer industry is industry i = I. So the total amount of computer capital
in the economy is S =
∑I
i=1 Si and F is the total amount of newly produced computers.
While the model assumes that computer capital is required for production in all industries,
there is no other input-output linkage among the rest. Each industry rents traditional capital
and computer capital at rates RK and RS.
Equilibrium The final good firm takes prices pi as given and solves
max
{
Y −
I∑
i=1
piYi
}
. (2.2)
Each sector i firm takes all prices as given and chooses capital, computer capital and labor
to solve
max
{
piYi −RKKi −RSSi − w
J∑
j=1
Lij
}
, (2.3)
where pi is the price of the sector i good, RK the rental rate of traditional capital, RS
the rental rate of computer capital, and w the wage rate—which is equal across jobs since
individuals do not differ in skill. In a competitive equilibrium,
1. Final good producers choose Yi to maximize profits (2.2), so
γiY /Yi = p

i for i ∈ {1, . . . , I}. (2.4)
Since we normalized the final good price to 1,
I∑
i=1
γip
1−
i = 1
1
1− = 1
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is the ideal price index.
2. All sector i firms maximize profits (2.3). The first-order necessary conditions are
RK = αipiYi/Ki, (2.5a)
RS = (1− αi) · (piYi/Zi) · (ωiZi/Si)
1
ρi , (2.5b)
w = (1− αi) · (piYi/Zi) · [(1− ωi)Zi/Xi]
1
ρi ·
[
νijM˜jXi/Lij
] 1
σ
(2.5c)
where M˜ :=Mσ−1.
3. Capital, computer and labor markets clear:
K =
I∑
i=1
Ki, S =
I∑
i=1
Si, L =
I∑
i=1
Li =
I∑
i=1
[
J∑
j=1
Lij
]
(2.6)
where Li :=
∑
j Lij is the total amount of labor used in sector i.
4. The rental rates satisfy
u′(C)
βu′(C ′)
= 1 + r = R′K + (1− δK) = [R′S + (1− δS)p′I ] /pI , (2.7)
and the transversality conditions hold.
lim
t→∞
βtu′(Ct)Kt = 0, lim
t→∞
βtu′(Ct)St = 0.
Equilibrium Characterization From (2.4) and (2.5a), we find that
αipiYi/αIpIYI = Ki/KI = (αi/αI) (γi/γI)
1
 · (Yi/YI)
−1

⇒ αipiyi/αIpIyI = ki/kI = (αi/αI) (γi/γI)
1
 · (yi/yI)
−1
 · (Li/LI)−
1
 ,
68
where yi := Yi/Li is output per worker and ki := Ki/Li is capital per worker in sector i. So
using (2.1), we can write
Ai
AI
=
(
αI
αi
) 
−1
· k

−1−αi
i
k

−1−αI
I
· z
1−αI
I
z1−αii
·
(
γILi
γiLI
) 1
−1
(2.8)
where (zi, si) is the labor productivity and computer per worker in sector i. From (2.5c),
holding i fixed we obtain Lij/Li1 = νijM˜j/νi1M˜1 for all j, so
Lij =
(
V˜ 1−σi · νijM˜j
)
· Li and Xi = V˜iLi, where V˜i :=
(
J∑
j=1
νijM˜j
) 1
σ−1
. (2.9)
Then the equilibrium allocations of (Lij, Zi) can be expressed as
Lij/Li = νijM˜jV˜
1−σ
i , and (2.10)
Zi =
[
ω
1
ρi
i S
ρi−1
ρi
i + V
1
ρi
i L
ρi−1
ρi
i
] ρi
ρi−1 ⇒ zi := Zi/Li =
[
ω
1
ρi
i s
ρi−1
ρi
i + V
1
ρi
i
] ρi
ρi−1
(2.11)
where Vi := (1− ωi)V˜ ρi−1i . Plugging these expressions into (2.5b)-(2.5c) we obtain
RS = (1− αi) · (piyi/zi) · (ωizi/si)
1
ρi , (2.12a)
w = (1− αi) · (piyi/zi) · (Vizi)
1
ρi , (2.12b)
and taking the wage-computer rent ratio (w/RS) across all sectors, we can express all other
sectors’ computer capital per worker relative to the computer sector’s:
(Vi/ωi) · si = [(VI/ωI) · sI ]
ρi
ρI (2.13)
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and plugging this expression into the definition of zi in (2.11), we obtain
zi = V
1
ρi−1
i
[
1 + (ωi/Vi) [(VI/ωI) · sI ]
ρi−1
ρI
] ρi
ρi−1
. (2.14)
Thus, all zi’s can be obtained given sI , the computer sector’s computer capital per worker,
and exogenous parameters. Similarly, taking the wage-capital rent ratio (w/RK) across all
sectors using (2.5a) and (2.12b), we obtain
(1− αi)αI
(1− αI)αi ·
ki
kI
=
(
z
ρi−1
ρi
i /z
ρI−1
ρI
I
)/(
V
1
ρi
i /V
1
ρI
I
)
, (2.15)
and since all zi’s are functions of sI , all ki’s can be obtained given sI and kI ’s, the computer
sector’s traditional capital per worker. So the equilibrium allocation can be found from (2.8)
subject to the market clearing conditions (2.6).
Discussion In our model, sector- and occupation-specific productivities are exogenous
(Ai and Mj, respectively). In particular, sector-specific productivities Ai are distinct from
“sectoral productivity” which refers to the productivity of a sector in an accounting sense.
And since the occupation-specific productivities affect sectoral productivity through Vi :=
(1 − ωi)(
∑
j νijM˜j)
ρi−1
σ−1 , sectoral productivity depends on Mj’s as well as Ai. Specifically,
sectoral productivity in our model is obtained by decomposing output into factors:
yˆi =
Aˆi + (1− αi) 1
ρi − 1
V
1
ρi
i
z
ρi−1
ρi
i
Vˆi

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sectoral Productivity
+ αi︸︷︷︸
K share
kˆi + (1− αi)ω
1
ρi
i s
ρi−1
ρi
i
z
ρi−1
ρi
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
S share
sˆi, (2.16)
where xˆ := d logx.
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The above is our definition of productivity in the subsequent quantitative analysis, which is
distinct from traditional measures of TFP.22 A rise inMj , the occupation-specific productivity
of job j, raises sectoral productivity through changes in Vi. In this case, all sectoral productiv-
ities would move in the same direction (either up or down), but their growth rates will differ
depending on the sector-specific parameters included in the expression for sectoral productiv-
ity in (2.16), as well as the endogenous response of zi. And since the production technology
is homogeneous of degree one (HD1), aggregate productivity is a sectoral output-weighted
average of the sectoral productivities. Hence changes in the exogenous productivities Ai or
Mj affect aggregate productivity both directly by changing all sector’s sectoral productivities,
but also indirectly by altering sectoral output shares.
Last but not least, changes in AI , the computer industry’s sector-specific productivity, has
further repercussions on aggregate output. As other industries, changes in AI alter aggregate
productivity both directly (by increasing the computer sector’s sectoral productivity) and
indirectly (by altering the output share of the computer industry). But in addition, it
lowers the price of computers (pI) and consequently the rental rate of computer capital
(RS), leading to a rise in the use of computers for industries whose elasticity of substitution
between computers and labor (ρi) is larger than one. Consequently, not only because it raises
aggregate productivity, but also because it increases the use of computers in all sectors, a
rise in AI contributes more to an increase in aggregate output than any other sector-specific
productivity does.
22The difference is that conventional TFP measurements separate only capital and labor, while we are
taking out computers as a distinct type of capital with its own income share.
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Industry BEA industry code
Mining 211, 212, 213
Construction 23
Durable goods manufacturing 311FT, 313TT, 315AL, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326
Non-durable goods manufacturing 321, 327, 331, 332, 333, 335, 3361MV, 3364OT, 337, 339
FIRE 521CI, 523, 524, 531, 532RL
Health 621, 622HO
Other high-skill services 512, 513, 514, 5411, 5412OP, 5415, 55, 61
Trade (Retail & Wholesale) 42, 44RT
Other low-skill services 22, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487OS, 493, 561, 562, 624,
711AS, 713, 721, 722, 81
Computer 334, 511
Table 2.1: Industry classification
Refer to BEA Industry Accounts for names of industries. The computer industry comprises hardware
(computer and electronic products) and software (publishing industries).
2.4 Quantitative Analysis
For the quantitative analysis, we classify industries into ten groups as summarized in Table
2.1. We exclude the agricultural sector and government. In Table 2.2, we classify occupations
into ten groups which broadly correspond to one-digit occupation groups in the census. We
then fit the model exactly to the data for 1980, and let only the exogenous occupation- and
sector-specific productivities (Mj, Ai) grow at a constant rate. Thus, a major test of the
model is how well it replicates the data in 2010, or equivalently, the growth of sectoral and
aggregate variables from 1980 to 2010.
2.4.1 Calibration
Aggregate production function The parameters of the final good production function
are estimated outside of the model using real and nominal value-added data by industry.
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Occupation Occupation code
High skill
Management 4 - 37
Professionals 43 - 199
Middle skill
Mechanics & Construction 503 - 599
Miners & Precision workers 614 - 699
Technicians 203 - 235
Sales 243 - 283
Transportation 803 - 889
Machine operators 703 - 799
Administrative support 303 - 389
Low skill services 405 - 498
Table 2.2: Occupation classification
Consistent occupation code (occ1990dd) constructed following Autor and Dorn (2013).
Specifically, we estimate the sectoral weights γi and complementarity parameter  from
log(piYi/pIYI) =
1

(γi/γI) +
− 1

log(Yi/YI), for i = 1, · · · , I − 1.
This system of equations is estimated by iterated feasible generalized nonlinear least squares
method. To reflect constraints on the parameters ( > 0 and 0 < γi < 1), we estimate the
unconstrained coefficents b and ci’s in
log(pi,tYi,t/pI,tYI,t) = (1 + e
b)ci + e
b log(Yi,t/YI,t) + εi,t,
where  = 1/(1 + eb) and γi = eci/(1 +
∑
eci).
Each sector i in the model consists of several industries in the BEA Industry Accounts, to
which we apply the Törnqvist index to obtain the price index of sector i. Real quantities
Yi are similarly aggregated up from the detailed BEA data. The aggregate price index is
normalized to 1 in 1963, the initial year in the data. The sample period for the estimation
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Table 2.3: Estimation results
Parameters Estimates
 0.765
∗∗∗
(0.002)
γ1 0.084
∗∗∗
(0.001)
γ2 0.159
∗∗∗
(0.002)
γ3 0.099
∗∗∗
(0.003)
γ4 0.124
∗∗∗
(0.002)
γ5 0.142
∗∗∗
(0.001)
γ6 0.087
∗∗∗
(0.002)
γ7 0.057
∗∗∗
(0.002)
γ8 0.094
∗∗∗
(0.003)
γ9 0.117
∗∗∗
(0.002)
AIC -1001.432
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗
p < 0.10,
∗∗
p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01
covers 1980 to 2010, which is our main interest. The point estimates for  and γi are presented
in Table 2.3.
Parameters calibrated without simulation In the calibration, we fix the traditional
capital share of only the computer industry (αI) from the data. Though computing the total
capital share is straightforward (i.e., 1 minus labor share), computing the traditional capital
share according to our model is not. To obtain this number for the computer industry, we
follow Koh et al. (2016), which we briefly describe below.
We begin by specifying an empirical no-arbitrage condition for rental prices. The return
on both types of capital must be equal to the interest rate 1 + r′, so
[R′K + (1− δ′K)p′K ]/pK = [R′S + (1− δ′S)p′I ]/pI (2.17)
where pK is the price of traditional capital and pI the price of computers. Note that this is
different from the model’s no-arbitrage condition (2.7) in that we have included the price
of capital, which in the model we had normalized to be equal to the price of the final
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Parameters Value Obtained from
σ 0.815 Mean absolute distance of the changes in the employment share
r + δS 0.300 Average depreciation rate of computer capital from FAT
Table 2.4: Calibrated Parameters
consumption good. Next, since sectoral production is HD1 in all factor inputs (traditional
and computer capital, and labor), for the computer industry we have
1− labor shareI = RKKI
pIYI
+
RSSI
pIYI
.
We solve for RK and RS from these two equations assuming a steady state (R′K = RK , R
′
S =
RS and pK = p′K , pI = p
′
I), plugging in for all other variables using data on the quantities,
prices and depreciation rates of each type of capital (from BEA FAT Nonresidential Estimates
by Industry and Type); and the computer industry’s real and nominal value-added, and its
labor share (from BEA Industry Accounts).23 Once we know RS, we can set αI = RSSI/pIYI
since all other variables are recovered directly from the data. We rely only on data from 1980.
Although the above procedure can be used for all industries, in our calibration we only
use it to compute the computer industry’s traditional capital share. All other industries’
traditional capital shares are calibrated directly from the model as explained below. Appendix
Figure B1(a) compares the traditional capital shares obtained using the above procedure
against those predicted by the calibration, which confirms that they are generally consistent.
Method of Moments The rest of parameters are recovered from simulating model mo-
ments to match corresponding data moments. To be precise, we plug the data for Lij (from
the IPUMS Census), and (ki, si) (from the BEA FAT Nonresidential Estimates by Industry
23 We take the weighted average across industries 334 and 511 (software and hardware) to obtain this value
for the computer industry, which in our quantitative model comprises both. For each industry, computer
capital is the sum of the net stock of “computers and peripheral equipment” and “software.”
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and Type) directly into the equilibrium equations, assuming a steady state in both 1980 and
2010, respectively. The detailed procedure is as follows:
1. Guess σ.
(a) Fix αI as above, and guess AI,1980 and ρi’s.
i. For 1980: obtain (νij, ωi, αi, Ai,1980) given guess.
- NormalizeMj = 1 for all j. Then the industry-specific occupation weights
νij ’s and V˜i are recovered from (2.9)-(2.10) using data on 1980 employment
shares..
- From (2.12a) of industry I, and replacing for yi using (2.1) and zi using
(2.11), ωI must solve
RS = (1− αI) · AIkαII ·
[
ω
1
ρI
I s
ρI−1
ρI
I + (1− ωI)
1
ρI V˜
ρI−1
ρI
I
] 1−ρIαI
ρI−1 · (ωI/sI)
1
ρI ,
given data on kI and sI in 1980. The solution ωI ∈ (0, 1) if 1 < (1 −
αI)AI(kI/sI)
αI .
- Given ωI , obtain all other ωi’s from (2.13) (since V := (1− ωi)V˜ ρi−1i ).
- For all i 6= I, compute αi’s from (2.15) by replacing for zi using (2.14),
and plugging in data on (ki, si).
- Exogenous sector-specific productivities Ai,1980’s are recovered from (2.8)
and AI,1980.
ii. For 2010: obtain Mj,2010 and updated guesses for the substitutability between
computers and workers, ρnewi .
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- Choose the Mj’s that yields the best fit of (2.10) across all i given 2010
employment shares:
Mj
M1
=
[∑
i
(
Li · Lij
Li1
· νi1
νij
)]/∑
i
Li,
Using this we can compute V˜i for 2010 using (2.9).
- From (2.15), we set ρnewI to get the best fit of
ρnewI · I =
∑
i
 log(ωI V˜I)− log((1− ωI)sI)log [(1− αI(1−αi)ki
αi(1−αI)kI
)
V˜I
]
− log
(
sIαI(1−αi)ki
αi(1−αI)kI − si
)

given data on (ki, si) in 2010.
Note that we need si/sI < (1 − αi)αIki/(αi(1 − αI)kI) < 1 or si/sI >
(1−αi)αIki/(αi(1−αI)kI) > 1 for ρnewI to be a real number. We exclude
those industries with (ki, si) for which this condition is not satisfied only
when we compute ρnewI .
- Compute the implied ρnewi ’s that are consistent with the 2010 si’s, i.e.,
ρnewi =
ρnewI log
(
1−ωi
ωisiV˜i
)
ρnewI log
(
V˜I
V˜i
)
+ log
(
1−ωI
ωIsI V˜I
)
(b) Iterate over ρi’s till ρi ≈ ρnewi .
(c) Set AI,1980 so that yI equals the computer industry’s real value-added per worker
in the data. Iterate over AI,1980 till convergence.
2. Iterate over σ to minimize
∑
j |`dj,2010 − `mj,2010|, where `j is the employment share of
occupation j.
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In the outermost loop of the above procedure, note that we use occupation employment shares
in aggregate. The industry-specific occupation weights νij’s were recovered only from within
industry employment shares by occupation. Once we have recovered all the parameters,
1. Get Ai,2010’s to match measured productivity by sector in (2.16) to 2010 data.24
2. Between 1980 and 2010, we assume that the Mj,t’s, and all Ai,t’s except AI , grow at
constant rates, so:
Mj,t =Mj,1980(Mj,2010/Mj,1980)
(t−1980)/30,
Ai,t = Ai,1980(Ai,2010/Ai,1980)
(t−1980)/30.
3. The computer sector’s exogenous productivity (AI) for other years are chosen so that
the sectoral productivity of the computer sector in (2.16) is equal in the data and
model.
2.4.2 Properties of the Benchmark Model
The calibration results are summarized in Tables 2.5 to 2.7. Since changes in Mj affect
occupational employment across all industries, we can identify occupation-specific productivi-
ties separately from the sector-specific productivities. Specifically, occupational employment
data alone gives enough information to identify the Mj’s, from Equation (2.10). Given
this, we can identify the sector-specific Ai’s to fit measured sectoral productivities from the
data using (2.16). The calibrated values for Mj’s show that routine intensive occupations,
such as machine operators or mechanics, indeed experienced much faster growth in their
24We compute traditional and computer capital income shares, and measure sectoral productivity directly
from the data. Hence, the model’s sectoral output may differ from the data.
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Figure 2.6: Computer per worker growth between 1980 and 2010
Source: BEA Industry Accounts and FAT. See Table 2.1 for details of the industry classification. Computer
capital is measured as the sum of “computers and peripheral equipment” and “software” by industry, available
in FAT Table 3.1.
occupation-specific productivities. And as expected, the sector-specific productivity of the
computer industry (AI) grew exceptionally fast especially during the 1990s.
It is also noteworthy that the ρi’s are identified from how computer capital per worker (si)
and traditional capital per worker (ki) evolve differently across industries. Roughly speaking,
when an industry that increases computers per worker more than other industries also uses
more traditional capital per worker, the elasticity of substitution ρi tends to be greater than
one (Equation 2.15). But since traditional capital is a constant share of production in our
model, our model admits ρi > 1 for sectors whose output per worker increases with computers
per worker. Since this is indeed the case for most industries in the data, as we saw in Figure
2.5, all calibrated ρi’s are larger than 1.25 This also implies that computerization leads to a
decline in the labor share both at the sector and aggregate levels.
25Figure 2.5 shows that some small industries have a negative relationship in the data, but this is no longer
the case once we aggregate the 60 industries into 10 more broadly defined sectors.
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Param/Target Const FIRE Health
High
serv.
Low
serv.
Dur Mine
Non-
durable
Trade
Comp-
uter
γ outside 0.084 0.159 0.099 0.124 0.142 0.087 0.057 0.094 0.117 0.037
ρ si,2010 1.699 1.213 1.413 1.461 1.415 1.263 1.445 1.559 1.419 1.840
ω si,1980 0.001 0.094 0.003 0.025 0.006 0.028 0.020 0.009 0.008 0.020
α ki,1980 0.167 0.374 0.301 0.454 0.475 0.333 0.793 0.402 0.186 0.322
Table 2.5: Industry specific parameters
Industry weights γi and the computer industry’s traditional capital income share αI are estimated directly
from the data using the BEA Industry Accounts and FAT, while the rest are calibrated according to a method
of moments. See text for details.
In turn, sectors with higher computer per worker growth would also have higher values of
ρi, as in Figure 2.6. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6(a), which plots computer per worker
growth in the data against the ρi’s. While panel (a) makes it clear how the relative values of
ρi are identified across sectors, note that the relationship is not exactly linear, even though
the model fits computer capital per worker exactly by assumption as shown in panel (b)—
since their empirical values are directly fed into step 1.ii of our calibration. This is because
computers are not substituting labor directly, but only indirectly through the occupation
composite Xi.26
Model Fit The model-implied employment share changes fit the data better by occupa-
tion than by industry (Figure 2.7). This is because the Mj’s directly affect occupational
employment through (2.10), and once we match sectoral productivity growth by industry
using (2.16), employment by industry is pinned down by (2.8).
This is also an indirect consequence of assuming constant σ’s across all industries. Note
that nowhere in our calibration did we separately target 2010 traditional capital per worker,
nor employment share changes by industry. Our calibration step 1.ii and Equation (2.15)
26Related, since computers substitute a composite of labor rather than each occupation separately, the values
of the substitutability parameters ρi’s are potentially sensitive to σ, which measures the complementarity
across occupations. We find that this is not the case for a wide range of values for σ lower than its benchmark
value, as shown in Appendix Table B1. While ρi’s are sensitive to much larger values of σ, then it becomes
impossible to fit other moments in the data (employment shares and TFP by industry).
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L serv. Admin. Mach Sales Trans Tech Mech Mine. Prof. Mngm
Const 0.009 0.058 0.027 0.009 0.218 0.016 0.564 0.015 0.021 0.061
FIRE 0.048 0.444 0.005 0.225 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.004 0.021 0.211
Health 0.328 0.172 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.122 0.009 0.011 0.293 0.050
H serv. 0.109 0.222 0.010 0.020 0.022 0.043 0.037 0.007 0.420 0.110
L serv. 0.375 0.143 0.025 0.041 0.129 0.012 0.080 0.023 0.070 0.101
Durable 0.022 0.115 0.372 0.021 0.102 0.027 0.081 0.136 0.049 0.076
Mining 0.017 0.103 0.047 0.010 0.195 0.051 0.121 0.311 0.065 0.080
Non-dur 0.028 0.118 0.386 0.039 0.135 0.023 0.050 0.106 0.036 0.079
Trade 0.025 0.150 0.022 0.406 0.152 0.005 0.066 0.042 0.022 0.110
Computer 0.016 0.165 0.310 0.059 0.042 0.062 0.041 0.070 0.124 0.111
Table 2.6: Industry-occupation specific weights on labor (νij)
Calibration results for νij from a method of moments. Empirical targets are within-industry employment
shares by occupation in 1980.
Target: emp. share by ind. and occ. in 2010 Target: measured productivity in 1980 and 2010
Mj 1980 1990 2000 2010 Ai 1980 1990 2000 2010
Low serv. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Const 14.125 10.394 7.648 5.628
Admin. 1.000 1.384 1.914 2.649 FIRE 17.924 17.267 16.633 16.023
Machine 1.000 2.273 5.168 11.749 Health 6.155 6.460 6.780 7.115
Sales 1.000 0.590 0.348 0.205 High serv. 1.385 1.624 1.904 2.232
Trans 1.000 1.263 1.595 2.014 Low serv. 0.050 0.053 0.057 0.060
Tech 1.000 0.736 0.542 0.399 Durable 0.198 0.191 0.185 0.179
Mechanics 1.000 1.610 2.591 4.171 Mining 3.048 3.104 3.161 3.219
Mine. 1.000 1.444 2.085 3.010 Non-durable 0.701 0.708 0.716 0.724
Prof. 1.000 0.553 0.306 0.169 Trade 0.269 0.373 0.516 0.714
Mngm 1.000 0.461 0.212 0.098 Computer 1.945 3.667 13.624 26.618
Table 2.7: Occupation- and sector-specific productivity
Occupation-specific productivities are normalized to 1 in 1980. For 2010, we minimize the distance between
the model and data on within-industry employment shares by occupation averaged across all industries in
the IPUMS Census. The computer industry’s 1980 sector-specific productivity is chosen to minimize the
distance between model and data on its real value-added per worker in the BEA Industry Accounts, while
all other industries’ productivities are implied by the model and data on capital and labor data relative
to the computer sector from the Industry Accounts and FAT. All sector-specific productivities in 2010 are
recovered from our expression for sectoral productivity in (2.16), using the Industry Accounts data and our
calibrated parameters. Except for the computer sector-specific productivity AI , all Ai’s are assumed to grow
at a constant rate from 1980 to 2010.
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Figure 2.7: Changes in employment shares between 1980 and 2010
Data Source: occupation data are from IPUMS Census, and industries from BEA Industry Accounts. See
Table 2.2 for details of the occupation classification.
exploit all three factors at once, per industry, using only data on 2010 computer capital per
worker by industry. This makes it clear that we can only let one of ρ or σ vary by sector.27
Both would affect how factor input ratios, and in particular computer capital per worker
si, change across sectors in response to changes in Mj’s. But one of our major goals is to
quantitatively compare how aggregate productivity is affected by complementarity across
occupations (shifts in Mj through σ) relative to complementarity across industries (shifts in
Ai through ). How to implement such a comparison becomes less obvious if σ’s vary across
sectors.
More important, letting the elasticity of substitution between computers and labor (ρi)
vary across sectors directly captures how computer capital per worker evolves differentially
across sectors, as we discussed above. If we were to instead let σ vary, the effect is only
indirect since computer-labor substitution would differ across sectors only due to differential
shifts in relative labor demand. That is, unlike the clear relationship between ρi and the
27Since the Vi’s are functions of σ.
82
growth of computer per worker si as seen in Figure 2.6(a), there would be no systematic
relationship between σ and si since it would also depend on the sector-specific occupation
weights νij’s.
Thus, our exact fit to computer capital per worker growth, to some extent, comes at the
expense of a lesser fit to employment share changes and traditional capital per worker growth
by industry. See Figures 2.7(b) and 2.8(b). This indicates that the unit elasticity assumption
between traditional capital and other factors, and also the assumption that the elasticity is
constant across sectors, may be too stringent. Still, both changes in employment shares and
traditional capital per worker by industry are qualitatively consistent with the data.
More assuringly, even though we did not use any data on output per worker growth—
neither by industry nor in aggregate—nor aggregate productivity, the model prediction of
output per worker growth by industry is remarkably close to the data, Figure 2.8(a). Most
importantly for our purposes, the model generates a slowdown in aggregate output and
productivity growth starting in 2000, similarly as in the data, as shown in Figure 2.9 and
tabulated in Appendix Table B2. The fit to aggregate productivity is especially remarkable
considering that we assume constant productivity growth rates for Mj and Ai—other than
AI—and do not target any aggregate variables in 2010.
Lastly, the model-implied factor income shares by industry are also generally consistent
with the data (Appendix Figure B1). Partly because of this, the aggregate labor share in
the model closely tracks the trend in the data, both in direction and magnitude (Figure
2.10), despite not being targeted at all at the sectoral nor aggregate levels. Recall that
our production technology assumes that traditional capital’s income share is constant by
construction. Thus, our results suggest that computer hardware and software, which are a
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Figure 2.8: Log changes of y and k between 1980 and 2010
Data Source: BEA Industry Accounts and FAT. See Table 2.1 for details of the industry classification.
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Figure 2.9: Aggregate production
Data Source: BEA NIPA. Exact numbers for the plots are tabulated in Appendix Table B2.
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Figure 2.10: Changes in labor share: model vs. data
Data Source: BEA NIPA and Industry Accounts. See Table 2.1 for details of the industry classification.
subset of total capital that accounts for 14 percent of all investment, can be responsible for
the vast majority of the fall in the labor share (4 out of 5 percentage points) since 1980.28
2.4.3 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, we investigate the underlying factors that shape aggregate output and
productivity, focusing on routinization and computerization. Routinization in our model
is a faster increase in the occupation-speciifc productivity, Mj, of certain occupations.
Computerization is driven by the computer industry-specific term, AI , which propagates
through all industries because computer capital is used in the production of all industrial
goods.
In our model equilibrium, this propagation happens by shifting the price of computer
capital. High AI shrinks the computer sector employment because of complementarity, but
28As a direct consequence of not fitting capital per worker growth by sector, the model fit to the fall in
labor shares by sector is poorer than in aggregate. Aggregate capital per worker k in the data is directly fed
into the model.
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also lowers the relative price of computers. This, in turn, leads to a drop in the rental rate
of computer capital, which induces all sectors to use more computers. This prevents the
computer sector from shrinking.
Aggregate productivity Note that the growth rates of occupation- and sector-specific
productivities (Mj and Ai) were assumed to be constant for the entire sample period except
for the computer sector’s (AI). Nonetheless, in the benchmark calibration, aggregate TFP
increases almost linearly from 1980 to 2000, slowing down in the last decade (Figure 2.11).29
We now show that the high growth rate of the computer sector-specific productivity (AI)
prevented a potential slowdown in aggregate productivity that would have appeared between
1990 and 2000. Figure 2.11 shows that, if we assume AI were constant between 1980 and 2010,
aggregate productivity growth would have slowed down since 1990. Without the growth in
AI , aggregate productivity would have grown by only 13 percent from 1980 to 2010, one-third
lower than the benchmark growth rate of 20 percent over the same period. This magnitude
is surprising considering the fact that the computer sector’s share of aggregate output is only
3 to 4 percent throughout the observation period.
When all occupation- and sector-specific productivities grow at constant rates over time,
complementarity across jobs and sectors induces the faster growing jobs and sectors to shrink
in relative size, reducing their weights in the computation of aggregate productivity. Hence,
as long as occupation- and sector-specific productivities grow at different rates, aggregate
productivity growth must slow down over time. So both the dispersions in the growth rates of
occupation-specific productivities (Mj) and in sector-specific productivities (Ai’s) contribute
to the aggregate productivity slowdown. To find out which dispersion is more important for
the slowdown, we conduct the following exercises.
29Aggregate productivity growth is measured as d log(y) − (traditional capital share) · d log(k) −
(computer share) · d log(s).
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Figure 2.11: Aggregate Productivity without Computerization
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Figure 2.12: Aggregate Productivity without Complementarity
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Figure 2.13: Aggregate Output without Computerization
In the first exercise, we force all Mj’s to grow at the same rate m for all j (i.e., no
routinization) while leaving the growth rates of Ai’s to be different from one another as in
the benchmark. Second, we force all Ai’s to grow at a common rate a while leaving the
growth rates of Mj’s heterogeneous as in the benchmark. The common growth rates m and
a are set so that aggregate productivity grows at the same rate as in the first decade of our
benchmark calibration. The results are shown in Figure 2.12, which shows that routinization,
or the dispersion in the growth rates of Mj , is more important in explaining the decline in the
growth rate of aggregate productivity. Without routinization, the growth rate of aggregate
productivity remains near 0.8 percent per year throughout the three decades. In contrast,
even when all sector-specific productivities grow at a common rate, aggregate productivity
growth falls almost as much as in the benchmark. Of course for the latter exercise, we are
also ruling out the faster growth of the computer sector, which partially explains the gap
between the benchmark growth rate and this counterfactual growth rate in the 1990s.
Output Fast-growing computer sector-specific productivity directly boosts aggregate pro-
ductivity, which leads to an acceleration of aggregate output growth. Furthermore, there is
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Figure 2.14: Output Growth by Industry without Computerization
In panel (a), we plug in model-simulated income shares and quantities into the accounting equations in
(2.18). In panel (b), we plug in data from NIPA and FAT directly. See Table 2.1 for details of the industry
classification.
an additional effect on aggregate output, since all sectors use more computer capital. Figure
2.13 shows the total effect of computerization on aggregate output. If AI were to remain
constant between 1980 and 2010, aggregate output growth from 1980 to 2010 would be 63
percent, or only about half of the growth in the benchmark. As expected, this is a larger
impact than that on aggregate productivity.
Figure 2.14 shows output growth by industry with and without AI growth. Due to the
substitutability between computer and labor, all industries benefit from computerization.
Unsurprisingly, the computer industry itself is affected the most, followed by finance and
high-skilled services. The construction industry has the least to gain (in terms of output
growth) from computerization.
Labor share Because the model calibration yields sector-specific elasticities of substitution
between labor and computer capital (ρi) that are larger than 1, computerization results
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Figure 2.15: Changes in Labor Income Shares by Industry
“no comp”: no computerization. “common m”: no complementarity across jobs. “common a”: no complemen-
tarity across industries. See Table 2.1 for details of the industry classification.
in the decline of labor shares in all sectors. Figure 2.15 shows changes in labor shares by
industry for various counterfactual exercises. Among all these exercises, the only two that
affect labor shares are when we eliminate computerization either explicitly (in red); or by
assuming common growth rates across all industries (in sky-blue). So we can conclude that
the growth in AI is the only important driving force behind the decline of the labor share.
Computer capital in the measurement of TFP In our benchmark, we measured
aggregate productivity growth between times s and t as follows:
log(At/As) = log(Yt/Ys)− 1
2
(
LIt
Yt
+
LIs
Ys
)
log(Lt/Ls)− 1
2
(
SIt
Yt
+
SIs
Ys
)
log(St/Ss)
− 1
2
(
KIt
Yt
+
KIs
Ys
)
log(Kt/Ks), (2.18a)
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where LI is labor income, SI is computer capital income, and KI is traditional capital
income. But typically, the standard way we compute TFP growth (the Solow residual Aˆ) is
log(Aˆt/Aˆs) = log(Yt/Ys)− 1
2
(
LIt
Yt
+
LIs
Ys
)
log(Lt/Ls)
− 1
2
(
KIs + SIt
Yt
+
KIs + SIs
Ys
)
log[(Kt + St)/(Ks + Ss)]. (2.18b)
Note that At and Aˆt can differ, especially when the gross rate of return on computer capital
and traditional capital are different. By inspection of (2.17), we see that this happens when
either the investment prices and/or the depreciation rates of the two types of capital differ.
In particular, the gross rate of return on computer capital is generally higher than traditional
capital because the former depreciates more quickly. This implies that the standard way of
computing TFP without separating out computer capital will overestimate the growth rate
of aggregate productivity.
In Figure 2.16, we compare aggregate productivity from our benchmark calibration (A)
against the TFP (standard Solow residual, Aˆ), both according to our model (panel a) and in
the data (panel b). For panel (a), we plug in our model-simulated data into (2.18). For panel
(b), we impute all variables needed in (2.18) directly from the data. The figure confirms
that the aggregate productivity growth is overestimated by about 10 percentage points over
the past 30 years if computer capital is not explicitly separated, both in the data and also
according to our model.
Summary of quantitative analysis There are two main findings from our quantitative
analysis. First, constant occupation- and sector-specific technological progress necessarily
slows down aggregate productivity growth over time, given complementarity across jobs
and industries. Second, it was the dispersion in the growth rates across occupations (i.e.,
routinization) that was most responsible for the aggregate productivity slowdown. This
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Figure 2.16: Comparing different measures of TFP’s
In panel (a), we plug in model-simulated income shares and quantities into the accounting equations in (2.18).
In panel (b), we plug in data from NIPA and FAT directly.
negative impact of routinization on the growth rate of aggregate productivity was more
or less perfectly counterbalanced by the impressive technological progress specific to the
computer industry and its spillover through inter-industry linkages during the 1980s and the
1990s. The slower pace of the computer sector’s productivity growth in recent years—and the
associated deceleration of computer usage by other industries since 2000—is finally revealing
the negative impact that decades of routinization has had on aggregate productivity growth.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
We presented a model in which productivities grow at heterogeneous rates across occupations
(routinization), and also across industries. In particular, to understand the effect of the rise of
the computer industry on aggregate productivity, we let its output be used in the production
of all industries as a distinct type of capital.
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We showed that when occupations and industries are complementary to one another
and occupation- and sector-specific productivities grow at different rates, routinization in
particular causes a slowdown in aggregate productivity. But such a slowdown was averted
prior to the 2000s in the U.S., thanks to the rapid rise of the computer industry’s productivity.
It was only after the productivity of this sector slowed down that routinization began to
reveal its negative impact on aggregate productivity growth.
The main message of our model is that multiple layers of the economy (i.e., occupations and
sectors) can interact to generate interesting time trends that can help us reconcile evidence at
the occupation and sector levels with aggregate trends. Moreover, we have also highlighted
the importance of inter-industry linkages by showcasing that a single industry—in our case
the computer industry—can have large effects on aggregate variables once such a propagation
mechanism is taken into account.
In reality, all industries are interlinked, not only by providing intermediate inputs to one
another as emphasized in some recent models (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Atalay, 2017) but also
by serving different types of capital in which all industries need to invest (as we have modeled
here). Modeling such additional layers of complexity is left for future research.
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Chapter 3
Growth Facts with Intellectual
Property Products: An Exploration
of 31 OECD New National Accounts
This chapter was coauthored with Dongya Koh and Raül Santaeulália-Llopis.
3.1 Introduction
In 2009, the United Nation Statistical Commission adopted the new System of National
Accounts (SNA) from 2008.30 The most notable update in the new system is the capitalization
of (some) intangibles in national accounts which recognizes the growting importance of
intangibles in the economy. In SNA08, the intangible capital measured by the national
accounts is labeled as intellectual property products (IPP). To be precise, the set of IPP
30 European Commission, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, United Nations, and World Bank, System of National Accounts 2008 (New York: 2009)
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measured by national accounts includes R&D and artistic originals, in addition to computer
software introduced since SNA 1993. By 2016, most OECD countries have implemented the
new system.31
We construct a new data set using new national accounts for 31 OECD countries that
have implemented SNA08. We then use these database to document the secular behavior of
economic growth and the big ratios (à la Kaldor (1957) and Jones (2016)) for these countries.
We find 1) a decline of labor income share, 2) a rise of capital-output ratio, and 3) a rise
of the rate of return to capital. We show that the new secular behavior of the big ratios
that we document is entirely driven by the reclassification of IPP from expense to capital. In
particular we show that treating IPP as expense, as in the pre-SNA93 accounting framework,
we would find a relatively trendelss labor income share, capital-to-output ratio, and rate of
return.
The main accounting assumption behind the capitalization of IPP implemented by national
accounts is that all IPP rents are attributed to capital.32 Specifically, the increase in IPP
investment on the national products accounts is moved to gross operating surplus (hence,
capital income) on the national income accounts. We argue that this accounting assumption
that follows SNA08 guidelines is arbitrary and extreme. Indeed, we show that the assumption
that all IPP rents are capital income is crucial in generating the new facts. Once we relax
this assumption based, for example, on the cost structure of R&D (as in Koh et al. (2018)),
we go back to the familar secular behavior of the big ratios in the pre-SNA93 accounting
framework.
31 A few exceptions are Turkey, Chile, and Japan.
32 See a detailed description of the capitalization IPP implemented by the Bureau of Economic analysis
(BEA) in the U.S in Koh et al. (2018).
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The introduction of IPP as capital in national accounts poses some challenges for mea-
surement that are not present for tangible capital (i.e., structures and equipment) (Corrado
et al., 2005; McGrattan and Prescott, 2005). Indeed, although it is loable that IPP is treated
as capital in national accounts given the long-run nature of its provided services, it is unclear
what are the best assumptions behind the capitalization. First, most IPP is simply unob-
served. Even within the context of the IPP items incorporated in national accounts (which
are arguably better measured), a large part of their production (such as software or R&D) is
conducted in-house without observable transactions for their valuation and pricing. Currently
the national accounts measure this own account production based on costs (plus made-up
nonmarket markups). Second, it is not obvious how to preserve the product-income identity
in the presence of intangibles. Currently the national accounts equate rents generted from
IPP to IPP invesment expenditure and then attribute all these rents to GOS. This is not
justfied empirically. Indeed, many workers directly related to the production of intangibles
(e.g., R&D lab managers) are paid a wage below their marginal value product in exchange of
future equity in the firm (McGrattan and Prescott, 2010, 2014). We show that once we relax
the SNA08 assumption on attributing all IPP rents to capital we find that the labor share of
income, the capital-to-output ratio, and the rate of return are relatively trendless.
That the factor income share is sensitive to the distribution of IPP income has important
implications on the quantitative importance of IPP capital as well, even though it does
not alter the amount of IPP capital. For example, when IPP rents go more to labor, the
contribution of IPP would work more through labor and less through capital. With the
labor share observed in data, the contribution of IPP capital accounts for about a quarter of
Solow residual in level and growth accounting. The additional explanationatory power from
IPP capital goes down to half, however, once relaxing the extreme assumption on the rent
allocation based on the cost structure of R&D activities.
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The paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe the capitalization of IPP in
the national accounts. In Section 3.3 we show the effects of IPP capitalization on economic
growth and the big ratios including the labor share of income, the capital-to-output ratio, and
the rate of return on capital. We conduct a development accounting exercise in Section 3.4
and a growth accounting exercise in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 IPP Capitalization in the National Accounts
In 2009, the United Nation Statistical Commission adopted the new System of National
Accounts, SNA 2008. The most notable update in the new system is an attempt to better
measure the intangible capital in a national economy. In SNA 2008, the intangible capital
measured by the national accounts of OECD countries is labeled as intellectual property
products (IPP). IPP accounts include include R&D and artistic originals, in addition to
computer software introduced since SNA 1993. By 2016, most OECD countries have imple-
mented the new system.33 Koh et al. (2018) explain in detail this accounting change using
the US national income and product accounts.
Since most countries have implemented SNA 2008 very recently, and are still updating
data figures, we build a new dataset that combines data from individual national sources
with the OECD stats database. We construct capital series by type (i.e. tangible, IPP,
and aggregate) using the perpetual inventory method with type specific depreciation rates
obtained from the consumption of fixed capital data whenever available. For countries with
no information on the consumption of fixed capital (either directly or indirectly from capital
stock data), we use estimated depreciation rates corresponding to the level of log GDP per
capita.34 The labor share is also adjusted for self employed income using data for mixed
33 A few exceptions are Turkey, Chile, and Japan.
34 These include Spain, Mexico, and Portugal.
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income or number of self employment, whichever provides longer data. The resulting dataset
has 907 country-year observations covering 31 OECD countries for various time periods (see
our Appendix for details). In documenting the growth facts, we exclude sample with GDP
per capita less than 10,000 USD (in 2005), which is near 1940 in US, to focus on economies
that are near balanced growth path in the sense of Kaldor (1957) and Jones (2016). This
drops 37 out of 907 observations and makes no difference in our results.
Three major differences between our dataset and the Penn World Table (PWT) are
noteworthy. First and most importantly, ours has IPP capital separately whereas PWT
does not. This separation is essential for our study of the effects of IPP capitalization on
growth and the big ratios across time and space. Second, we used longer series of mixed
income or self employment data in general compared to PWT in the adjustment of labor
share. Third, we used information of time varying depreciation rates for the construction of
capital stock while PWT assumes constant depreciation rates for each capital type. These
depreciation rates have implications for the measures of the stock of capital and hence growth
and development accounting decompositions.
What does the IPP capitalization entails for the national product and income accounts?
After the revision, expenditures on IPP capital (XI) are treated as investment, and so the
identity between the national product and national income is,
Y = C +XT +XI = RK︸︷︷︸
gross operating surplus
+ WL︸︷︷︸
compensation of employees
. (3.1)
Instead, before the revision, IPP investment was treated as an expense. Because the revision
has the key accounting assumption that all IPP investment, XI , is moved to gross operating
surplus, GOS, we can summarize the result of the revision in the SNA as following. From
the national income identity, production, expenditure and income side before the revision
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can be expressed as
YPre−SNA2008 = C +XT = (RK − χXI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gross operating surplus
+ (WL− (1− χ)XI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
compensation of employees
. (3.2)
where χ refers to the fraction of IPP expenses coming from capital owners, whereas 1− χ is
the fraction of IPP expenses from workers. That is, χ captures the distribution of IPP rents
across factors of production. The main accounting assumption behind the IPP capitalization
implemented by national statistical offices—following the SNA2008 guidelines—is that χ = 1.
McGrattan and Prescott (2010) refer to χXI and (1−χ)XI as expensed and sweat investment,
respectively. The current accounting practice under the SNA 2008 adds the entire XI to
the gross operating surplus, which implicitly assumes χ = 1. In reality, χ is not neccessarily
one as workers in R&D activities often get paid less than their marginal productivity with
a promise of future equity compensation (McGrattan and Prescott, 2010). This is relevant
as Koh et al. (2018) show that setting χ = 1 has quantitative implications for the secular
behavior of the labor share in the U.S.
3.3 The Effects of IPP Capitalization on Growth and
the Big Ratios
First discuss the effects of IPP capitalizaiton on output growth and dispersion (Section 3.3.1).
Second, we show that the decline of the accounting labor share observed in OECD countries
can be explained by the capitalization of IPP (Secction 3.3.2). The capitalizaiton of IPP is
also behind an increase in the capital-to-output ratio (Section 3.3.3) and in the rate of return
to capital (Section 3.3.4).
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Table 3.1: IPP investment at current PPP rates (Billions) in 2011
IPP inv IPP inv IPP inv IPP inv
AUS 29.8 (3.4) ESP 41.3 (3.0) ISL 0.2 (2.3) NZL 4.2 (3.3)
AUT 16.2 (5.1) EST 0.7 (2.6) ISR 9.8 (4.9) POL 10.2 (1.4)
BEL 17.1 (4.4) FIN 10.7 (6.0) ITA 53.8 (2.9) PRT 7.6 (3.2)
CAN 44.1 (3.4) FRA 117.9 (5.7) KOR 81.5 (6.1) SVK 2.5 (2.0)
CHE 24.6 (6.3) GBR 85.3 (4.3) LUX 1.2 (3.1) SVN 1.8 (3.7)
CZE 9.8 (3.8) GRC 4.8 (1.9) MEX 7.5 (0.4) SWE 25.9 (7.6)
DEU 121.9 (4.1) HUN 5.7 (3.0) NLD 33.0 (5.0) USA 783.8 (5.7)
DNK 11.7 (6.0) IRL 11.7 (6.4) NOR 9.8 (3.7)
Notes: We write in parenthesis the proportion (%) of IPP investment in value added.
3.3.1 Effects of IPP Capitalization on Output Growth and Disper-
sion
Under the new SNA (2008) the production of IPP, xI , is added to the pre-accounting measures
of value added. This procedure has been gradually implemented by OECD countries. Precisely,
the accouting change implies an increase in value added in the OECD output by 4% on
average in 2011. Table 3.1 summarizes the effects of the IPP capitalization on value added
for all our OECD countries in year 2011. The largest change occurs in the US with a value
added that increases by 783.8 billions, the lowest change is by 0.2 billions in Iceland.
The accounting increase in value added due to the capitalization of IPP in percentage
terms, γy, is captured by this ratio,
γy = log
y
y − xI , (3.3)
where y is value added xI is IPP investment, and the denominator, y − xI , captures value
added before the capitalization of IPP. We plot γy for the OECD across time (panel (a1),
Figure 3.1) and across space (panel (a2), Figure 3.1). The increasing importance of IPP
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investment across time and space is clear. Precisely, we find that γy increases from 0.9% in
1930 to 5.8% in 2014 on average in OECD countries. Across space, when a country’s GDP
per capita is near 8,000 USD (in 2005 PPP), γy is 0.7% on average. The γy increases to 5.7%
on average when the GDP per capita attains near 70,000 USD (in 2005 PPP).
Naturally, the growth rate of value added also changes with the capitalization of IPP. The
OECD value added growth rate currently averages 3.20% from 1950 to 2011, while this figure
is 3.13 with the pre-SNA93 that expenses IPP. To be precise, we plot the changes over time
for γy (:= dγy) which is the difference between the growth rate of value added corresponding
to the current accounting and the growth rate of the pre-SNA93 accounting value added for
the OECD across time (panel (b1), Figure 3.1) and across space (panel (b2), Figure 3.1).
The difference between the growth rates has no clear trend over time and space, remaining at
around 0.07% on average across time and space.
An interesting aspect of the IPP capitalization is that it increases value added proportionally
more for countries with larger IPP investment. If countries that have large IPP investments
are income-rich countries before the accounting change, then IPP capitalization can increase
the dispersion of cross-country incomes. If countries that have large IPP investments are poor
countries before the accounting chnage, then IPP capitaliation can decrease the dispersion of
cross-country incomes. In Figure 3.2, we show the difference between cross-country standard
deviation of log value added per capita before and after IPP capitalization across time. The
cross-country standard deviation of value added per capita increases for all years with the
capitalization of IPP (+ .77% on average between 1995 and 2011).
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Figure 3.1: The Effects of IPP Capitalization on Value Added, 31 OECD countries
(a) Percentage Increase in Value Added due to IPP Investment (γy)
(a1) Across Time (a2) Across Space
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(b) Increase in Value Added Growth due to IPP Investment (dγy)
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Notes: Where γy is constructed as in equation (3.3). The average time series are based on the estimated time
fixed effects using GDP (PPP) as weight.
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Figure 3.2: The Effects of IPP Capitalization on Cross-Country Income Variation
(a) Level (b) Difference
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3.3.2 Effects of IPP Capitalization on the Accounting Labor Share
The accounting labor share is experiencing a global decline that has attracted lots of attention
(?). Figure 3.3 shows this decline across time (panel (a)) and space (panel (b)) for OECD
countries. The accounting labor share is defined as
LS = 1− GOS
Y
.
where GOS is gross operating surplus and Y is gross domestic income.
To measure the effects of the capitalization of IPP on the accounting LS, we follow the
strategy in Koh et al. (2018) by constructing a counterfactual pre-SNA93 accounting LS in
which IPP items are expensed as opposed to capitalized,
LSPre−SNA93 = 1− GOS −XI
Y −XI ,
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where XI is investment in IPP. Because Y > GOS, IPP capitalization unambiguously reduces
labor share. Moreover, the revision can generate a declining trend for the labor share if the
IPP investment is growing faster than value added which it does.
Figure 3.3 depicts accounting LS under the current SNA2008 scenario where IPP is
capitalized and the pre-SNA1993 scenario where IPP is expensed. The time path of OECD
labor share is obtained by the year fixed effects weighted by the dollor output as time
coverages are different by countries35 Both graphs show that the accounting LS declines in
OECD countries across time and space under the current SNA2008, but the trend vanishes
when IPP is expensed, i.e., under the pre-SNA2008 scenario. That is, the decline of the
accounting LS is fully explained by the capitalization of IPP.
Figure 3.3: Effects of IPP Capitalization on Labor Share, 31 OECD Countries
(a) Across Time (b) Across Space
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The current accouting assumes that the IPP investment from the national product side is
entirely attributed to GOS in national income (i.e. χ = 1), see Section 3.2. This assumes
35 We estimate LSi,t = ci + βtt+ εi,t and then plot βˆt where its 1950 value is normalized to the weighted
average of 1950 labor share.
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Figure 3.4: Labor Share in R&D Based on Cost Structure, 31 OECD Countries
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that the workers do not fund the R&D activities. However, it is widely happening in the
R&D activities that workers get paid less than their contribution (marginal productivity)
for a promise of future compensation such as stock options. We argue that this should be
understood as evidence of χ < 1. That is, workers also fund R&D investment, and their
contribution should be understood as labor income, not capital income.
However, estimating χ is not a trivial matter as it requires a detailed micro-level information
on the R&D activities. For now, we use the information based on the cost structure of R&D
to examine the value of χ different from one. Specifically, we set χ = 1 − LSR&D, where
1 − LSR&D is a fraction of capital expenses in total cost of R&D, obtained from OECD
statistics database. Figure 3.4 confirms that LSR&D is clearly different from 0, and has a
slightly increasing trend over the development path (log GDP per capita). For example, for
the US it raises from roughly 45% to 65% over the past 20 years.
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Figure 3.5: Labor Share with alternative distributions of IPP rents, χ’s
(a) Across Time (b) Across Space
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With our proxy for χ based on the cost structure of R&D, we compute an alternative
labor share as following.36
LSχ=1−LSR&D = 1−
GOS − (1− χ)XI
Y
.
We find that the role of χ is critical in understanding labor share decline. In particular,
the decline of the labor share vanishes when relaxing the assumption that all the rents on
IPP investment go to capital (χ = 1). For our estimate of χ based on the cost structure of
R&D activities labor share is trendless across time (panel (a), Figure 3.5) and space (panel
(a), Figure 3.5). These findings extend to the OECD countries the accounting results in Koh
et al. (2018) for the U.S.
36 More precisely, we also adjust for the mixed income in computing labor share with any values for χ.
That is, the labor share is LS = [CE + (1 − χ)XI × (Y −MI)/Y ]/(Y −MI) where MI is mixed income
(mainly proprietors’ income).
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Figure 3.6: Effects of IPP Capitalization on the Capital to Output Ratio, 31 OECD Countries
(a) Across Time (b) Across Space
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3.3.3 Effects of IPP Capitalization on the Capital-to-Output Ratio
We plot the aggregate capital to output ratio with the current SNA08 and pre-SNA93 where
all IPP was expensed. To replicate the pre-SNA93 scenario we compute the capital to output
ratio as KT
Y−XI where KT is tangible capital and we remove investment in IPP from output in
the denominator. It is clear that the capital to output ratio that incorporates IPP capital
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grows over time, while the capital to output ratio of the pre-IPP capitalization accounting is
relatively trendless and consistent with the Kaldor facts (panel (a), Figure 3.6). Similarly, the
capital to output ratio across space is larger when IPP is capitalized (panel (b), Figure 3.6).
Although in this case we find relatively trendless capital-to-ouptut ratios across space in both
scenarios, with and wihout IPP capitalization.
We decompose the sources behind the increase in the aggregate capital to output ratio.
We compare the ratio of tangible capital KT to output Y (panel (c), Figure 3.6) and the
ratio of IPP capital KI to output Y (panel (d), Figure 3.6). It is clear that it is the increase
in the ratio of IPP capital to output over time that generates the increase in the aggregate
capital to output ratio. Instead, the ratio of tangible capital to output decreases over time.
But is IPP capital accurately measured? A very important caveat of these findings is
that the construction of the series of capital is based on the perpetuary inventory method
(consistent with the procedure followed in the fixed asset tables of the national accounts)
and this requires measures of unobserved IPP prices and unobserved IPP depreciation rates.
National accounts capitalize structures and equipment, as well as IPP, using separate laws
of motion for capital to obtain the series for KT and KI (see the appendix for the details).
Therefore, the construction of the capital stock series implies that we need to use data on
IPP prices and IPP depreciation rates which are unobservable and, we argue, subject to
questionable assumptions in their construction. Precisely, in the US, the BEA does not
provide an accounting measure of IPP depreciation but an economic one (Koh et al., 2018).
To estimate R&D depreciation—aimed at capturing obsolescence and competion which are
not directly observable—the BEA uses an economic model that maximizes profits over R&D
choices with ad-hoc assumptions on the effect of R&D on profits (Li and Hall, 2016). Hence,
treating the BEA IPP depreciation as measurement is only logically consistent with theory
that complies with the BEA economic model that estimates IPP depreciation. In addition,
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the estimation of IPP depreciation requires IPP prices that we do not observe because
there are no transactions of in-house production of intangibles and because R&D projects
are heterogeneous in nature. Because we simply do not observe transactions of in-house
production, the estimates of IPP prices for in-house production are hard to measure. A useful
approach to estimate intangible capital that is unobservable is introduced in McGrattan and
Prescott (2010). Instead, the BEA uses an input cost index as a proxy for the R&D output
price change. However, an input cost index does not capture the impact of productivity
change on real R&D output. Argumenting that R&D increases aggregate productivity, the
BEA uses the economy-wide measure of multifactor productivity (MFP) from the BLS to
proxy for unobserved R&D productivity and subtracts the growth rate of MFP from the input
cost index (Crawford et al., 2014). Again, this is breeding ground for logical inconsistencies
between theory and measurement if theory does not comply with the MFP from the BLS.
3.3.4 Effects of IPP Capitalization on the Rate of Return
The rate of return under the current system of national accounts is plotted across time and
space in Figure 3.7. We find an increasing pattern for the rate of return in both cases. Instead,
using the pre-SNA1993 accounting we go back to the standard Kaldor facts that deliver a
rate of return that is relatively constant across time and space, see Figure 3.7.
Now we turn to an investigation of the quantitative importance of the IPP capital by level
and growth accounting exercises in the following sections.
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Figure 3.7: Effects of IPP Capitalization on the Rate of Return to Capital, 31 OECD
Countries
(a) Across Time (b) Across Space
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3.4 Development Accounting with IPP Capital
We first focus on the standard production function approach to level (or development)
accounting. Second, we look at the product side (i.e., expenditures) of the national product.
3.4.1 Production Function Approach
We conduct a standard development accounting exercise with the introduction of IPP capital
in national accounts. Consider the following constant returns to scale (CRS) production
function,
yj,t = aj,tk
θI,j,t
I,j,t k
θT,j,t
T,j,t h
θh,j,t
j,t (3.4)
where yj,t is output for country j in period t. The factor inputs of production are tangible
capital, kT,j,t, IPP capital, kI,j,t, and labor in efficiency units, hj,t. Each of these factors of
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Table 3.2: Cross-Country Differences in Output per Capita: Value Added and the Importance
of IPP Measured by National Accounts
(a) With χ = 1 (SNA, 2008)
1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011
Measure (A):
Success 0.42 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.54 0.53
Success without IPP 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.41 0.40
Difference 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13
Measure (B):
Success 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.59 0.63 0.61
Success without IPP 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.45 0.48 0.45
Difference 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.16
(b) With χ = 1− LSR&D
1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011
Measure (A):
Success 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.47 0.46
Success without IPP 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.41 0.40
Difference 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06
Measure (B):
Success 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.55 0.58 0.56
Success without IPP 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.48 0.51 0.49
Difference 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Notes: Success measure is fraction of variance explained by factor inputs. IPP explanation refers difference
between success measure with IPP and without IPP out of output variation unexplained by traditional factors.
production contribute to output according to their respective coefficients θ, where θI,j,t +
θT,j,t + θh,j,t = 1.
We assume competitive markets which together with CRS technology implies that the
coefficients θ are the factor shares of income. In terms of measurement, we compute each of
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these shares as:
θh,j,t =
whj,t + (1− χj,t)xI,j,t
yj,t
, (3.5)
θI,j,t =
χj,txI,j,t
Yk,t
, (3.6)
θT,j,t =
yj,t − whj,t − xI,j,t
yj,t
= 1− θI,j,t − θh,j,t, (3.7)
Again, consistently with the current system of national accounts (SNA, 2008) we use the
accounting assumption that χj,t = 1 ∀j, t. We parallelly examine the implications of this
assumption by using the cost structure of R&D (χj,t = 1 − LSR&D,j,t). Detailed data
construction procedure for the level accounting is described in the appendix. Note that if
xI = 0, then we are back to the previous accounting (SNA 1993 where IPP capital was not
capitalized). If xI > 0 and χ = 1, then we are in the current system of national accounts
(SNA, 2008).
The quantitative assessment of the importance of the IPP capital in accounting for the
cross-country differences in output, we need measures of IPP capital. National accounts
for each country provides these measures constructed using the perpetual inventory method
given series for IPP investment, IPP prices and IPP depreciation rates. As we discussed
earlier, these series of capital are subject to substantial mismeasurement and are in large part
of the result of accounting assumptions behind the series of IPP investment, IPP prices and
IPP depreciation rates. For now, we take these series as given.
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To see the impact of IPP on the cross-country per capita income differences we write
production (3.4) for each period t in logs as,
log(yj,t) = log(aj,t + θI,j,t log(kI,j,t) + θT,j,t log(kT,j,t) + θh,j,t log(hj,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
log(q−I,j,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
log(qj,t)
.
where qj,t = k
θI,j,t
I,j,t k
θT,j,t
T,j,t h
θh,j,t
j,t captures the set of observable factor inputs in the national
accounts and q−I,j,t = k
θT,j,t
T,j,t h
θh,j,t
j,t excludes IPP capital. To see the impact of IPP on the
cross-country per capita income differences we compare measures of accounting success with
and without IPP capital. Our two measures of accounting success follow Caselli (2005). First,
we define,
Success A =
var(log qj,t)
var(log yi,t)
Success A, without IPP =
var(log q−I,j,t)
var(log yi,t)
Because total factor productivity potentially comoves with the observable factor inputs we
also use the following alternative measure of success:
Success B =
var(log qj,t) + cov(log qj,t,log aj,t)
var(log yi,t)
Success B, without IPP =
var(log q−I,j,t) + cov(log q−I,j,t,log aj,t)
var(log yi,t)
Table 3.2 shows the results. With IPP capital, the success measure (A) increases by 10%
in 1996, from 32 to 42%, and by 13% in 2011, from 40 to 53% (see panel (a) in Table 3.2).
We find a similar increasing pattern of the contribution of IPP capital to cross-country per
capita income differences over time using success measure (B). Precisely, we find that IPP
capital increases success measure (B) by 13% in 1996, from 41 to 54%, and by 16% in 2011,
from 45 to 61%. However, the results change with the value of χ, which can be easily seen
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Table 3.3: Decomposition of the output variance in 2011
IPP related h related k related
var(kI) cov(kI , h) cov(kI , k) var(h) cov(h, kT ) var(kT )
χ = 1 (SNA08) 9.5 6.6 35.5 37.3 6.6 233.9
χ = 1− LSR&D 2.0 3.1 16.2 40.1 6.9 233.9
Difference -7.5 -3.5 -19.3 +2.7 +0.2 +0.0
Table 3.4: Additional fraction explained by IPP capital in 2011
δI δI = 0 δI = δT
χ = 1 (SNA08) 0.22 0.20 0.23
χ = 1− LSR&D 0.10 0.08 0.10
from equation (3.5) to (3.7). Even though χ does not alter the level of IPP capital, it changes
factor shares. Indeed, the additional explanation from the IPP capitalization goes down to
less than a hal, when relaxing the extreme assumption that χ = 1 to χj,t = 1 − LSR&D,j,t,
see panel (b) in Table 3.2.
Why does the explanation decrease with χ < 1? The reduction in χ essentially lowers
the IPP capital share with higher labor share. When the labor’s contribution becomes
more important, our understanding on cross country income differences gets smaller. This
is because the variation in human capital is less useful for the understanding of the cross
country income disparities than that of capital, at least for the human capital measured by
the average years of schooling a la Barro-Lee in the PWT. Yet the precise measurement on
human capital has not reached consensus (Schoellman and Hendricks, 2017, and references
therein).
Note that the IPP rents going to labor makes workers’ compensation higher but not their
human capital better. When a country increases IPP investment, its additional contribution
works through both labor and capital. The indirect channel working through additional
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compensation to labor explains less for the increase in output, as long as the level of human
capital remains same. Therefore, it would be important to distinguish wage and human
capital in the level accounting exercise, which is consistent with the point made in Caselli
and Ciccone (2017) or Schoellman and Hendricks (2017).
To see how much the explanation coming from the variation in human capital is small
using the Barro-Lee measures of human capital from the PWT, we decompose the variance
of output as following:
var(log y) = var(log a) + 2[cov(a, θh logh) + cov(a, θI log kI) + cov(a, θT log kT )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
TFP related
+ var(θh logh) + cov(θh logh, θI log kI) + cov(θh logh, θT log kT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Human capital related
+ var(θI log kI) + cov(θh logh, θI log kI) + cov(θI log kI , θT log kT )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
IPP capital related
+ var(θT log kT ) + cov(θh logh, θT log kT ) + cov(θI log kI , θT log kT )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tangible capital related
Table 3.3 shows the decomposition result, which confirms that the larger success from
IPP and smaller success from human capital under the current accounting (χ = 1). The
magnitude of additional explanation from IPP capital is larger than that of human capital,
resulting in larger overall success in the case with χ = 1.
Another parameter to consider a variation is the depreciation of IPP capital (δI). In the
accounting of IPP capital, the depreciation of IPP capital is higher than that of traditional
capital. Different values for the depreciation may also change the level accounting results,
as it alters the amount of IPP capital accumulated in the national economy. We examine
the sensitivity of the level accounting to various depreciation rates; benchmark depreciation
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rate (δI = δˆI), no depreciation (δI = 0), and depreciation rate of traditional capital (δI = δˆT ).
Contrary to the case of χ, changes in δI do not affect the results of level accounting much
(see table 3.4).
3.4.2 Level Accounting from the Product Side of National Ac-
counts
Because the production of IPP is equated to IPP investment in national accounts, an
alternative approach to document the role of IPP in explaining cross-country differences in
output per capita is conducting the analysis from the product side of the accounts, i.e.,
y = c+ xI + xT + g (3.8)
where c is private consumption, xI is investment in IPP, xT is investment in tangible assets,
and g is government expenditure.
The level accounting from the product side of the accounts is interesting because it does
not rely on measures of IPP capital (which requires measures of IPP prices and depreciation).
At the same time it does not require mesaures of the factor share. Because the product
side is additive (3.8), we can directly measure the contribution of its components to the
cross-country variation in the level output. For example, to study the role of IPP investment
we compute,
var(xI,j,t) + cov(xI,j,t, yj,t − xI,j,t)
var(yj,t)
. (3.9)
Note that because we do not take logs the variance of output across countries depends on
its average. This is however irrelevant for our analysis as we are interested in the percentual
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Table 3.5: Cross-Country Differences in Output per Worker: Contribution of IPP from the
Product Side of National Accounts (%)
1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011
Eq (3.9) (investment PPP) 4.0 4.5 4.7 4.6 5.2 6.4
Eq (3.9) (GDP PPP) 3.7 4.4 4.8 4.5 4.9 5.6
Notes: We use the decomposition in (3.9)
contribution of each of the components in the product side of the accounts (3.8) to output
variation.
A difficulty is that the product components do not add up to the value added (y) when
considering the price dispersion across countries. For example, we convert the unit of each
product component into USD using the PPP rates that are different across items in the
previous subsection. Therefore, we consider two different cases, one with xI converted by
investment PPP rate (as in the previous subsection) and another with xI converted by GDP
PPP rate.
Our results are in Table 3.5. We find that IPP investment explains about 4.8% of GDP
variation on average. When using investment PPP, its explanation increases, but the difference
is not significant. Because national accounts equate IPP investment to IPP income, we can
use this result from the product side of the national accounts to validate the value of χ
on the income side of the accounts. In this direction, we note that our results for the IPP
contribution to cross-country income per capita differences is much more similar to the our
preferred case with χ = 1− LSR&D (4.3% on average) than the SNA08 assumption of χ = 1
(8.9% on average). This suggests a value close to our choice χ = 1− LSR&D is preferred.
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3.5 Growth Accounting with IPP capital
In this section, we do growth accounting exercise. Many studies have attempted to account
for the importance of innovational activities in economic growth. Related, Corrado et al.
(2005, 2009) extend the standard growth accounting to incorporate a precisely measured
innovation-related capital. The main difference with respect to Corrado et al. (2005, 2009) is
that we focus on the implication of income allocation of the R&D activities (i.e. χ) in the
growth accounting.
Note that under the assumption of constant return to scale and competitive market,
growth accounting exercise is insensitive to exact form of production function. Specifically,
given any constant return to scale production function y = af(kI , kT , h), we have
dy
y
= θT
dkT
kT
+ θI
dkI
kI
+ θh
dh
h
+
da
a
,
where y, kT , kI , h, and a are output per employment, traditional capital per employment, IPP
capital per employment, average human capital, and total factor productivity, respectively.
The θf ’s are the income share of factor input f .
Hence, the TFP growth from year s to year u can be approximated by
log(au/as) = log(yu/ys)− θ¯T log(kT,u/kT,s)− θ¯I log(kI,u/kI,s)− θ¯h log(hu/hs), (3.10)
where θ¯ is average factor share between s and u, y is GDP per worker, kT is traditional
capital per worker, kI is IPP capital per worker, and h is average human capital (measured
by the years of schooling). Decomposition of growth of output from a specific time period s
to u is straightforwad by summing up each of four components. Similar to section 3.4, we
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Table 3.6: IPP explanation for growth (log(zu/zs)/[log(zu/zs)+ log(au/as)]) : OECD average
δI δI = 0 δI = δT
χ = 1 (SNA08) 0.25 0.55 0.49
χ = 1− LSR&D 0.12 0.26 0.23
define the additional IPP explanation as log(kI,u/kI,s)/[log(kI,u/kI,s) + log(au/as)] and do
the growth accounting exercise with various χ’s and δI ’s.
Table 3.6 shows the summarized results with detailed results in table C4 and C5 in
appendix C.2. On average, IPP capital contributes around 9% of output growth, which is
slightly less than one half of the TFP (22%). This means that the additional IPP explanation
is 25% under the benchmark χ (= 1) and δI . Again, the additional explanation from the IPP
capital goes down to 12% with χ = 1− LSR&D < 1, which is less than half of the case with
χ = 1. The reason is similar to the case with level accounting: average human capital grows
less than IPP capital itself.
Of course, the IPP growth increases when the depreciation rate is lower. For example,
with no depreciation in IPP capital (δI = 0), the IPP’s explanation goes up to even higher
than that of TFP (IPP explanation of 55%). But the fraction explained by IPP capital
again is reduced to a half when relaxing the assumption on the distribution of IPP rent (i.e.,
χ = 1→ χˆ).
3.6 Conclusion
We document the rise of intellectual property products (IPP) captured by up-to-date national
accounts in 31 OECD countries. These countries gradually adopt the new system of national
accounts (SNA2008) that capitalizes IPP—which was previously treated as an intermediate
expense in the pre-SNA1993 accounting framework. We examine how the capitalization of
119
IPP affects stylzed growth facts and the big ratios (Kaldor, 1957; Jones, 2016). We find that
the capitalization of IPP generates (a) a decline of the accounting labor share, (b) an increase
in the capital-to-output ratio across time, and (c) an increase in the rate of return to capital
across time. The key accounting assumption behind the IPP capitalization implemented by
national accounts is that the share of IPP rents that are attributed to capital, χ, is equal
to one. That is, national accounts assume that IPP rents are entirely owed to capital. We
argue that this assumption is arbitrary and extreme. More reasonable assumptions about
the split of IPP rents between capital and labor—for example, based on the cost structure of
R&D—generate a secularly trendless labor share, a constant capital-to-output ratio, and a
constant rate of return across time. We discuss the implications of these new measures of IPP
capital—conditional on χ—for cross-country income per capita differences using standard
development and growth accounting exercises.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Use of Equipment and Software by Occupation
The capital use by occupation data is constructed by combining BEA NIPA and O*NET Tools
and Technology Database. In NIPA table 5.5, the investment on non-residential equipment
are categorized by 25 types. In UNSPSC, the classification system used in O*NET Tools and
Technology database, there are 4,300 commodities, which are in 825 classes, in 173 families,
and in 36 segments.
To construct a mapping between two, we firstly assign one of NIPA investment types
to the relevant segment in UNSPSC. Often, it is apparent that a segment includes several
types of equipment investment in NIPA. In this case, we use the family categories in the
assignment procedure. Again, if a family apparently includes several types in NIPA, we use
classes. Through this procedure, we could make a rough concordance between a subset of
UNSPSC and the types of equipment investment in NIPA. The constructed concordance is
shown in table A1.
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Next, we assume that two tools have same price if they are classified in the same cate-
gory. For example, the “metal cutting machines” in UNSPSC is assigned to “metalworking
machinery” in NIPA investment type. The value of using the metal cutting machines are
then the amount of investment in metalworking machinery divided by total use of all the
commodities in the metalworking machinery category, where the total use of all the tools
in the metalworking machinery is defined as sum of a number of total employment of each
occupation times a number of UNSPSC commodities assigned to the metalworking machinery
that each occupation uses.
The method is assuming that the number of tools above well represent the value of
them, only within the NIPA investment category. Across the NIPA investment categories,
each number of tools used would get different weights, according to the average amount of
investment given to each tool. The procedure may make a big difference from average number
of tools if a category with many commodities had small values compared to a category with
few commodities. However, as more differentiated categories are usually advanced (and hence
have expensive items), we expect not much difference from the adjustment.
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Table A1: Concordance between NIPA equipment investment types and UNSPSC
NIPA UNSPSC
Line Title Code Title
3 Information processing equipment
4 Computers and peripheral
equipement
43210000 Computer Equipment and Accessories
5 Communication equipment 43190000, 45110000 Communications Devices and Accessories, Audio and visual pre-
sentation and composing equipment
6 Medical equipment and in-
struments
42000000 Medical Equipment and Accessories and Supplies
9 Nonmedical instruments 41000000 Laboratory and Measuring and Observing and Testing Equip-
ment
10 Photocopy and related
equipment
45100000, 45120000 Printing and publishing equipment, Photographic or filming or
video equipment
11 Office and accounting equip-
ment
44100000, 31240000 Office machines and their supplies and accessories, Industrial
optics
12 Industrial equipment
13 Fabricated metal products 27000000, 31150000,
31160000, 31170000,
40140000, 40170000
Tools and General Machinery, Rope and chain and cable and
wire and strap, Hardware, Bearings and bushings and wheels
and gears, Fluid and gas distribution, Pipe piping and pipe fit-
tings
14 Engines and turbines 26101500, 26101700 Engines, Engine components and accessories
17 Metalworking machinery 23240000, 23250000,
23260000, 23270000,
23280000
Metal cutting machinery and accessories, Metal forming machin-
ery and accessories, Rapid prototyping machinery and acces-
sories, Welding and soldering and brazing machinery and acces-
sories and supplies, Metal treatment machinery
18 + 19 Special industry machinery,
n.e.c. + General indus-
trial, including materials
handling, equipment
23100000, 23110000,
23120000, 23130000,
23140000, 23150000,
23160000, 23180000,
23190000, 23200000,
23210000, 23220000,
23230000, 23290000,
24100000, 24110000,
31140000, 40000000
Raw materials processing machinery, Petroleum processing ma-
chinery, Textile and fabric machinery and accessories, Lapidary
machinery and equipment, Leatherworking repairing machin-
ery and equipment, Industrial process machinery and equip-
ment and supplies, Foundry machines and equipment and sup-
plies, Industrial food and beverage equipment, Mixers and their
parts and accessories, Mass transfer equipment, Electronic man-
ufacturing machinery and equipment and accessories, Chicken
processing machinery and equipment, Sawmilling and lumber
processing machinery and equipment, Industrial machine tools,
Material handling machinery and equipment, Containers and
storage, Moldings, Distribution and Conditioning Systems and
Equipment and Components
20 + 41 Electrical transmission, dis-
tribution, and industrial ap-
paratus + Electrical equip-
ment, n.e.c.
26101100, 26101200,
26101300, 26110000,
26120000, 26130000,
26140000, 39000000
Electric alternating current AC motors, Electric direct current
DC motors, Non electric motors, Batteries and generators and
kinetic power transmission, Electrical wire and cable and har-
ness, Power generation, Atomic and nuclear energy machinery
and equipment, Electrical Systems and Lighting and Compo-
nents and Accessories and Supplies
21 Transportation equipment
22 + 25 Trucks, buses, and truck
trailers + Autos
25100000 Motor vehicles
26 Aircraft 25130000 Aircraft
27 Ships and boats 25110000 Marine transport
28 Railroad equipment 25120000 Railway and tramway machinery and equipment
29 Other equipment
30 Furniture and fixtures 56000000 Furniture and Furnishings
33 Agricultural machinery 21000000 Farming and Fishing and Forestry and Wildlife Machinery and
Accessories
36 Construction machinery 22000000 Building and Construction Machinery and Accessories
39 Mining and oilfield machin-
ery
20000000 Mining and Well Drilling Machinery and Accessories
40 Service industry machinery 48000000 Service Industry Machinery and Equipment and Supplies
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A.2 Discrete Approximation of the Model
This section discusses equilibrium conditions with discrete approximation of the model. For
the approximation, assumption 1 and 4 are replaced by assumption 5 and 6 in section 1.3
and 1.4.
The task production is given by equation (1.19) with tasks discretized into j = 0, 1, · · · , J .
Now the tasks are discrete, so workers are sorted into each task according to cutoff level of
human capital hˆj. More preciesely, we have a sequence of human capital {hˆj}j=0,··· ,J+1 such
that a worker with h ∈ [hˆj, hˆj+1) are sorted into task j with hˆ0 = h and hˆJ+1 = h¯.
For a worker with exactly the threshold level of human capital should be indifferent
between tasks so that
ωjb(hˆj, j) = ωj−1b(hˆj, j − 1), for all j, for , j = 1, · · · , J (A.2.1)
replacing the original equilibrium condition (1.9).
The task production is solving
max pjTj −
∫
h
w(h)l(h)dh−
∫ Ne
k=0
pe(k)e(k)dk −
∫ Ns
k=0
ps(k)s(k)dk,
which gives the FOCs,
w(h) = ωjb(h, j) = pjT
1
σs
j H
1
σe
− 1
σs
j
(∫ hˆj+1
hˆj
b(h, j)µ(h)dh
)− 1
σe
b(h, j),
1
Aeνe
= pjT
1
σs
j H
1
σe
− 1
σs
j (Ne)
σe−1
σeνe
−1e
− 1
σe
j ,
1
Asνs
= pjT
1
σs
j (Ns)
σs−1
σsνs
−1s
− 1
σs
j ,
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using the fact that pe = 1/(Aeνe), ps = 1/(Asνs), ej(k) = ej, and sj(k) = sj in equilibrium,
and Hj :=
[
αh,j(
∫ hˆj+1
hˆj
b(h, j)µ(h)dh)
σe−1
σe + αe,j(
∫ Ne
k=0
e(k)νedk)
σe−1
σeνe
] σe
σe−1
.
Combining the FOCs, we get
pj =
[(
ασeh,jω
1−σe
j + α
σe
e,j (νeAeN
ϕe
e )
σe−1) 1−σs1−σe + ασss,j (νsAsNϕss )σs−1] 11−σs , for j = 0, · · · , J
(A.2.2)
which replaces equation (1.11).
The demand for each task is from
maxY −
∑
j
pjTj,
which gives
pj =
(
γjY
Tj
) 1

.
Combining this with FOCs, we obtain
p−σsj =
γjα
σs
h,j
(
ασeh,jω
1−σe
j + α
σe
e,j (νeAeN
ϕe
e )
σe−1)σe−σs1−σe Y
ωσej
∫ hˆj+1
hˆj
b(h, j)µ(h)dh
, for j = 0, · · · , J, (A.2.3)
replacing equation (1.10).
Now the equilibrium thresholds hˆj ’s, wage rate ωj ’s and prices pj ’s are obtained by solving
equation (A.2.1) to (A.2.3), which are 3J + 1 equations with the same number of unknowns.
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A.3 Proof
Proof of lemma 2 Since assignment function hˆ(τ) is strictly increasing, its inverse τˆ(h)
is well-defined. From the demand for task, equation (1.7), we know that there will be strictly
positive task output T (τ) > 0 (and hence l(h, τˆ(h)) > 0) for all τ ∈ [0, τ¯ ]. The equation (1.8)
and lemma 1 then implies
w(h) = ω(τˆ(h))b(h, τˆ(h)) ≥ ω(τˆ(h′))b(h, τˆ(h′)), and
w(h′) = ω(τˆ(h′))b(h′, τˆ(h′)) ≥ ω(τˆ(h))b(h′, τˆ(h)).
Combining these two inequalities, we have
b(h, τˆ(h′))
b(h, τˆ(h))
≤ ω(τˆ(h))
ω(τˆ(h′))
≤ b(h
′, τˆ(h′))
b(h′, τˆ(h))
Let τ = τˆ(h) and τ ′ = τˆ(h′). Since τˆ has an inverse function hˆ, above inequality is equivalent
to
b(hˆ(τ), τ ′)
b(hˆ(τ), τ)
≤ ω(τ)
ω(τ ′)
≤ b(hˆ(τ
′), τ ′)
b(hˆ(τ ′), τ)
By taking log on both sides and dividing by τ ′ − τ ,
log b(hˆ(τ), τ ′)− log b(hˆ(τ), τ)
τ ′ − τ ≤
−(logω(τ ′)− logω(τ))
τ ′ − τ ≤
log b(hˆ(τ ′), τ ′)− log b(hˆ(τ ′), τ)
τ ′ − τ
As τ ′ − τ → 0, we have
d logω(τ)
dτ
= −∂ log b(hˆ(τ), τ)
∂τ
,
which is the equation (1.9).
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Now consider the task production. For notational convenience, we introduce
H(h, τ) =
[
αh(τ)(b(h, τ)l(h))
σe−1
σe + αe(τ)
(∫ Ne
0
e(k, τ)νedk
)σe−1
σeνe
] σe
σe−1
From
max p(τ)T (τ)−
∫
h
w(h)l(h, τ)dh−
∫ Ns
0
ps(k)s(k, τ)dk −
∫ Ne
0
pe(k)e(k, τ)dk,
we have the following first order conditions:
w(h) ≥ αh(τ)p(τ)T (τ)
1
σsH(h, τ)
σs−σe
σeσs l(h)−
1
σe b(h, τ), (A.3.1)
pe(k) = αe(τ)p(τ)T (τ)
1
σsH(h, τ)
σs−σe
σeσs
(∫ Ne
0
e(k, τ)νe
)σe−1−νeσe
νeσe
e(k, τ)νe−1, (A.3.2)
ps(k) = αs(τ)p(τ)T (τ)
1
σs
∫ Ns
0
s(k, τ)νsdk
σs−1−νsσs
νsσs
s(k, τ)νs−1, (A.3.3)
In equipment- and software-producing sector, we solve
max pe(k)e(k)− e(k)/Ae, max ps(k)s(k)− s(k)/As
subject to (A.3.2) and (A.3.3). The solution gives
pe = 1/(νeAe), ps = 1/(νsAs) for all k. (A.3.4)
Substituting (A.3.4) into the FOCs, we get
p(τ) =
[{
αh(τ)
σeω(τ)1−σe + αe(τ)σe (νeAeNϕee )
σe−1} 1−σs1−σe + αs(τ)σs (νsAsNϕss )σs−1] 11−σs ,
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by combining the FOCs, which is the equation (1.11).
Again from equation (A.3.1) to (A.3.3), the task production T (τ) can be expressed by
T (τ) = p(τ)−σsω(τ)σeαh(τ)−σe
(
αh(τ)
σeω(τ)1−σe + αe(τ)σe (νeAeNϕee )
σe−1)σs−σe1−σe ∫
h
b(h, τ)l(h, τ)dh
(A.3.5)
From the labor market clearing condition and lemma 1, we have
l(h, τ) = µ(h)δ[τ − τˆ(h)],
where δ is a Dirac delta function. Then we have
∫
h
b(h, τ)l(h, τ)dh =
∫
τ ′
b(hˆ(τ ′), τ)µ(hˆ(τ))δ[τ − τ ′]hˆ′(τ ′)dτ ′ = b(hˆ(τ), τ)µ(hˆ(τ))hˆ′(τ).
Combining this with equation (1.7) and (A.3.5), we have
hˆ′(τ) =
γ(τ)p(τ)σs−αh(τ)σs
(
αh(τ)
σeω(τ)1−σe + αe(τ)σe (νeAeNϕee )
σe−1)σe−σs1−σe Y
ω(τ)σeb(hˆ(τ), τ)µ(hˆ(τ))
,
which is the equation (1.10).
Proof of lemma 3 In steady state, if it exists, r = pis/ηs = pie/ηe = ρ from the Euler
equation (1.17). Then X˙/X = 0 for X = C, E, S, Ne, and Ns follow from usual argument.
What we need to show is that there exist Ns and Ne that satisfy pis/ηs = pie/ηe = ρ.
We start with the following lemma.
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Lemma 4 Fix p(τ) and hˆ(τ). There exists a pair (νs, νe) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1) such that s(τ) is
strictly decreasing in Ns and e(τ) is strictly decreasing in Ne.
Proof Combining equation (A.3.1) to (A.3.3) (FOCs), we have
s(τ) = N−1s N
ϕs(σs−1)
s (νsAs)
σs αs(τ)
σsαh(τ)
− σe
1−σe b(hˆ(τ), τ)µ(hˆ(τ))hˆ′(τ)
×
[(
p(τ)1−σs − αs(τ)σs (νsAsNϕss )σs−1
) 1−σe
1−σs − αe(τ)σe (νeAe(Nsnes)ϕe)σe−1
] σe
1−σe
× (p(τ)1−σs − αs(τ)σs (νsAsNϕss )σs−1)σs−σe1−σs , (A.3.6)
and
e(τ) = N−1e N
ϕe(σe−1)
e (νeAe)
σe αe(τ)
σeαh(τ)
− σe
1−σe b(hˆ(τ), τ)µ(hˆ(τ))hˆ′(τ)
×
[(
p(τ)1−σs − αs(τ)σs (νsAs(Ne/nes)ϕs)σs−1
) 1−σe
1−σs − αe(τ)σe (νeAeNϕee )σe−1
] σe
1−σe
, (A.3.7)
where nes := Ne/Ns.
From equation (A.3.6) and (A.3.7), we can express
∂ log s(τ)
∂Ns
= − 1
Ns
+ s1(τ ;ϕs), (A.3.8)
∂ log e(τ)
∂Ne
= − 1
Ne
+ e1(τ ;ϕe), (A.3.9)
and it’s straightforward to check that limϕs↓0 |s1(τ ;ϕs)| = 0, limϕe↓0 |e1(τ ;ϕe)| = 0, and
∂s1/∂ϕs > 0, ∂e1/∂ϕe > 0. This implies that there should be 0 < νs < 1 and 0 < νe < 1
which make s(τ) strictly decreasing in Ns and e(τ) strictly decreasing in Ne.
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Lemma 5 Fix p(τ) and hˆ(τ). With νe and νs close to one, we have the following:
lim
Ns→0
s(τ) =∞, lim
Ne→0
e(τ) =∞, lim
Ns→∞
s(τ) = 0, lim
Ne→∞
e(τ) = 0.
Proof By substituting νe = 1 and νs = 1 (and hence ϕe = 1−νeνe = 0 and ϕs =
1−νs
νs
= 0) into
equation (A.3.6) and (A.3.7), we have
s(τ) = N−1s (νsAs)
σs αs(τ)
σsαh(τ)
− σe
1−σe b(hˆ(τ), τ)µ(hˆ(τ))hˆ′(τ)
×
[(
p(τ)1−σs − αs(τ)σs (νsAs)σs−1
) 1−σe
1−σs − αe(τ)σe (νeAe)σe−1
] σe
1−σe
× (p(τ)1−σs − αs(τ)σs (νsAs)σs−1)σs−σe1−σs , (A.3.10)
and
e(τ) = N−1e (νeAe)
σe αe(τ)
σeαh(τ)
− σe
1−σe b(hˆ(τ), τ)µ(hˆ(τ))hˆ′(τ)
×
[(
p(τ)1−σs − αs(τ)σs (νsAs)σs−1
) 1−σe
. 1− σs − αe(τ)σe (νeAe)1−σe
] σe
1−σe
(A.3.11)
The result is straightforward from equation (A.3.10) and (A.3.11).
Since pie and pis are proportional to integration of s(τ) and e(τ), lemma 4 and 5 imply the
existence of unique steady state under some νe and νs large enough, fixing static equilibrium.
Note that both hˆ and µ(h)dh are bounded above by assumtion and boundary conditions,
and p(τ) is also bounded as
∫
τ
γ(τ)p(τ)1−dτ = 1. Hence, the existence follows when pie and
pis are continuous in Ne and Ns even when considering changes in static equilibrium. Recall
that p(τ) and hˆ(τ) could be obtained from the system of differential equations (1.9) to (1.11).
Since all functions in equation (1.9) to (1.11) are differentiable, pie and pis are also continuous
in Ne and Ns and the desired result follows.
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Intuitively, large νe and νs mean small returns to introducing additional variety, in turn,
meaning decreasing rete of return. To see this intuition more clearly, recall that the task
production function is given by
T (τ) =
[{
αh(τ)
(
b(hˆ(τ), τ)µ(hˆ(τ))hˆ′(τ)
)σe−1
σe
+ αe(τ)N
σe−1
σeνe
e e(τ)
σe−1
σe
}σe(σs−1)
(σe−1)σs
+αs(τ)N
σs−1
σsνs
s s(τ)
σs−1
σs
] σs
σs−1
, (A.3.12)
as s(k, τ) = s(τ) and e(k, τ) = e(τ) in equilibrium. The production is homogeneous of degree
one in labor, Ne and Ns when νe → 1 and νs → 1. Since labor is fixed component, the
production features strict concavity along Ne and Ns, meaning decreasing returns to scale in
terms of total varieties.
The second part of lemma (3) is when σe = σs = 1. In this case,
p(τ)T (τ) =
ω(τ)b(hˆ(τ), τ)µ(hˆ(τ))hˆ′(τ)
αh(τ)
, (A.3.13)
s(τ) =
νsAsαs(τ)p(τ)T (τ)
Ns
, (A.3.14)
e(τ) =
νeAeαe(τ)p(τ)T (τ)
Ne
. (A.3.15)
Combining the FOCs, T (τ) satisfies
p(τ)T (τ) = p(τ)
1
αh(τ)κ(τ)NΨes(τ)s
(
Ne
Ns
)Ψe(τ)
B(τ), (A.3.16)
where κ(τ) := (αs(τ)νsAs)
αs(τ)
αh(τ) (αe(τ)νeAe)
αe(τ)
αh(τ) , Ψes(τ) := 1−νsνs
αs(τ)
αh(τ)
+ 1−νe
νe
αe(τ)
αh(τ)
, Ψe(τ) :=
1−νe
νe
αe(τ)
αh(τ)
, and B(τ) := b(hˆ(τ), τ)µ(hˆ(τ))hˆ′(τ) are introduced to simplify notation.
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From equation (A.3.14) and (A.3.15), it is apparent that s(τ) and e(τ) are dcreasing in
Ns and Ne respectivley when Ψes(τ) < 1, which is a condition given in lemma 3.
Proof of proposition 1 (job polarization) Substituting p(τ) out from equation (1.9) to
(1.11), we have
hˆ′(τ) =
γ(τ)αh(τ)
1−αh(τ)(1−)Y
b(hˆ(τ), τ)µ(hˆ(τ))ω(τ)1−αh(τ)(1−)
×[(
αs(τ)νsAsN
(1−νs)/νs
s
)αs(τ) (
αe(τ)νeAeN
(1−νe)/νe
e
)αe(τ)]−1
(A.3.17)
d logω(τ)
dτ
= −∂ log b(hˆ(τ), τ)
∂τ
(A.3.18)
First, we show hˆ1 and hˆ2 has to cross at least once. Suppose there is no crossing. Since
hˆ1(0) = hˆ2(0) and hˆ1(τ¯) = hˆ2(τ¯), we have
(
ω1(0)
ω2(0)
)1−αh(0)(1−)
=
hˆ′2(0)
hˆ′1(0)
(
Ae2
Ae1
)(1−)αe(0)
, (A.3.19)(
ω1(τ¯)
ω2(τ¯)
)1−αh(τ¯)(1−)
=
hˆ′2(τ¯)
hˆ′1(τ¯)
(
Ae2
Ae1
)(1−)αe(τ¯)
, (A.3.20)
from equation (A.3.17). Combining,
(
ω1(τ¯)/ω1(0)
ω2(τ¯)/ω2(0)
)1−αh(0)(1−)(ω1(τ¯)
ω2(τ¯)
)(αh(0)−αh(τ¯))(1−)
=
hˆ′2(τ¯)/hˆ
′
2(0)
hˆ′1(τ¯)/hˆ1′(0)
(A.3.21)
Since hˆ(τ) is strictly monotone and continous, with no crossing on entire (0, τ¯), we
have to have either (i) hˆ′2(τ¯)/hˆ
′
2(0) < hˆ
′
1(τ¯)/hˆ
′
1(0) and hˆ1(τ) < hˆ2(τ) for τ ∈ (0, τ¯), or (ii)
hˆ′2(τ¯)/hˆ
′
2(0) > hˆ
′
1(τ¯)/hˆ
′
1(0) and hˆ1(τ) > hˆ2(τ) for τ ∈ (0, τ¯). However, from equation (A.3.18)
and log supermodularity of b(h, τ), we have ω1(τ¯)/ω1(0) > ω2(τ¯)/ω2(0) with hˆ1(τ) < hˆ2(τ).
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With small enough αs(τ¯), (ω1(τ¯)/ω2(τ¯))(αh(0)−αh(τ¯))(1−) goes close to one, and hence equation
(A.3.21) contradicts log supermodularity of b(h, τ).
Second, we show that when hˆ1(τ) and hˆ2(τ) cross at any three points τa < τb < τc, we
have hˆ′1(τa)/hˆ
′
1(τb) < hˆ
′
2(τa)/hˆ
′
2(τb) with hˆ2(τ) > hˆ1(τ) for τ ∈ (τa, τb) and hˆ′1(τc)/hˆ′1(τb) <
hˆ′2(τc)/hˆ
′
2(τb) with hˆ1(τ) > hˆ2(τ) for τ ∈ (τb, τc).
From equilibrium condition (A.3.17),
(
ω1(τb)/ω1(τa)
ω2(τb)/ω2(τa)
)1−αh(τa)(1−)(ω1(τb)
ω2(τb)
)(αh(τa)−αh(τb))(1−)
=
hˆ′2(τb)/hˆ
′
2(τa)
hˆ′1(τb)/hˆ
′
1(τa)
(
Ae2
Ae1
)(1−)(αe(τb)−αe(τa))
(A.3.22)(
ω1(τc)/ω1(τb)
ω2(τc)/ω2(τb)
)1−αh(τc)(1−)(ω1(τb)
ω2(τb)
)(αh(τb)−αh(τc))(1−)
=
hˆ′2(τc)/hˆ
′
2(τb)
hˆ′1(τc)/hˆ
′
1(τb)
(
Ae2
Ae1
)(1−)(αe(τc)−αe(τb))
(A.3.23)
With small enough α′h(τ), these equations are approximated to
(
ω1(τb)/ω1(τa)
ω2(τb)/ω2(τa)
)1−αh(τa)(1−)
≈ hˆ
′
2(τb)/hˆ
′
2(τa)
hˆ′1(τb)/hˆ
′
1(τa)
(
Ae2
Ae1
)(1−)(αe(τb)−αe(τa))
(A.3.24)(
ω1(τc)/ω1(τb)
ω2(τc)/ω2(τb)
)1−αh(τc)(1−)
≈ hˆ
′
2(τc)/hˆ
′
2(τb)
hˆ′1(τc)/hˆ
′
1(τb)
(
Ae2
Ae1
)(1−)(αe(τc)−αe(τb))
(A.3.25)
The only possibility that this can hold at the same time is when αe(τb) > αe(τa) and
αe(τb) > αe(τc) so that the signs of exponent term with respect to (Ae2/Ae1) are different. Recall
that ω1(τb)/ω1(τa) < ω2(τb)/ω2(τa) implies hˆ′2(τb)/hˆ
′
2(τa) > hˆ
′
1(τb)/hˆ
′
1(τa) from equilibrium
condition (A.3.18) and log supermodularity of b(h, τ). Since qe1 > qe2, αe(τb) > αe(τa),
and αe(τb) > αe(τc), we must have ω1(τb)/ω1(τa) > ω2(τb)/ω2(τa) and ω1(τc)/ω1(τb) <
ω2(τc)/ω2(τb), which implies hˆ1(τ) < hˆ2(τ) for τ ∈ (τa, τb) and hˆ1(τ) > hˆ2(τ) for τ ∈ (τb, τc).
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The proof in the first part rules out any even number of crossings and no crossing. The
second part implies they have to cross only a single time on τ ∈ (0, τ¯) as they already meet at
0 and τ¯ . Then the result follows from the second part of proof.
Proof of proposition 2 (the rise of software) We firstly show that the production
share of middle skill task (task 1) falls and that of high skill task (task 2) rises in re-
sponse to the decline of price of equipment in a discretized model as well. To be specific, we
prove the following lemma first.
Lemma 6 Fix Ne and Ns. Consider a decline of the price of equipment; d logAe > 0 and
suppose  < 1 and assumption 2, 5, and 6. Then we have d log p1 < 0 and d log p2 > 0.
Proof From the equilibrium conditions (A.2.1) to (A.2.3),
2∑
j=0
γjp
1−
j = 1
pj =
(
ωj
αh,j
)αh,j ( 1
νeAeαe,j
)αe,j ( 1
νsAsαs,j
)αs,j
N−ϕeαe,je N
−ϕsαs,j
s , for j = 0, 1, 2
wj−1b(hˆj, j − 1) = wjb(hˆj, j), for j = 1, 2
ωj−1
∫ hˆj
hˆj−1
b(h, j − 1)µ(h)dh
ωj
∫ hˆj+1
hˆj
b(h, j)µ(h)dh
=
αh,j−1γj−1
αh,jγj
(
pj−1
pj
)1−
, for j = 1, 2,
with σs = σe = 1.
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Let ∆x = d log(x). Then by differentiating above and using assumption 5,
∆pj = αh,j∆ωj − αe,j∆Ae (A.3.26)
∆ωj−1 = ∆ωj +∆b(hˆj, j)−∆b(hˆj, j − 1) (A.3.27)
∆ωj−1 −∆ωj = (1− )(∆pj−1 −∆pj) (A.3.28)
2∑
j=0
γjp
1−
j ∆pj = 0 (A.3.29)
Eliminating ωj’s,
(
1
αh,0
− (1− )
)
∆p0 =
(
1
αh,1
− (1− )
)
∆p1 +
(
αe,1
αh,1
− αe,0
αh,0
)
∆Ae (A.3.30)(
1
αh,2
− (1− )
)
∆p2 =
(
1
αh,1
− (1− )
)
∆p1 +
(
αe,1
αh,1
− αe,2
αh,2
)
∆Ae (A.3.31)
Since 1/αh,j > (1− ) for all j’s and αe,1/αh,1 > αe,j/αh,j for j = 0, 2, it is easy to check that
∆p1 < 0 by substituting equation (A.3.30) and (A.3.31) into equation (A.3.29).
Substituting equation (A.3.30) and (A.3.31) into equation (A.3.29), we also have
[
γ0p
1−
0
(
1
αh,2
− (1− )
1
αh,0
− (1− )
)
+ γ2p
1−
2 + γ1p
1−
1
(
1
αh,2
− (1− )
1
αh,1
− (1− )
)]
∆p2
+γ0p
1−
0

(
αe,1
αh,1
− αe,0
αh,0
)
−
(
αe,1
αh,1
− αe,2
αh,2
)
1
αh,0
− (1− )
∆Ae
−γ1p1−1
αe,1
αh,1
− αe,2
αh,2
1
αh,1
− (1− )∆Ae = 0 (A.3.32)
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By assumption 6 and  < 1, we have
[
γ0p
1−
0
(
1
αh,2
− (1− )
1
αh,0
− (1− )
)
+ γ2p
1−
2 + γ1p
1−
1
(
1
αh,2
− (1− )
1
αh,1
− (1− )
)]
> 0,
γ0p
1−
0

(
αe,1
αh,1
− αe,0
αh,0
)
−
(
αe,1
αh,1
− αe,2
αh,2
)
1
αh,0
− (1− )
 = 0,
γ1p
1−
1
αe,1
αh,1
− αe,2
αh,2
1
αh,1
− (1− ) > 0,
implying ∆p2 > 0 from equation (A.3.32).
Now we show that lemma 6 implies a relative increase of software variety in the new steady
state. Note that the profits from providing software and equipment variety are given by
pis =
∑
j
1− ν
νAs
sj and pie =
∑
j
1− ν
νAe
ej.
From the FOC and using (A.3.4) (pe = 1/(νAe) and ps = 1/(νAs)), demand for equipment
and software for each task are ej = νeAeαe,jpjTj/Ne and sj = νsAsαs,jpjTj/Ns.
From lemma 3, we know pie/η = pis/η = ρ in any steady state equilibrium, and hence,
dpie = (1− ν)
[
(1− )(αe,0p−0 dp0 + αe,1p−1 dp1 + αe,2p−2 dp2)Y
+(
∑
j
αe,jp
1−
j )dY −
1
Ne
∑
j
αe,jp
1−
j Y dNe
]
= 0
dpis = (1− ν)
[
(1− )(αs,0p−0 dp0 + αs,1p−1 dp1 + αs,2p−2 dp2)Y
+(
∑
j
αs,jp
1−
j )dY −
1
Ns
∑
j
αe,jp
1−
j Y dNs
]
= 0
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Combining,
(1− )[(αe,1 − αs,1)p−1 dp1 + (αe,2 − αs,2)p−2 dp2]
=
∑
j
αe,jp
1−
j
[
dNe
Ne
− dY
Y
]
−
∑
j
αs,jp
1−
j
[
dNs
Ns
− dY
Y
]
=
∑
j
αs,jp
1−
j
[
dNe − dNs
Ns
−
(
1− Ne
Ns
)
dY
Y
]
< 0,
where the last equality is from no arbitrage condition (1.16) (Ns
Ne
=
∑
j αs,jγjp
1−
j∑
j αe,jγjp
1−
j
), and the
inequality is from lemma 6 and assumption 6.
Hence, we have
dNs > dNe + (Ne −Ns)dY
Y
.
Since decrease in the price of equipment raise the level of production, we have dY /Y > 0.
Hence, with the condition given in this proposition (Ne ≥ Ns), (Ne −Ns)dY /Y ≥ 0 and so
dNs > dNe. Finally, since Ne ≥ Ns, we have
dNs/Ns > dNe/Ne,
which was to be shown.
Proof of proposition 3 (skill demand reversal) Suppose they cross at least once. It
means that we have at least three points τa < τb < τc such that hˆ1(τa) = hˆ2(τa), hˆ1(τb) = hˆ2(τb),
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and hˆ1(τc) = hˆ2(τc). Then, we have
(
ω1(τb)/ω1(τa)
ω2(τb)/ω2(τa)
)1−αh(τa)(1−)(ω1(τb)
ω2(τb)
)(αh(τa)−αh(τb))(1−)
=
hˆ′2(τb)/hˆ
′
2(τa)
hˆ′1(τb)/hˆ
′
1(τa)
(
Ns2
Ns1
)ϕs(1−)(αs(τb)−αs(τa))
(A.3.33)(
ω1(τc)/ω1(τb)
ω2(τc)/ω2(τb)
)1−αh(τc)(1−)(ω1(τb)
ω2(τb)
)(αh(τb)−αh(τc))(1−)
=
hˆ′2(τc)/hˆ
′
2(τb)
hˆ′1(τc)/hˆ
′
1(τb)
(
Ns2
Ns1
)ϕs(1−)(αs(τc)−αs(τb))
(A.3.34)
where ϕs ≡ (1− νs)/νs.
With small enough α′h(τ), above equations can be approximated to
(
ω1(τb)/ω1(τa)
ω2(τb)/ω2(τa)
)1−αh(τa)(1−) hˆ′1(τb)/hˆ′1(τa)
hˆ′2(τb)/hˆ
′
2(τa)
≈
(
Ns2
Ns1
)ϕs(1−)(αs(τb)−αs(τa))
(A.3.35)(
ω1(τc)/ω1(τb)
ω2(τc)/ω2(τb)
)1−αh(τc)(1−) hˆ′1(τc)/hˆ′1(τb)
hˆ′2(τc)/hˆ
′
2(τb)
≈
(
Ns2
Ns1
)ϕs(1−)(αs(τc)−αs(τb))
(A.3.36)
Again, since matching function is continuous and monotone, and b(h, τ) is log supermodular,
signs of log of LHS in both equation (A.3.35) and (A.3.36) should be different. However, since
αs(τ) is strictly increasing, signs of log of RHS in equation (A.3.35) and (A.3.36) are same,
which is contradiction.
Finally, to show hˆ2(τ) < hˆ1(τ) for τ ∈ (0, τ¯), recall that equilibrium condition (A.3.17)
implies
(
ω1(τ¯)/ω1(0)
ω2(τ¯)/ω2(0)
)1−αh(τ¯)(1−) hˆ′1(τ¯)/hˆ′1(0)
hˆ′2(τ¯)/hˆ
′
2(0)
=
((
Ns2
Ns1
)ϕs ω2(0)
ω1(0)
)(1−)(αs(τ¯)−αs(0))
(A.3.37)
Since (1− )(αs(τ¯)−αs(0)) > 0 and Ns2 > Ns1, we have to have ω1(τ¯)/ω1(0) > ω2(τ¯)/ω2(0),
which implies hˆ2(τ) > hˆ1(τ).
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A.4 Numerical Examples: Continuous Tasks
To illustrate the comparative statics, we provide some numerical examples. For this example,
we set:
b(h, τ) = h− τ, M(h) = 1− h
−a
1− h¯−a , γ(τ) = 1,
αe(τ) = −2.5(τ − .5)2 + .6, and αs(τ) = .3τ + .025.
For the parameter values, we use τ¯ = 1, h¯ = 4, dτ = .005, a = 2.5,  = 0.7, νs = 0.65,
νs = .8, ηs = ηe = As = Ae = 1, θ = 1, and ρ = .03.
In the inner loop, we solve static equilibrium given Ns and Ne. The equilibrium assignment
function is computed from equation (1.9) to (1.11). Specifically, we use hˆ(0) = 1 and guess
hˆ′(0) and ω(0). With the guess, differential equation is solved using finite difference method.
We iterate until hˆ(1) = 4 and
∫
p(τ)1−dτ = 1 using Gauss-Newton method.
Then in the outer loop, we search for Ns and Ne that equate pis/ηs = pie/ηe = ρ, again
using Gauss-Newton method.
Factor intensities and the equilibrium assignment function in this example are shown in
figure A1. The equipment intensity αe(τ) is increasing on τ ∈ [0, 0.5] and decreasing on
τ ∈ [0.5, 1], while the software intensity αs(τ) is increasing from 0 to 1. We can also see that
the equilibrium assignment function hˆ(τ) is strictly increasing on τ .
Now we compare equilibrium with Ae = 1 and Ae = 5 in figure A2. The assignment
function in the original equilibrium (with Ae = 1), in the static equilibrium (with Ae = 5)
and the new steady state (with Ae = 5) are depicted in figure A2(a). As expected from
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proposition 1 through proposition 3, we see that the assignment function in the static
equilibrium (blue line) cross with the original assignment function (black line) at the middle
of τ . The assignment function in the steady state (red line) is generally located above the
assignment function in static equilibrium (blue line).
To see the changes in the employment structure more clearly, we also plot changes in
the employment share by skill percentile in figure A2(b), similar to the graph shown in
figure 1.2(a). To be specific, the horizontal axis shows the tasks (τˆ(h)) corresponding to
each percentile in the skill distribution M, and the vertical axis shows the changes in the
employment share of those tasks from the original equilibrium to new static equilibrium (blue
line) and from the new static equilibrium to new steady state (red line). For example, the
first two points on the horizontal axis is two task τˆ1(h1) and τˆ1(h2) where τˆ1 represents the
original (inverse) assignment function and h1 = 1 and h2 = M−1(1). Then the first point
on the blue line is difference between M(hˆ2(τˆ1(h1)))−M(hˆ2(τˆ1(h2)) and M(h2)−M(h1),
where hˆ2 is the assignment function in the static equilibrium corresponding to Ae = 5.
Figure A1: Factor intensities and assignment function
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(b) Assignment function hˆ(τ)
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Figure A2: Equilibrium comparison with Ae = 1 and Ae = 5
(a) Assignment function hˆ(τ)
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(b) Changes in employment by skill percentile
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For the relative size of software variety to equipment variety, it was initially .74 in the
original equilibrium, and increases to .77 in the new steady state, which is about 6% increase.
CES Task Production To characterize the analytical results, we assume unitary elasticity
between labor and capital. However, the crucial characteristic is that the elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital is greater than the elasticity of substitution between
tasks (). Furthermore, we expect that task production need not be Cobb-Douglas in
generating responses consistent with propositions 1 to 3, at least numerically.
What could we expect if the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is different
from one? We predict that the larger the elasticity of substitution between labor and
equipment becomes, the higher the polarization effect would appear. We also expect that the
skill demand reversal effect (decreasing high-skill demand) and the rise of software would be
enhanced as the elasticity of substitution between labor and software increases.
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Figure A3: Equilibrium comparison with Ae = 1 and Ae = 5: CES task production
(a) Changes in employment with σe = 1.2
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(b) Changes in employment with σs = 1.2
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Intuitively, when the elasticity of substitution between equipment and labor is greater
than one, a decrease in the price of equipment lowers the demand for middle-skill tasks not
only through the adjustment in the assignment but also through the adjustment between
labor and equipment within a task. Additionally, when the elasticity of substitution between
software and labor is greater than one, corresponding increases in software would substitute
high-skill labor more than before.
To confirm the intuition, we provide several numerical illustrations in figure A3 (details can
be found in appendix A.4). As expected, the magnitude of the decreasing middle increases as
σe increases, and the decrease in high-skill demand is enhanced as σs increases.
A.5 Data Construction for Section 1.5
For relative employment by industry, we use a ratio of employment of routine occupations and
employment of cognitive occupations. Routine occupations include machine operators, office
and sales, mechanics, construction and production, and transportation occupations. Cognitive
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occupations are management, professionals, and technicians. The level of employment is
obtained from Census 1980, 1990, and 2000, and American Community Survey (ACS) 2010,
received from IPUMS. We made a concordance between consistent industry code ind1990
and indnaics using employment in Census 2000. Then employment by indnaics is merged
into 61 BEA industry code based on a concordance between BEA industry code and NAICS.
The price of equipment and software by industry is from Section 2 of Fixed Asset Table
from BEA. The price index is constructed by dividing nominal investment by real investment.
We use private non-residential equipment investment by industry for the benchmark, although
other series (e.g. industrial equipment) also give similar results.
For growth of software innovation, we use log difference of own account software investment
by industry, which captures software investment made in-house by firms. We believe this as
a good proxy for software innovation, as in-house software investment is made to develop
new software for firm’s production process.
It is not straightforward to measure R&D for equipment related innovation from industry
level data, as BEA records R&D expenditures only by sources of funds. We think that R&D
expenditures funded by equipment producing industries are likely to be used for equipment
related innovation, but they should be only a subset of total equipment related innovations.
It is also likely that most of these expenditures are used by equipment producing industries,
not others, which makes it difficult to capture industry variation. Therefore, we use total
R&D expenditures other than software as a benchmark series for Ne, and examine robustness
using many different combinations of R&D data. All combinations, including a case with
own-account software only, show similar positive relation against relative price.
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A.6 Calibration Procedure
This section describes the detailed calibration procedure. We normalize exogenous variables
Mj’s, Ae, and As to one in 1980.
1. We start from hˆj’s that correspond to employment share of occupation j in 1980 and
fix , σs and σe arbitrarily.
2. By indifference between tasks at the threshold level of skills, we have
wj
wj−1
=
hˆj − χj−1
hˆj − χj
,
and so wj = w0
∏j
k=1(hˆk − χk−1)/(hˆk − χk). Therefore, payroll share of occupation j is
given by ∏j
k=1(hˆk − χk−1)/(hˆk − χk)
∫ hˆj
hˆj−1
(h− χj)h−a−1dh∑
j
∏j
k=1(hˆk − χk−1)/(hˆk − χk)
∫ hˆj
hˆj−1
(h− χj)h−a−1dh
.
We set 8 parameters χj ’s and 1 parameter a to minimize distance between payroll share
in data and the model for 9 occupations.
3. Guess αj,e and αj,s. We find γj’s that match with hˆj’s in equilibrium.
4. We iterate over αj,e and αj,s untill aggregate labor share, Ej and Sj in the model match
with aggregate labor share, equipment and software investment by occupation in data.
5. We solve for Mj’s for routine occupations (j = 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8) to match employment
share of routine occupations in data. Note that we already have different values of Ae
and As for each period obtained from data.
6. Iterate over σs and σe so that labor share with and without software match with trend
implied level in 2010.
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7. Iterate over  so as to minimize an average distance between changes in payroll share
by occupation in the model and data.
The procedure gives all the parameters needed to be calibrated. For νe and νs, we use
estimated value as described in the section 1.6.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Tables and Figures Not Included in Text
Const FIRE Health High
serv.
Low
serv.
Dur Mine Non-
durable
Trade Comp-
uter
σ = .1 1.577 1.260 1.497 1.579 1.447 1.222 1.423 1.462 1.505 1.828
σ = .5 1.593 1.245 1.473 1.546 1.436 1.225 1.422 1.473 1.480 1.825
σ = .7 1.624 1.229 1.444 1.506 1.423 1.234 1.426 1.498 1.451 1.825
σ = .815 1.699 1.213 1.413 1.461 1.415 1.263 1.445 1.559 1.419 1.840
Table B1: Calibrated ρi’s across various σ’s
For each value of σ, the ρi’s are calibrated as explained in Section 2.4.1 except that σ is fixed. We found that
for values of σ above its benchmark value of 0.815, the model fit quickly becomes exponentially poor with no
solution as it approaches 1. The reason is that occupation-specific productivities Mj become so large that it
becomes impossible to simultaneously match employment share changes and measured TFP by industry.
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Output Productivity
Data Model Data Model
1980- 3.41 3.81 0.43∗ 0.85
1990- 3.75 3.28 1.26 0.73
2000- 1.54 1.30 0.44 0.34
Table B2: Model Fit to Aggregate Output and Productivity
Data source: BEA NIPA. ∗Although average productivity growth seems low in the data for the 1980s, this is
more of a cyclical phenomena in the early 1980s that persisted from the late 1970s. For example, average
productivity growth from 1982-1990 is 1.18%.
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Figure B1: Factor income shares by industry: model vs. data
In the model, traditional capital income shares are computed by first fixing that of the computer industry’s
to 1980 data as explained in Section 2.4.1, and then calibrating them for all other industries using a method
of moments. Data traditional capital income shares are computed by applying the procedure in Section 2.4.1
too all industries in 1980. All data from BEA NIPA and FAT.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 The Data
C.1.1 Data sources
We use National Accounts data of countries following SNA 08, which are AUS, AUT, BEL,
CAN, CHE, CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, EST, FRA, FIN, GBR, GRC, HUN, IRL, ISL, ISR, ITA,
KOR, LUX, MEX, NLD, NOR, NZL, POL, PRT, SVK, SVN, SWE, and USA. Data are
from either OECD statistics or National statistical offices, which gives longer or conceptually
more accurate series. The data sources are summarized in table C1 and C2.
C.1.2 Investment
We classify type of investments by traditional and IPP. Traditional investment includes
dwellings, other buildings and structures, and equipments & weapon systems. We exclude
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Table C1: National sources
Country Name of Institution Name of Table
AUS Australian Bureau of Statistics Australian System of National Accounts
AUT Statistics Austria National Accounts
BEL NBB statistics National Accounts
CAN Statistics Canada System of macroeconomic accounts
CHE Swiss Statistics National Accounts
CZE Czech Statistical Office National Accounts
DNK Statistics Denmark National accounts and government finances
DEU Statistisches Bundesamt National Accounts
ESP National Statistics Institute National Accounts
EST Statistics Estonia National Accounts
FIN Statistics Finland National Accounts
FRA National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies National Accounts
GBR Office for National Statistics National Accounts
GRC Hellenic Statistical Authority National Accounts
HUN Hungarian Central Statistical Office Integrated economic accounts
IRL Central Statistical Office National Accounts
ISL Statistics Iceland National Accounts
ISR Bank of Israel National Accounts
ITA Italian National Institute of Statistics National Accounts
KOR Bank of Korea National Accounts
LUX Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg National Accounts
NLD Statistics Netherlands Macroeconomics table
NOR Statistics Norway National Accounts
NZL Statistics New Zealand National Accounts
POL Central Statistical Office of Poland National Accounts
PRT Statistics Portugal National Accounts
SVK Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic Macroeconomic Statistics
SVN Statistical Office RS National Accounts
SWE Statistics Sweden National Accounts
USA Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Account
OECD OECD Statistics National Accounts
cultivated biological resources from both classification of which shares in total investments is
less than 1% on average.
Since statistical office does not provide real value of traditional investment, we construct
it from subitems – dwellings, other buildings and structures, and equilpments & weapon
systems – using Törnqvist index. Specifically, price change of traditional investment (piTt ) is
piTt = ω
R
t pi
R
t + ω
S
t pi
S
t + ω
E
t pi
E
t ,
[154]
Table C2: Data sources by country
Variables
CE MI GVA SE5) Pc NI RI NK RK CFC D
AUS NS NS NS – NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
AUT OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD –
BEL OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD –
CAN OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD NS – OECD –
CHE OECD OECD OECD – OECD OECD OECD NS NS OECD –
CZE OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD –
DEU OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD NS NS OECD –
DNK NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS –
ESP OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD – – OECD –
EST OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD –
FRA OECD OECD OECD – OECD OECD OECD NS OECD OECD NS
FIN OECD NS OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD NS –
GBR NS NS NS OECD NS OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD NS
GRC OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD –
HUN OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD –
IRL OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD –
ISL OECD – OECD – OECD OECD OECD – – OECD –
ISR OECD OECD4) OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD –
ITA OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD –
KOR OECD OECD4) OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD NS NS NS –
LUX OECD – OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD – – –
MEX OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD – – OECD –
NLD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD –
NOR OECD NS OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD – NS –
NZL OECD OECD4) OECD OECD OECD OECD NS NS OECD NS –
POL OECD NS OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD NS –
PRT OECD OECD OECD – OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD –
SVK OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD –
SVN OECD OECD OECD – OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD –
SWE NS NS NS OECD NS NS NS OECD OECD NS –
USA NS NS NS – NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
Notes: 1) CE: compensation of employees, MI: gross mixed income, GVA: gross value added at basic price,
SE: total employment / (total employment - # of self employee), Pc: price index of private consumption, NI:
nominal investment by type, RI: real investment by type, NK: nominal net capital stock by type, RI: real net
capital stock by type, CFC: consumption of fixed capital from income account, D: consumption of fixed
capital by type.
2) NS refers to national source.
3) Marked as OECD when OECD series and NS series are same.
4) Gross operational surplus of households sector is used instead of MI for ISR, KOR, and NZL.
5) SE is used (and appeared here) only when it is longer available than mixed income.
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where R, S, E refer to dwellings (R), other buildings and structures (S), and equipments
& weapon systems (E), ω refer to two-year moving average of nominal share of each item
in total investments, and pi’s refer to price changes. Then the price index of traditional
investment is given by P Tt =
∏t
i=0(1 + pi
T
i ), with pi
T
0 = 0. Nominal investment is simply sum
of subitems (ITt = I
R
t + I
S
t + I
E
t ) and real investment is nominal investment divided by price
index (XTt = I
T
t /P
T
t ).
C.1.3 Depreciation rates
Depreciation rates is defined as consumption of fixed capital divided by capital stock at end
of previous year. When both real value of consumption of fixed capital (CFC) and capital
stock data are available, we use data (AUS, GBR, and USA) where real value of traditional
capital and traditional consumption of fixed capital are constructed using Törnqvist index as
above. When only nominal value of CFC is available (FRA), depreciation rate is obtained by
δit =
NCFCit
NKit−1 × PKit/PKit−1
,
where NCFC is nominal CFC in data, NK is nominal capital in data, and PK is price of
capital in data for IPP and Törnqvist index for traditional, and i ∈ {T, IPP}.
However, most countries do not provide CFC data by asset type. For these countries, we
consider two estimates of CFC from data. Firstly, we can estimate real value of CFC by asset
type using
ˆRCFC
i
t = RK
i
t−1 +X
i
t −RKit ,
where RK is real value of capital, X is real value of investments, and i ∈ {T, IPP}. It
is worth noting that price of capital is different from price of investment in data since all
subitems in each category differ in terms of both depreciation rates and price changes. When
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RK is not available in data (e.g. CAN, ESP, ISL, LUX, MEX, and NOR), however, we use
price of investment for price of capital.
Secondly, we can estimate nominal value of CFC by
ˆNCFC
i
t = NK
i
t−1 ×
PKit
PKit−1
+ I it −NK it ,
where NK is nominal capital, I is nominal investments, and i ∈ {T, IPP}. Note that
ˆNCFC/ ˆRCFC is not simply PK since price of investment and capital are different.
The prices of CFC, capital, and investment are all different since composition of subitems
are different. In this sense, RCFC should be better measure for true depreciation rates than
NCFC. However, we can use more information with NCFC, which is total CFC that can be
obtained from income accounts. Specifically, we can obtain one of NCFC as residual from
total CFC of income accounts, for example, ˆNCFC
T
t = CFCt − ˆNCFC
IPP
t .
Note that dep rates are actually stable for countries with CFC data available, but CFC
estimated above could fluctuate due to re-valuation and inventory adjustment. Hence, in
practice, we plot depreciation rates from both ˆRCFC and ˆNCFC, and then chooses dep
rates that are more stable. If they are similar, we went with RCFC. The countries with
RCFC are AUT, CHE, DEU, FIN, GRC, HUN, ISR, ITA, LUX, NLD, and PRT. Those with
NCFC are BEL, CAN, CZE, EST, IRL, KOR, NOR, NZL, POL, SVK, SVN, and SWE.
C.1.4 Capital
Depending on methods of getting depreciation rates, it is possible that RK in data is not
compatible with implied depreciation rates. Importantly, this includes cases where we get
depreciation rates from CFC data. This is because in data, capital is adjusted for revaluation
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and inventories, where gross fixed capital formation does not include them. To make capital
series to be compatible with investment data in a standard model sense, we construct real
value of capital as following.
Kit+1 = (1− δit)Kit +X it , (C.1.1)
with Ki0 being nominal capital data of base year.
Note that above methods require estimated δ which requires data for capital and investment.
In many countries, however, we have longer investment series available than capital series.
For these countries (AUT, CAN, CHE, CZE, ESP, EST, FIN, FRA, GBR, ISL, ITA, KOR,
LUX, MEX, NLD, POL, PRT, SVK, SVN, and SWE), it could be useful to consider extension
of capital series.
With X it given as data, what we need is δ
i
t for those years without capital data. For the
depreciation rates, we use fitted value obtained from the following regression.
δij,t = βj + γ log(GDP per capitaj,t) + εj,t,
where j refers each country. To make GDP per capita comparable across countries, we use
constant PPP rates obtained from PWT 8.1.37
With estimated depreciation rates δˆj,t at hands, we can get capital series by computing
Kit =
Kit+1 −X it
1− δˆit
. (C.1.2)
The problem with this method, however, is that it is very sensitive to even very small error in
base year because errors are accumulated across the extension. To be precise, when NK0 in
37 To be specific, PPP rates (pppr) is obtained from pppr = q gdp/rgdpo, where q gdp is real GDP in
national currency from NA data of PWT 8.1 and rgdpo is output-side real GDP at chained PPPs. We then
multiply 1/pppr to our series of real GDP with SNA 08. We assume ppprt=pppr2011 for t > 2011.
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data is a little bit different from K0 that could have been obtained if we had data for K−10,
estimated Kˆ−10 from NK0 can be very different from true K−10 because the small difference
in time 0 is accumulated from t = 0 to t = −10. To see this more clearly, it is useful to see
an example.
Figure C1 compares K from equation (C.1.1) with K0 = K1929 (call this K1, a blue line)
and K from equation (C.1.2) with K0 = K2005 (call this K2, a red line). Because of reasons
stated above, K1 is not exactly same with Kt in data. Since we use exactly same δt, K1 has
to be equal to K2 if K12005 = K2005. However, K1 is a little bit different from K at 2005
and this makes K2 a lot different from K1 as time goes back.
One way to mitigate this problem is to set a restriction on the initial movement of capital.
Since errors are accumulated, magnitude of K1/K0 becomes really big (either positive or
negative as can be seen in graphs) if there was an error in base period. By restricting K1/K0
to be a reasonably small number (e.g. fitted growth rate of capital against log GDP per
capita), we can mitigate the exploision problem as can be seen by a black line in figure C1.
Precisely, the black line is obtaind by equation (C.1.1), with
Ki1 = gˆ
i
0K
i
0, K
i
1 = (1− δˆi0)Ki0 +X i0 → Ki0 =
X i0
gˆi0 + δˆ
i
0
, (C.1.3)
where gˆi0 and δˆ
i
0 are fitted growth rate and depreciation rate of capital against log GDP
per capita. Note that the assumption we use is not a steady state assumption because we
use estimated depreciation rates that are fluctuating over time. Rather, our assumption is
simply stating that the growth rate of capital from the initial period to next period is set to
fitted growth rate. From then on, we use exactly same procedure of making capital series via
equation (C.1.1) using freely moving depreciation rates, δˆjt .
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Figure C1: Extended capital by different methods
(a) Traditional, USA (b) IPP, USA
(c) Traditional, AUS (d) IPP, AUS
Notes: Benchmark: K ′ = K(1 − δ) + X with K0 =data, Method 1: K = (K ′ − X)/(1 − δ) for t < 2005,
Method 2: K ′ = K(1− δ) +X with K0 = X0/(g + δ).
In practice, we plot capital series obtained from equation (C.1.2) (method 1), and if capital
series go up or become negative as time goes back, we use the restriction (C.1.3) (method 2).
As a result, we apply method 2 to traditional capital of NLD, ITA, and PRT, and to IPP
capital of AUT, CAN, CZE, EST, FRA, GBR, IRL, ITA, NLD, POL, SVK, SVN and SWE.
We have three countries in our sample with no capital stock available in data (ESP, ISL,
and MEX). For these countries, we set initial level of capital as a fitted value from the
[160]
following regression,
log
(
Ki
Y
)
= β + γ log(GDP per capitaj,t) + εj,t,
and then apply equation (C.1.1). Since Mexico gives decreasing IPP capital near initial
period, we apply method 2 (equation (C.1.3)) for IPP capital of Mexico.
C.1.5 Labor Share
We adjust for mixed income following Koh, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Yu (2015) in constructing
our baseline labor share. To begin with, we classify Gross Domestic Income into unambiguous
capital income (UCI), unambiguous income (UI), and ambiguous income (AI). Unambiguous
capital income (UCI) is the gross operating surplus (GOS) which does not include gross
mixed income (GMI) in the National Accounts. Note that both gross operating surplus and
gross mixed income includes consumption of fixed capital. Adding compensation of employees
(CE) to unambiguous capital income (UCI), we get unambiguous income (UI=UCI+CE).
Ambiguous income is income other than UI, which is sum of gross mixed income and tax
net of subsidy (AI=GMI+Tax-Sub). We assume gross capital income share in ambiguous
income is same as gross capital income share of unambiguous income. Then the total capital
income can be obtained by summing up unambiguous capital income and capital income in
ambiguous income (KI=UCI+θ×AI, θ =UCI/UI). Finally, labor share is one minus capital
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share which is capital income divided by total income (LS=1-KI/GDI).
Unambiguous Capital Income, UCI = GOS
Unambiguous Income, UI = CE+ UCI
Ambiguous Income, AI = GMI+ Tax− Sub
Capital Income, KI = UCI+ AI× θ, θ = UCI/UI
Labor Share, LS = 1− KI
UI+ AI
= 1− KI
GDI
(C.1.4)
The differences between ours and Koh, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Yu (2015) are that we do not
adjust for Business Current Transfer Payments in gross operating surplus due to limited data
availability (table C3) and that we use gross operating surplus not net operating surplus.
However, the Business Current Transfer Payments is only 0.5% of GDI on average and
does not affect trend of labor share. The BEA only provides proprietor’s income excluding
consumption of fixed capital, i.e net mixed income. Hence we have to use net labor share to get
accurate labor income of proprietors for US. Net capital income share of unambiguous income
is θ˜=NOS/(CE+NOS) and so total capital income becomes KI=NOS+θ˜×NMI+θ×(Tax-
Sub)+DEP, where θ is gross capital share and θ˜ is net labor share. Labor share is then
computed by LS=1-KI/GDI.
To avoid confusion, we call net operating surplus excluding net proprietor’s income as net
operating surplus (NOS). Note, however, that Net operating surplus in NIPA table includes
(net) proprietor’s income so that net operating surplus in NIPA table is different from what
we call NOS here (see table C3).
In cases where longer series of self employee are available (i.e. AUT, BEL, CAN, CHE,
CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, EST, FIN, GRC, IRL, ISR, ITA, KOR, MEX, NLD, NOR, NZL,
POL, PRT, and SVK), we extend labor share in equation (C.1.4) with self employee adjusted
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labor share as
LSt−1 = LSt × (LSSEt−1/LSSEt ),
where LSSE = CEGDI-(Tax-Sub) × Total employmentTotal employment - # of self employees . In words, LSSE is labor share
adjusted with assumption that average wage of self employees is same with that of employees.
Since average wage of self employees is usually less than that of employees, LSSE is likely to
overestimate the level of labor share. However, LSSE gives similar pattern with our baseline
labor share and we only reflect changes in labor share to extend our baseline labor share
which we believe the best measure for labor share in the economy. The exceptions are LUX
and ISL where only LSSE is available (LUX) or neither MI nor SE is available (ISL).
An adjustment of IPP effects on labor share is as following. From the standard represen-
tative firm’s profit maximizing problem, we have
Rit+1 = (1 + rt+1)
1
V it
− (1− δit+1)
1
V it
,
Table C3: Structure of income account: BEA NIPA and OECD National Accounts
BEA NIPA (USA) OECD NA
GDI GDI
Compensation of employ (CE) Compensation of employ (CE)
Taxes (Tax) Taxes (Tax)
Subsidies (Sub) Subsidies (Sub)
Net operating surplus (NOS+NMI)
Net intersts
Business current transfer payments
Proprietor’s income (NMI) Gross operating surplus (GOS)
Rental income Gross mixed income (GMI)
Corporate profits
Current surplus of government enterprises
Consumption of fixed capital (DEP)
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where R is gross return, r is net return, V i = P c/P i, and i ∈ {T, IPP}. Also, labor share in
data can be expressed as
LS = 1− R
TKT
Y
− R
IPPKIPP
Y
,
from any constant returns to scale production function.
Assuming common net return for T and IPP (i.e. no arbitrage), these constitute three
equations for three unknowns RT , RIPP , and r. Then the labor share without IPP (LST ) is
obtained by
LST = 1− R
TKT
Y −RIPPKIPP .
Note that this adjustment is available only when our capital series are available. Since
capital was extended up to a point with investment data available, we have LST whenever
investment data are available. However, for some countries in our sample, labor share data
covers longer periods than investments. To extend LST up to a point when LS data starts,
we estimate following regression.
difj,t = βj + γ log(GDP per capitaj,t) + εj,t,
where difj,t = LS
T
LS
− 1 = RIPPKIPP
Y
. Then extended LST is computed by
LˆS
T
j,t = LSj,t × (1 + ˆdif j,t).
C.2 Growth Accounting Results
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Table C4: Growth Accounting with χ = 1
Growth rates Percent explained time
country y h k z tfp h k z tfp s t
AUS 1.51 0.10 0.70 0.14 0.57 6.4 46.2 9.4 38.0 1985 2012
AUT 1.39 0.34 0.41 0.17 0.47 24.3 29.6 12.3 33.8 1977 2014
BEL 0.66 0.24 0.20 0.14 0.09 36.2 30.2 20.6 13.0 1996 2014
CAN 1.14 0.36 0.63 0.11 0.04 31.2 55.7 9.4 3.7 1982 2010
CHE 0.91 0.17 0.00 0.16 0.57 19.1 0.3 17.5 63.2 1995 2013
CZE 2.47 0.25 1.06 0.04 1.12 10.0 42.9 1.8 45.4 1994 2014
DEU 0.57 0.17 0.25 0.08 0.06 30.2 44.7 14.9 10.2 1992 2014
DNK 1.74 0.38 0.64 0.20 0.53 21.6 36.9 11.4 30.2 1967 2013
ESP 0.47 0.39 1.08 0.13 -1.13 83.4 230.8 27.1 -241.3 1996 2011
EST 5.17 0.49 2.45 0.21 2.01 9.4 47.5 4.1 39.0 1996 2013
FIN 1.87 0.46 0.55 0.52 0.34 24.6 29.2 28.0 18.3 1976 2014
FRA 2.29 0.47 0.91 0.15 0.77 20.5 39.5 6.4 33.6 1961 2014
GBR 1.70 0.42 0.76 0.13 0.39 24.8 44.8 7.5 23.0 1981 2014
GRC 0.78 0.36 1.42 0.07 -1.08 46.4 181.3 9.5 -137.2 1996 2013
HUN 1.82 0.47 0.44 0.20 0.71 26.0 24.3 11.0 38.7 1996 2013
IRL 3.48 0.27 1.70 0.45 1.05 7.9 48.9 13.0 30.3 1996 2013
ISL 1.98 0.45 1.11 0.09 0.34 22.4 56.1 4.4 17.1 1998 2011
ISR 1.12 0.44 0.21 0.02 0.45 39.1 18.6 1.8 40.5 1996 2014
ITA 1.18 0.53 0.55 0.07 0.03 45.0 46.9 5.7 2.4 1971 2014
KOR 4.30 0.87 2.57 0.40 0.45 20.2 59.8 9.4 10.5 1970 2013
LUX 0.63 0.56 0.25 0.23 -0.41 89.3 39.9 36.7 -65.8 1997 2012
MEX 0.72 0.25 1.57 0.00 -1.10 35.0 219.0 -0.3 -153.6 2004 2011
NLD 0.69 0.29 0.45 0.15 -0.20 42.0 64.7 22.1 -28.8 1981 2014
NOR 2.46 0.38 0.60 0.17 1.30 15.5 24.4 7.1 53.0 1971 2013
NZL 0.41 0.04 0.91 0.15 -0.68 9.5 219.1 35.6 -164.2 1972 2011
POL 3.24 0.43 1.60 0.07 1.14 13.3 49.3 2.1 35.2 1996 2013
PRT 0.91 0.49 0.96 0.06 -0.60 53.9 105.3 6.7 -65.9 1996 2013
SVK 2.81 0.41 0.41 0.06 1.93 14.7 14.5 2.2 68.6 1996 2013
SVN 2.11 0.29 0.55 0.11 1.14 14.0 26.3 5.4 54.3 1996 2013
SWE 2.14 0.20 0.90 0.09 0.96 9.1 41.8 4.4 44.7 1993 2013
USA 1.63 0.36 0.56 0.13 0.57 22.3 34.5 8.1 35.0 1950 2014
OECD 1.75 0.37 0.85 0.15 0.38 20.9 48.6 8.7 21.8
Notes: Growth rates are computed by 100× (ln(xt)− ln(xs))/(t− s), where t and s refers to final and initial
point. OECD refers to average.
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Table C5: Growth Accounting with χ = χˆ
Growth rates Percent explained time
country y h k z tfp h k z tfp s t
AUS 1.51 0.10 0.70 0.08 0.63 6.6 46.0 5.4 42.0 1985 2012
AUT 1.39 0.35 0.41 0.08 0.55 25.0 29.5 5.7 39.9 1977 2014
BEL 0.66 0.25 0.20 0.06 0.16 37.6 30.1 8.7 23.7 1996 2014
CAN 1.14 0.37 0.63 0.05 0.10 32.1 55.4 4.2 8.3 1982 2010
CHE 0.91 0.18 0.00 0.07 0.66 20.0 0.3 7.3 72.4 1995 2013
CZE 2.47 0.25 1.06 0.03 1.14 10.3 42.7 1.1 46.0 1994 2014
DEU 0.57 0.18 0.25 0.03 0.10 31.3 44.4 6.0 18.4 1992 2014
DNK 1.74 0.39 0.64 0.07 0.64 22.3 36.6 4.3 36.7 1967 2013
ESP 0.47 0.40 1.08 0.06 -1.06 85.4 229.5 12.0 -226.9 1996 2011
EST 5.17 0.49 2.45 0.14 2.09 9.5 47.4 2.7 40.4 1996 2013
FIN 1.87 0.47 0.54 0.27 0.58 25.2 29.1 14.6 31.2 1976 2014
FRA 2.29 0.49 0.90 0.06 0.84 21.4 39.1 2.7 36.8 1961 2014
GBR 1.70 0.43 0.76 0.07 0.44 25.4 44.6 3.9 26.1 1981 2014
GRC 0.78 0.37 1.41 0.04 -1.04 47.5 180.0 4.8 -132.3 1996 2013
HUN 1.82 0.48 0.44 0.12 0.78 26.4 24.2 6.6 42.8 1996 2013
IRL 3.48 0.29 1.69 0.20 1.30 8.3 48.7 5.7 37.4 1996 2013
ISL 1.98 0.46 1.11 0.03 0.38 23.0 56.1 1.8 19.1 1998 2011
ISR 1.12 0.47 0.21 0.00 0.45 41.5 18.3 0.4 39.8 1996 2014
ITA 1.18 0.54 0.55 0.03 0.06 46.0 46.6 2.5 4.9 1971 2014
KOR 4.30 0.89 2.55 0.23 0.63 20.8 59.3 5.3 14.6 1970 2013
LUX 0.63 0.58 0.25 0.09 -0.29 91.4 39.8 14.7 -45.8 1997 2012
MEX 0.72 0.25 1.57 0.00 -1.10 35.1 218.9 -0.2 -153.8 2004 2011
NLD 0.69 0.30 0.44 0.05 -0.11 43.7 64.2 7.3 -15.3 1981 2014
NOR 2.46 0.39 0.60 0.07 1.40 16.0 24.2 2.8 57.0 1971 2013
NZL 0.41 0.04 0.91 0.07 -0.60 9.7 218.9 17.3 -145.9 1972 2011
POL 3.24 0.44 1.59 0.04 1.17 13.5 49.1 1.3 36.1 1996 2013
PRT 0.91 0.50 0.96 0.03 -0.58 54.8 104.8 3.8 -63.5 1996 2013
SVK 2.81 0.42 0.40 0.04 1.94 14.9 14.4 1.5 69.1 1996 2013
SVN 2.11 0.30 0.55 0.06 1.20 14.3 26.1 2.7 56.8 1996 2013
SWE 2.14 0.21 0.89 0.05 1.00 9.6 41.6 2.3 46.5 1993 2013
USA 1.63 0.38 0.56 0.05 0.65 23.1 34.3 3.1 39.5 1950 2014
OECD 1.75 0.38 0.85 0.07 0.45 21.5 48.4 4.2 26.0
Notes: Growth rates are computed by 100× (ln(xt)− ln(xs))/(t− s), where t and s refers to final and initial
point. OECD refers to average.
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